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ARTICLE
ANTI-SLAPP CONFABULATION AND
THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
STEVEN J. ANDRÉ∗

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a lawsuit filed by concerned citizens to challenge a
religious monument erected by a public entity in violation of the
Establishment Clause. The United States Supreme Court has recognized
the government’s ability to place such monuments, and to refuse others,
is within its power as government speech.1 Now picture the same
government agency, relying upon a statutory provision
granting
protection for the exercise of free speech and petition rights, responds to
the lawsuit with an anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation
(“anti-SLAPP”) motion to strike. The basis for the motion is that the
challenged government action is government speech protected pursuant
to a State anti-SLAPP statute, such as California’s Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16.2
Assuming the government speech is protected by the statute, the
only question for anti-SLAPP purposes is the second prong of the

∗
Adjunct Professor, Lincoln Law School, Attorney, Carmel, California, J.D. University of
California, Hastings College of Law, 1987; B.A. Political Science, B.A. Legal Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, 1983.
1
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
2
Establishment Clause cases typically involve statements by government agents: the
erection of monuments, religious symbols and prayers—all of which would potentially qualify for
protection under the literal wording of CAL. CODE CIV.PROC. § 425.16(e)(3) (“written or oral
statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue
of public interest”) or CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §425.16(e)(4) (“conduct in furtherance of the exercise
of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.”).
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analysis—whether the plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that a
government violation exists.3
So, let us go the next step. Imagine the government agency above
prevailed on its motion to strike and obtained an award of its attorney’s
fees: $15,000 in the trial court and an additional $45,000 after an appeal.
Why stop there? Some state statutes allow a statutory penalty of $5,000
against the losing plaintiffs and $10,000 more against their attorneys.4
The illogic of such an extension of anti-SLAPP protection to
government agencies should crystallize at this point. It renders every
separation challenge subject to a government motion to strike and a
potential award of fees against the public interest litigant seeking to
uphold the vital First Amendment distinction between church and state.
The chilling effect upon litigants of facing an anti-SLAPP motion and
potentially paying the government agency’s attorney’s fees and penalties
is enormous.
California was the first state to find judicial acceptance of the notion
that government may avail itself of anti-SLAPP protections against
private citizens who petition for redress of grievances. It is the purpose
of this article to explore the judicial entrenchment of such a misguided
balancing of government interests against constitutional rights, and to
illustrate why it is shortsighted and a very harmful misinterpretation of
otherwise very worthy and beneficial statutes.
I.

THE OBJECTIVE OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES—PROTECTING
CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Over the course of the last century, First Amendment jurisprudence
gradually came to accept a marketplace of ideas paradigm ennobling
private speech and other First Amendment activity as critical to the
functioning of the democratic process.5 Anti-SLAPP legislation has been
enacted nationally to curtail abusive use of litigation to suppress such
vital First Amendment activity. Anti-SLAPP laws were conceived to
prevent misuse of the legal process as a weapon to discourage petitioning

3

Anti-SLAPP motion analysis proceeds in two-prongs: The primary legal inquiry is
whether the basis of the plaintiff’s lawsuit is activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The
secondary legal inquiry is only reached after the first prong is satisfied. It shifts the burden to the
plaintiff to establish probable cause for the cause of action. Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 712
(Cal. 2007).
4
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §4.24.525(6)(a) (requiring additional mandatory $10,000
award plus sanctions on plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel).
5
Steven J. Andre, The Transformation of Freedom of Speech: Unsnarling the Twisted Roots
of Citizens United v. FEC, 44 J. MARSHALL L.REV. 69, 127 (2011).
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activity.6 Twenty nine states have now enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.7
These may be characterized as narrow, moderate and broad in the scope
of activity protected.8 California’s Code of Civil Procedure section
425.169 is an example of a broad statute.10 Enacted in 1992, it was the
first statute endeavoring to encompass non-petitioning activity within its
protections. Its language and judicial treatment have served as models
for the rest of the nation.11
The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is its lack of merit.12 Defendants
prevail on the merits in over 77% of SLAPP suits.13 A SLAPP “is
brought with goals of obtaining an economic advantage over a citizen
party by increasing the cost of litigation”, to weaken that defendant’s
ability to engage in petitioning activity undesirable to the plaintiff, and to
deter future activity. 14
Since winning is not a primary motivation, “traditional safeguards
against meritless actions, (suits for malicious prosecution and abuse of
process, and requests for sanctions) are inadequate to counter
SLAPPs.”15 Anti-SLAPP statutes generally seek to protect those

6

See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 3, 12 (1989) (“SLAPPs are . . . a counter-attack against petition-clause-protected activity.”);
see also CAL. COD CIV. PROC. § 425.16(a) (Westlaw 2014) (“[P]articipation should not be chilled
through abuse of the judicial process”)
7
Carson Barylak, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 845,
847 n.8 (2010). Since 2010, the District of Columbia and Texas have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.
D.C. LAW 16-5501 et seq. (Westlaw 2014); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §27.001 et seq. (Westlaw
2014). One territory, Guam, has an anti-SLAPP statute. 7 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 17101-17109
(2005).
8
Shannon Hartzler, Protecting Informed Public Participation: Anti-SLAPP Law and the
Media Defendant, 41 VAL. U. L.REV. 1235, 1238 (2007).
9
Unless otherwise indicated, all further references are to the California Code of Civil
Procedure.
10
See Barbara Arco, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment Rights of
Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 594; see also James Devine, Rule
11’s Big-Mouthed Little Brother: How a Federal Anti-SLAPP Statute Would Reproduce Rule 11’s
Growing Pains, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 367, 375 (2011) (“The California statute departs significantly
from Pring-Canan’s anti-SLAPP model. While California’s statute protects petitioning and speech
rights, the Pring-Canan statute simply offers expressed immunity for those exercising their
constitutional right to petition . . . .”).
11
See Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1055-1056 (Cal. 2006) (“Rusheen v. Cohen—to
provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of
constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)); see also Tom Wyrwich, Comment, A Cure for a “Public
Concern”: Washington’s New Anti-SLAPP Law, 86 WA. L. REV. 663, 671 (2011).
12
U.S. ex.rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir.
1999).
13
Pring, supra note 6, at 12.
14
Newsham, 190 F.3d at 970-71.
15
Id. at 971 (citing Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 817 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994)).
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engaging in First Amendment activity and deter abusive lawsuits by
providing for early termination of the suit and award of the target
defendant’s fees incurred in achieving early dismissal of the SLAPP.16
Broad statutes, like California’s, protect activity beyond petitioning
and potentially include activity that does not necessarily enjoy First
Amendment protection. Narrower statutes involving only nongovernment officials (NGOs) as targets, and applied to retaliation for just
the exercise of constitutional petition rights, have not raised
constitutional concerns.17 Broad statutes are criticized for their potential
to chill access to justice.18 The inhibiting effect of fee awards is
especially of concern.19
California’s hybrid statute, because it includes non-petitioning
activity within its ambit, created a problem not contemplated by those
who conceived of SLAPP defendants as limited to NGOs engaging in
petitioning activity.20 For fairly obvious reasons, a government agency
16

Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-Slapp Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on
Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L.REV. 801, 801 (2000).
17
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT, 8-9,
15 (TEMPLE U. PRESS 1996) (regarding government agents as enjoying sufficient protections in
contrast to the greater vulnerability of private citizens).
18
Arco, supra, 594-595,599-600,616; Alice Glover and Marcus Jimison, SLAPP Suits: A
First Amendment Issue and Beyond, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 122, 141 (1995) (“[T]he California law
possesses the inequity and imbalance of creating a chilling effect on one group’s exercise of a
constitutional right in an attempt to remove the chilling effect on another group’s exercise of
constitutional rights.”); LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007, 1021 (S. Ct. N.J. 2009) (“[C]ourts
must be vigilant so as not to so zealously seek to deter SLAPP suits and those who file them that we
unintentionally punish ‘the plaintiff who seeks redress in good faith for a genuine reputational wrong
but whose case unfortunately resembles the paradigm SLAPP.’” (citations omitted)). Andrews,
Motive Restrictions, supra at 722-723: LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007,1021 (S.Ct.N.J.2009)
(“[C]ourts must be vigilant so as not to so zealously seek to deter SLAPP suits and those who file
them that we unintentionally punish ‘the plaintiff who seeks redress in good faith for a genuine
reputational wrong but whose case unfortunately resembles the paradigm SLAPP.’ [citation]”);
Barylak, supra 871-872; Sobczak, Mark, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the
Citizen Participation Act, 28 N.Ill.L.Rev. 559 (2008); Devine supra, 370; Stone, Michael and Marc
Berger, Legal Defense Trust Training Bulletin: California Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies to Routine
Administrative Mandamus Petitions: An Analysis of the Holding and Effect of Vergos v. McNeal, at,
http://www.rcdsa.org/trainingbulletins2/2007/June2007.pdf.
19
Thomas Walden, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Laws and in the Courts’
Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1043-1044 (1992); Treiman, Robert,
SLAPPed Down, Daily Journal p.5 (Dec. 9, 2008); Steven J. Andre, California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 425.16—An Epitaph to the Right to Petition Government for Redress of
Grievances, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 155, 155 (2009); see also Graffiti Protective Coatings v. City of
Pico Rivera, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 692, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he chilling effect . . . is of
particular concern because a defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to an
award of attorney fees.”).
20
See George Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1989); see also Pring & Canan, supra note 17, at 8-9, 15. California appropriated the
term to cover activity not included in the meaning “SLAPP” by the concept’s creators. Pring and
Canan defined a SLAPP as suits filed against “non-government individuals and/or groups” and did
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does not bother to petition itself. Thus, the problem of a government
official utilizing an anti-SLAPP motion against an individual or group
never would have occurred to anti-SLAPP laws’ progenitors.
For the same reason, the notion of government responding to pure
citizen petitioning activity with an anti-SLAPP motion would have
seemed so incongruous as to have escaped the imagination of those
conceiving of anti-SLAPP legislation. California’s legislative extension
of protection to other First Amendment conduct ironically created the
anomaly of protections potentially afforded to government action
counteracting individuals’ constitutionally protected right to petition
government for redress of grievances.
II.

THE PROPER STATUTORY BALANCING OF PRIVATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SOUGHT BY ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTES

A.

THE PETITION RIGHT—FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHT TO FILE A LAWSUIT

The statutory protection from meritless21 lawsuits afforded
defendants by anti-SLAPP statutes runs up against the First Amendment
petition right of a litigant to access to justice. The Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, evolved by the U.S. Supreme Court to protect petition rights, is
applicable to petitioning in the form of a lawsuit.22 The doctrine
establishes immunity, except where the lawsuit is demonstrated to be a
“sham.”23 A sham is a lawsuit that is both objectively baseless and
not include free speech activity, limiting it to “communications to a government body, official, or the
electorate.” See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation (“SLAPPS”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar, and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 937, 946-47 (1992).
21
Hall v. Time Warner, Inc., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1337, 1346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“To
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, the plaintiff must show that the complaint is
legally sufficient and must present a prima facie showing of facts that, if believed by the trier of fact,
would support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. The plaintiff’s showing of facts must consist of
evidence that would be admissible at trial. The court cannot weigh the evidence, but must determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor as a matter of law, as
on a motion for summary judgment.” (citations omitted)); see also 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg,
107 Cal. App. 4th 568, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
22
See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see also
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
23
Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). Petitioning
has many manifestations. The fact that one form of petitioning may be a lawsuit should not obscure
the critical inquiry as to whether it is, in actuality, a “sham.” If the petitioning did not involve a
lawsuit, the question of whether “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the
merits" (Professional Real Estate Investors Inc. v. Columbia Pictures (1993) 508 U.S. 49, 60
(PREI)) would not come into play. Instead, what is pertinent is whether the petitioner’s actions were
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subjectively brought for an improper purpose.24 Thus, the sanction of
early termination of a lawsuit—depriving a plaintiff of his or her day in
court— may not be imposed absent a showing that the lawsuit is a
“sham” under this standard.25
California follows this standard for sanctioning litigation activity.
Under California’s sanction statute, the courts have consistently regarded
section 128.5 sanctions as involving both an objective and a subjective
element.26 Therefore, any conflict with the two-pronged “sham”
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been avoided. The
California Supreme Court, in In Re Marriage of Flaherty, struck down
an award of sanctions for maintaining a frivolous appeal and held that
such an award for frivolous litigation required a showing that the appeal
is both baseless and pursued in bad faith.27 The court applied such a
standard to the term “frivolous” to avoid chilling litigants’ rights:
[A]ny definition must be read so as to avoid a serious chilling effect
on the assertion of litigants’ rights on appeal. Counsel and their clients
have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is
28
extremely unlikely that they will win on appeal.

What is less certain, and remains to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court, is whether statutory fee-shifting in favor of government agencies
and against petitioning citizens is subject to the two-pronged “sham”
standard. Outside the context of anti-SLAPP awards, cases are found
involving statutory awards of fees to government entities against private
persons.29 The leading case is Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C.30

taken for an improper purpose such as a “predatory motive.” PREI at 55-56. This is aptly illustrated
by considering Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 365 (Omni). Omni did
not involve an underlying lawsuit. It instead involved a challenge to allegedly competitive efforts to
lobby and curry favor with government agencies. The Court engaged in no objective analysis. It
stated the operative concern for ascertaining a “sham” to be solely a subjective inquiry. Id. 380.
24
Id.
25
BE & K Constr. Co. v. Nat’l. Labor Relations Bd., 536 U.S. 516, 526-27 (2002).
26
See, e.g., Dolan v. Buena Eng’rs, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1505-1506 (Cal Ct. App.
1994); Abbett Elec. Corp. v. Sullwold, 193 Cal. App. 3d 708 (Cal Ct. App. 1987), 712; Corbett v.
Hayward Dodge, Inc., 119 Cal. App. 4th 915, 921 (Cal Ct. App. 2004).
27
In Re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 649-650 (Cal. 1982).
28
Id. at 650.
29
See Salazar v. Upland Police Dept., 116 Cal. App. 4th 934, 949 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(construing the language of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1021.7 disjunctively to allow fee-shifting to a
government agency where either the objective or subjective component is not demonstrated by the
losing plaintiff); see also Kobzoff v. Los Angeles Cnty. Harbor/UCLA Medical Center, 19 Cal. 4th
851, 853 (1998) (construing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1038 to allow a government agency to recover
fees where the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate either reasonable cause or good faith). These
decisions interpreted the statutes’ plain language (Kobzoff at 863) without contemplating Petition
Clause and Noerr-Penningtion considerations.
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Christiansburg held that a fee award should not be allowed in favor of a
prevailing government defendant in an action to enforce Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 without a showing that the action was
“frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.”31
In so holding, the Court did not consider the question of petition
rights, but instead looked at congressional intent behind allowing fees to
defendants under the Civil Rights Act.32 The Court relied upon
Congress’s primary objective in encouraging such lawsuits as a matter of
public policy and in promoting private prosecution of those violating the
law.33 It regarded the congressional objective in making the provision
mutual as one merely designed to discourage suits that were frivolous,
groundless, or unreasonable.34 The same rule would later be applied to
other federal attorneys fee provisions.35 The dual standard is not applied
mechanically, but instead applied in view of the objectives sought to be
achieved by a fee-shifting scheme.36
A determination that a suit is a SLAPP merely finds that the lawsuit
implicates protected activity and that the plaintiff is unable to muster a
showing of probable cause. Because this is not a determination that the
lawsuit meets either objective or subjective aspects of a “sham”, the
SLAPP plaintiff’s right to litigate should enjoy First Amendment
protection.37 As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in BE & K
Construction v. NLRB, “the genuineness of a grievance does not turn on
whether it succeeds.”38
Thus, protecting citizens against SLAPPs pits the interest in
preventing imposition upon their First Amendment rights against the
access to justice rights of those who sue.39 The Rhode Island Supreme

30

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n., 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
Id. at 422.
32
Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
33
Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420.
34
Id. at 420-422.
35
E.g. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 6-7 (1980).
36
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523-524 (1994).
37
Neither the subjective inquiry into the plaintiff’s motive (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer
Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 66-67 (Cal. 2002) (holding that no “intent to chill” requirement is
needed)), nor the objective inquiry (see Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 60
(recognizing standard that “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits”))
is the same inquiry involved in finding a “probability” of prevailing (§425.16(b)(3) ).
38
BE & K, 536 U.S. at 532.
39
See, Pring & Canan, supra note 17, at 12, 17-19; Carol Andrews, Motive Restrictions on
Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 722 (2000); Arco, supra note
10, at 617. Anti-SLAPP statutes stand as a barrier to access to the courts by providing an early
penalty to claimants who seek judicial redress. In both theory and practical judicial application, antiSLAPP statutes involve a careful balancing recognizing the tension between the First Amendment
31
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Court recognized this clash of First Amendment interests in Palazzo v.
Alves:
By the nature of their subject matter, anti-SLAPP statutes require
meticulous drafting. On the one hand, it is desirable to seek to shield
citizens from improper intimidation when exercising their
constitutional right to be heard with respect to issues of public
concern. On the other hand, it is important that such statutes be limited
in scope lest the constitutional right of access to the courts . . . be
improperly thwarted. There is a genuine double-edged challenge to
40
those who legislate in this area.

The court warned, “courts should give careful consideration to the
negative effect that such filings can have on the right of access to the
courts . . . . Great caution should be the watchword in this area.”41
B.

THE GENERAL PETITION RIGHT—ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE
RIGHT TO SUE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES

The U.S. Supreme Court observed that, “the right to petition
extends to all departments of the Government [,] [t]he right of access to
the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”42 A lawsuit
challenging government action involves that particular aspect of the right
to petition—the right to invoke the judicial process.43
More
significantly, it also involves the right to invoke that process against the
government.
The right of access forbids governmental conduct that unduly
obstructs persons who seek to present complaints to the State’s
adjudicatory authorities. Solicitude for access to justice concerns is not
of recent genesis. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court explained “[t]he
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws . . . [and o]ne of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection . . . .”44
The access to justice aspect of the right is different in nature and
protects different constitutional concerns than other aspects of the First

rights of litigants to have their day in court and the rights of citizens to be free from retaliatory
lawsuits targeting exercise of speech or petitioning rights.
40
Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 150 (R.I. 2008).
41
Palazzo, 944 A.2d at 150 n.10.
42
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
43
See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. Nat’l. Labor Relations Bd., 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983)
(“. . . going to a judicial body for redress of alleged wrongs . . . stands apart from other forms of
action directed at the alleged wrongdoer.” (citing Peddie Bldgs., 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 272 (1973)).
44
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)
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Amendment and the petition right itself. The access right emanates from
both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause, and protects
access to state prescribed processes.45 It is among the rights protected by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.46
The access right is never purely private because it invokes a public
process which may announce or apply the law in ways that govern the
future conduct of others. The access component of the Petition Clause
protects admittance to state prescribed processes in which persons can
address “violated rights and interests” and obtain “the psychological
benefits of vindication [and the] public airing of disputed facts.”47 The
availability of a dispute resolution process that operates neutrally and
dispenses justice as “the alternative of force” in private disputes has been
recognized as “the right conservative of all other rights.”48 This rationale
has even greater salience when citizens use the judicial process to
petition their government using prescribed processes to challenge the
manner in which government conducts its affairs. The latter process
involves something in which the public always has an interest beyond
mere announcement of rules of law. Accordingly, access to that process
is the alternative of revolution and entails exercise of a right conservative
of our participatory form of government.
The application of the anti-SLAPP statute to suits brought by
citizens against their government implicates the most basic concerns of
the access component of the Petition Clause. In BE & K, the U.S.
Supreme Court characterized “this right to petition as one of ‘the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.’”49 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court continues to selectively filter foisting the Bill of
Rights upon states through a narrow portal since the Slaughter-House
Cases,50 the general Petition right is regarded as secured under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.51

45

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (“The Due Process Clause also requires
states to afford certain civil litigants a ‘meaningful opportunity to be heard’ by removing obstacles to
their full participation in judicial proceedings.” (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379
(1971) ; M.L.B. v. S.L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 (1996)); Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343, 362-63;
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors (1985) 473 U.S. 305, 335.
46
See Blake v. McLung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898) (stating that privileges and immunities of
citizens include the right “to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state[.]”).
47
Bill Johnson’s Rests., 461 U.S. at 743.
48
Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
49
BE & K, 536 U.S. at 525 (citing Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967)).
50
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1872).
51
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3029 (2010) (“. . . the Privileges or
Immunities Clause protects such things as the right ‘to come to the seat of government to assert any
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The special level of protection required for petitioning in the form
of suits against government is apparent not just from the language of the
First Amendment, but from the origins of the Petition Clause itself.52
Suits against government deserve greater protection because they
embody two preferred aspects of the Petition right:
First, suits against any governmental agency actually comprise two
petitions—one general and one judicial—combined into one, and
thereby concurrently serve the two primary interests of petitioning.
Second, a suit against the government, unlike other general petitions,
........... 53
triggers a governmental duty to respond to petitions

The historic development of petition rights is consistent with the
substantially greater judicial protection accorded petitioning by a citizen
to the government than is accorded private action that is not genuinely
aimed at procuring favorable government action. Historically, petitions
were all addressed to the King.54 Laws were initially the product of
petitions granted by the King, not parliamentary legislation.55 Petitions
on private matters—such as legal disputes—were similarly addressed to
the monarch.56 With the passage of time, courts emerged to handle the
private disputes and Parliament took on the exclusive power to enact
laws.57 This separation of the two types of petitioning “led to separation
of the legislative and judicial powers from each other and from royal
prerogative.”58 The distinction has not fallen into desuetude. The U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged the difference between “direct” and
“indirect” petitioning of governmental officials.59 Lesser protection is

claim [a citizen] may have upon that government’ “ (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80
(1872)).
52
See Carol Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 596-598; 613-615 (1999); see also James
Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue
Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 961-62 (1997); see also Gregory
A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2174 (1986).
53
Harvard Law Review, Note, A Petition Clause Analysis of Suits Against the Government:
Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1118 (1993).
54
See Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected,
But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1155 - 1156 (1986).
55
Id. at 1156.
56
Id. at 1155.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988).
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afforded interaction with government of an indirect, private, or nonpolitical nature.60
Outside the anti-SLAPP context, California courts have consistently
recognized that something more is at stake when it comes to the
combined judicial and general petition.61 The contrast of judicial with
general petitioning as yielding immunity from claims for litigation
expenses incurred by government was recognized by the California
Supreme Court in City of Long Beach v. Bozek (Bozek).62 Bozek held
that private citizens enjoyed Petition Clause immunity from a city’s
attempt to recoup fees expended defending against an allegedly
malicious lawsuit. To extend common law malicious prosecution
liability to allow government entities to recoup fees from citizen litigants
would impose an unconstitutional burden upon petition rights. Bozek
observed the distinction between actions brought by private citizens and
malicious prosecution actions brought by government against citizens
who petition it for redress of grievances.63 In dicta, the court essentially
stated that should the Legislature determine to allow such recovery,
Noerr-Pennington immunity requires the lawsuit must be shown to be a
“sham” to avoid an unconstitutional burden upon petition rights.64
60

Id. at 506 - 507.
Other than in the anti-SLAPP context the courts addressing burdens upon petitioning have
steadfastly resisted efforts to water down the “sham” exception and permit a lesser showing to
overcome the immunity attaching to petition rights. See, PG&E v. Bear Stearns; Ludwig v. Superior
Court (City of Barstow) (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8; Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir (9th Cir.2011)
F.3d .
In Wolfgram, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 53 (citing Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 530), the Court of
Appeal characterized Bozek as holding that “a suit by a subject against the government occupies a
preferred status over a suit invoking the judicial power of government against another subject.”
Wolfgram further held that the historical right to petition involves “the right to complain about and
complain to the government.” Id. at 50. Quoting Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1833) §
998, p. 707, Wolfgram stated that such historical right “embraces dissent.” Id. at 50-51.
Other California courts have recognized that the right of petition includes the right to sue
the government. See California Teachers Assn. v. State of California, 20 Cal. 4th 327, 338-39
(1999) (holding that Education Code § 44944(e)’s requirement that teachers unsuccessfully suing the
state pay one-half of the administrative law judge’s salary was unconstitutional because “the
importance of free access to the courts” is “an aspect of the First Amendment right of petition”);
Smith v. Silvey, 149 Cal. App. 3d 400, 407 (1983) (filing of mandamus action against board of
supervisors was an exercise of the right to petition the judicial branch of the government).
62
31 Cal. 3d 527 (1982), re-affirmed, 33 Cal. 3d 727 (1983). Cate v. Oldham, 450 So. 2d
224, 226 (Fla. 1984) (following Bozek and holding that “[t]he presentation of a complaint to
government concerning its conduct is now expressly held central to the right to petition that
government for the redress of grievances against it”).
63
Id. n. 9; See also, Padres L.P. v. Henderson (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 495,510.The distinction
was aptly stated by the court in Padres L.P.. That court found no discord with Bozek in allowing
exactly such a fee award to a private actor arising from a judicial petition. While the municipality in
Padres could not recover its attorney’s fees from the lawsuit (since that would have involved a
burden upon general petitioning activity), there was no such impediment to private defendants
recovering their fees (because as to them the lawsuit was merely a judicial petition).
64
The court referenced then recent legislation enacting Code of Civil Procedure §128.5
(providing for sanctions for “actions not based on good faith which are frivolous or which cause
unnecessary delay.” – which requires an element of subjective bad faith) and Code of Civil
61
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In contrast, Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.65
subsequently held that shifting attorney’s fees between private litigants
pursuant to an anti-SLAPP statute did not implicate the constitutional
protections involved in the exercise of the judicial petition rights
involved there. Equilon did not address the constitutionality of an award
of fees in a situation involving an exercise of general petition rights.
Equilon is entirely consistent with Bozek’s differential treatment of
government efforts to recoup expenses incurred in responding to citizen
petitioning in the form of lawsuits. A lawsuit directed to government
and seeking governmental change rises to a more rarefied level than a
legal action over a private contract issue that indirectly may achieve new
precedent or a change in governmental behavior. Thus, an incursion
upon such an exercise of First Amendment rights must be justified by a
most significant right or extremely compelling government interest on
the other side of the scale.
C.

RECONCILING CHRISTIANSBURG AND NOERR-PENNINGTON:
RETAINING/ELIMINATING THE IMPROPER PURPOSE PRONG FOR
ANTI-SLAPP FEE AWARDS TO GOVERNMENT AGENTS AGAINST
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGANTS

Christiansburg, in spite of
Noerr-Pennington
requirements,
suggested that a single objective prong standard may be used to gauge
whether an award of fees to a government agency may impinge upon a
citizen’s petition rights in bringing a lawsuit against government.66
Accepting such a standard would overlook the distinction between
general and judicial petition rights. The objective aspect of the exception
to Noerr-Pennington—that the suit be without any merit from the
perspective of a reasonable attorney—applies to judicial petitions. A
general petition, meanwhile, may not involve a lawsuit, but may be
brought for an improper purpose.67 Thus, the more essential (or
minimal) prong for evaluating combined petitions must be the subjective
Procedure §1021.7 (allowing fee shifting to a law enforcement defendant where an action is not
“filed or maintained in good faith and with reasonable cause."), concluding in language indicating
that lack of merit (the objective factor) alone cannot overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity and
provide a basis for fee recovery: “governmental entities may not maintain actions for malicious
prosecution against those who have previously sued such entities without success.” Id. at 538-39.
But see, note 29, supra, observing subsequent cases interpreting the language of §1021.7 as
disjunctive (allowing a fee award based upon either a subjective or objective finding).
65
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53.
66
Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 413 (allowing fee-shifting without distinguishing awards in
favor of government agencies where a lawsuit is objectively baseless, did not consider Petition
rights and Noerr-Pennington issues.)
67
See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding that a petition for purpose of
defamation is not subject to absolute immunity from liability).
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(improper purpose) inquiry.68 Since a lawsuit may be entirely
meritorious, but brought for an improper purpose, both prongs of NoerrPennington’s “sham” exception need to be considered to evaluate
whether combined petition rights can be burdened.
In terms of divining a comprehensible standard from the existing
body of authority, a more consistent approach to the fee award problem
does emerge. The standard would be to subject civil rights, qui tam, and
other public interest actions against private entities to the Christiansburg
objective lack of merit standard. Lawsuits challenging government
conduct (involving general petitioning) would fall under the NoerrPennington requirement that a “sham” must be established—requiring
both the subjective and the objective showing—to allow an award of fees
to a prevailing government defendant. General petitioning activity not
involving a lawsuit would be subject to the improper purpose aspect of
the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington to allow fees to any
defendant.
In any event, the improper purpose requirement of NoerrPennington is not comprehended by the two-prong anti-SLAPP inquiry69
and the probable cause anti-SLAPP standard is not the same as the
objective standard for frivolous suits under Noerr-Pennington.
III. DIVERGENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO ANTI-SLAPP
PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT ACTORS
A.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Where government agents use statutory anti-SLAPP protections
against private citizens the interests balanced cannot be accorded the
same weights involved in statutory fee-shifting between private litigants.
The use of an anti-SLAPP statute by government does not merely
involve a barrier to access to justice, but a burden upon a person’s right
to petition government.70 This additional burden is not imposed based
68

See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) (applying a
standard that looked simply at whether a defendant’s activities are “not genuinely aimed at procuring
favorable government action”); see also Hi-Top Steel Corp. v. Lehrer, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 651
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
69
See Equilon Enter’s v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 690-691 (Cal. 2002).
70
The general petition in the form of litigation has the same political significance in terms of
achieving social change as other general petitioning activity. The U.S. Supreme Court in Borough of
Duryea, supra, observed:
Individuals may also ‘engag[e] in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and
association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public.’ In re
Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 431 (1978). Litigation on matters of public concern may facilitate the
informed public participation that is a cornerstone of democratic society. It also allows
individuals to pursue desired ends by direct appeal to government officials charged with
applying the law.
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upon a need to protect certain essential rights, but to
advance
government’s interest in sanctioning and deterring unsuccessful, nonfrivolous, petitions.71
Unquestionably, sometimes certain government conduct –
specifically, government speech – can be very important. The national
security considerations at issue in the Pentagon Papers case72 were
certainly significant. However, not all government speech is so
important; and it may even be innocuous. As the Pentagon Papers case
demonstrates, even speech that is so important may not warrant
suppression of First Amendment rights.73
Identifying the constitutionally required manner in which
individual First Amendment rights are to be balanced against
government interests has been an evolutionary process. From the days of
the “bad tendency” test to Brandenburg v. Ohio74, the United States
Supreme Court has moved away from
allowing
generalized
governmental interests to trump First Amendment rights. Judicial
willingness to countenance suppression of speech hampering general
governmental agendas dwindled with ascending appreciation of the
importance of protecting individual rights - accepting the logic that
"speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government." 75
The Supreme Court has not carved out a constitutional niche for
government interests alongside First Amendment or other rights in the
constitutional constellation. Government may act to bolster protection of
individual rights against encroachments by others who are exercising
their rights. For example, the Court recognized that an ordinance may
properly restrict picketing from interfering with persons’ privacy
interests in their homes.76 Government may also act to protect an
individual privacy interest in being free from offensive mail.77 Content
neutral regulation preventing picketing from intruding upon family
memorial services may be proper.78 But even where government is acting
to bolster some citizen rights against other private rights, its role is
circumscribed.
Government’s judgments relating to the balance struck in
protecting some individual rights vis á vis others’ rights have not been

Therefore, its value in any judicial balancing of that right against governmental interests should be
accorded the same weight.
71
Infra, p. 172.
72
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
73
Id. at 718-719.
74
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
75
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64,74-75 (1964).
76
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484-486 (1988).
77
Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728,738 (1970).
78
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (U.S. 2011). n.5 (and preceding text)
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acceded broad deference by the court which has emphasized that this
scope is limited: “Our holding today is narrow. . . As we have noted, ‘the
sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between
First Amendment and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited
principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the
instant case.’[Citation].” 79 In other words, it is not for the legislative
branch to decide what constitutional rights deserve greater or lesser
weight on balance against other constitutional rights.
Likewise, in Burson v. Freeman80, the court addressed ad hoc
such a clash between rights involving a direct restriction upon political
expression within 100 feet of a polling place. The court gave no special
deference to the judgment of the Tennessee Legislature and recognized,
“This case presents us with a particularly difficult reconciliation: the
accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse with the right
to vote - a right at the heart of our democracy.”81 The Court required a
compelling state interest to permit the infringement upon the First
Amendment rights involved.82 It held that the state had a “compelling
interest in securing the right to vote freely and effectively”.83
An anti-SLAPP application that not only protects government
from the exercise of First Amendment rights, but also imposes
government’s fees upon unsuccessful litigants who challenge perceived
government wrongdoing, vastly departs from the trepidatious balancing
of rights recognized as essential in Palazzo. It does not involve balancing
respective individual rights at all. Even if it did, the legislative balancing
of rights against government interests is suspect where protections of
statutory rights go beyond reasonable time, place and manner
considerations and serve instead to prevent or inhibit citizen expression
and interaction with elected officials and the marketplace of ideas, or to
insulate government agents from citizen input and accountability.
The Supreme Court recognized in Noerr, courts should not
lightly impute to the Legislature the intent to infringe upon petition
rights.84 In this regard, anti-SLAPP statutes, short of being found
unconstitutional, can - consistent with their purpose and history - be
construed to comply with the First Amendment’s petition clause.85 A

79

Id at 1220.
(1992) 504 U.S. 191.
Id. at 198.
82
The Court identified the implication of three First Amendment concerns: “regulation of
political speech, regulation of speech in a public forum, and regulation based on the content of the
speech.” Id. 196-198.
83
Id. at 208.
84
Id. at 137-138.
85
The canon of constitutional avoidance would prevent such an outcome: “[W]here an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
80
81
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judicial determination that anti-SLAPP protection does not apply to any
or all government activity literally described by the statute’s terms or that
anti-SLAPP statutes do not permit fee awards and other sanctions in
favor of government, should not require dismantling of other, socially
beneficial aspects of an anti-SLAPP law.86
B.

RISE OF THE ABOMINATION—DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW
EXTENDING ANTI-SLAPP PROTECTION TO GOVERNMENT

Prior to Vargas v. City of Salinas (Vargas I) a peculiar body of
California authority had emerged that improperly treated government
activity as enjoying First Amendment protection without giving due
consideration to whether government has rights or to the NoerrPennington doctrine. 87 Nadel v. Regents of University of California, a
defamation case against a government agent, was the first case to imply
the First Amendment lends protection to government speech.88
Subsequently, the Second District, Division Six, in Bradbury v.
Superior Court, relying on Nadel, was the first case to hold governments
are “persons” who could use the anti-SLAPP statute.89 Bradbury also
relied upon Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland90 for the dubious

intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
(1988) 485 U.S. 568, 575; see also, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi. (1979) 440
U..S. 490, 499-501; Vermont Agency of Nat. Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens (2000) 529
U.S. 765, 787; People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667.
86
Courts have not always followed the doctrine of constitutional avoidance with regard to antiSLAPP procedures conflicting with constitutional rights. In addressing an anti-SLAPP conflict with
the constitutional right to have factual determinations made by a jury, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire invalidated that state's law: "A solution cannot strengthen the constitutional rights of one
group of citizens by infringing upon the rights of another group." Opinion of the Justices (N.H.
1994) 641 A.2d 1012, 1015.
87
Vargas v. City of Salinas, 46 Cal. 4th 1 (Cal. 2009) [hereinafter Vargas I].
88
Nadel v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). Nadel, in
actuality, did not hold anything more than that because an employee was entitled to the First
Amendment protections outlined in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), the
employee’s public agency employer should likewise enjoy comparable protections. In reaching this
conclusion, the court sensitively balanced competing interests involving citizen rights and
government power in that limited scenario. Id. at 1268-1269. The New York Times rationale does
not warrant extending First Amendment protection to government defendants. New York Times
protected criticism of government officials, not the officials themselves. It did so, in part, because
government agents enjoy privileges against liability. Nadel’s “primary concern” was its second
ground—i.e., protecting government employees’ rights. Yet this rationale was undermined by
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) 547 U.S. 410, 426, and subsequent cases recognizing that speech by
employees in their individual capacity is protected by the First Amendment, but speech in their
official capacity is not. E.g., Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2007).
89
Bradbury v. Super. Ct, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
90
Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 47 Cal. App. 4th 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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proposition that the First Amendment protects government speech in
respondeat superior situations.91
The same panel of the Second District that decided Bradbury then
decided Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara.92
Mission Oaks concerned a property developer’s suit against a county for
wrongfully denying a development permit, and found that First
Amendment protection was afforded to a government agency as well as
its contractors under section 425.16.93 Neither case engaged in any
substantive consideration of whether constitutional protection is properly
afforded to government entities, nor considered the impact of fee awards
in favor of government agents upon petition rights.
Schroeder v. City of Irvine was the only published case that came
close to confronting the issue of whether general petition rights are
impaired by an anti-SLAPP fee award to government.94 Schroeder
reached a conclusion regarding the imposition on petition rights that is
contrary to Bozek and the Noerr-Pennington line of cases. Schroeder did
not determine that the importance of petition rights pales in comparison
to the objectives of section 425.16; rather, the court accepted a curious
concession that the First Amendment protected the government conduct
at issue.95 In effect, the court treated the petitioning activity as in conflict
with the constitutional rights of another citizen.
Consequently, given this odd twist, the Schroeder Court did not
regard the activity as immune.96 It, therefore, did not evaluate the
burdening of petitioning conduct in terms of the treatment afforded
general petitioning in Bozek. In terms of weighing governmental
interests against petition rights, the scale was not loaded properly.
Constitutional rights of equivalent dimension sat on both sides of the
scale and the court did not need to undertake the “sham” analysis, or
consider whether a compelling state interest was involved.97 The court
was simply weighing coequal private constitutional rights in terms of a
government regulation incidentally interfering with one right in order to
protect the other right.

91

See Bradbury, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1115 -1116 (reasoning “Petitioners had a First
Amendment right to keep the public informed, issue the report, respond to media questions, and ask
other law enforcement agencies to conduct their own investigation.”).
92
Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
93
Id. at 729.
94
Schroeder v. City of Irvine, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
95
Id. at 183 n.3; San Ramon Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass’n,
125 Cal. App. 4th 343, 356 (125 Cal. App. 4th 2004).
96
Schroeder, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 197.
97
Id. at 196-197.
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For this reason, Schroeder evaluated the rights of the petitioners in
light of the standard adopted in Simpson v. Municipal Court.98 Simpson
pitted the rights of picketers against the interest of the state legislature to
ensure the quality of its deliberative process and the right of others to
avoid an oppressive atmosphere that would chill their speech.99 In light
of the countervailing rights at stake, the court in Simpson (as recounted
in Schroeder) declined to enforce the picketers’ “‘freedom of speech in
disregard of the rights of others.’”100
With regard to gauging the narrowness of the anti-SLAPP statute’s
tailoring, the court in Schroeder did not depart from this countervailing
rights approach:
Simpson upheld the law because it banned all picketers equally and
without regard to the content of their message, was narrowly tailored
to achieve legitimate and substantial governmental interests, and
banned only a narrow type of picketing while omitting other forms of
picketing from its ambit. The same analysis convinces us that section
425.16, subdivision (c) is valid. The attorney fee clause applies to all
unmeritorious lawsuits premised on acts taken in furtherance of the
defendant’s constitutional rights of petition or free speech, regardless
of the point of view espoused by the plaintiff. It applies only to that
narrow category of lawsuits against governmental entities that are
premised on acts taken in furtherance of the defendant’s rights of
speech, and leaves untouched any other type of lawsuit against
101
governmental entities.

Thus, Schroeder must be limited to its unusual facts where a
government entity was qua citizen, exercising a constitutionally, rather
than a statutorily protected speech right. Schroeder skipped the essential
Noerr-Pennington “sham” analysis and overlooked the significant fact
that fee awards to government defendants discourage the exercise of
general petition rights. 102 The decision did not analyze the narrowness
of the tailoring of the statute in terms of the feasibility of narrow drafting
of the anti-SLAPP statute—whether it could have accomplished its
purpose without burdening petition rights. It did not analyze whether
allowing use of the statute by or a fee award in favor of a government
entity was valid or essential to fulfilling anti-SLAPP purposes.

98

Id.; see also Simpson v. Mun. Ct., 14 Cal.App.3d 591 (1971).
Schroeder, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 196.
100
Id. at 196-197 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930,
941 (Cal. 1970).
101
Schroeder, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 197 (emphasis and italics supplied) (citation omitted).
102
Id.
99
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Relying upon Bradbury, other California courts propped up a
precarious house of cards by stating that government entities are entitled
to First Amendment protections and are, therefore, entitled to proceed
under section 425.16.103
C.CONFABULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE WITH
A “RIGHT”
Post-Bradbury, there was a judicial muddling of the First
Amendment protected right to free speech and the government speech
doctrine that pervaded the reasoning of some of the cases that followed.
The two concepts are separate. Confounding them is a result of their
similarity inasmuch as they both involve expression. There is no textual
support for a government “right” to free speech from the First
Amendment, which speaks in terms of forbidding the State from
abridging speech rights.104 Framing the First Amendment in terms of
listener interests, which might permit the bootstrapping of government
speech, is likewise not supported by the language of the Bill of Rights,
because those rights are cast as possessed by speakers, not listeners.105
In addition, the notion runs against the grain of basic Constitutional
principles. The Constitution speaks in terms of powers and rights.
Conceptually, people have rights and relinquish them to grant powers to
government. Rights run in favor of persons, citizens, and states, and
protect against encroachments by the federal government and (after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment) by non-federal governmental
agencies. In contrast are powers that are vested in government and
limited by rights and structural checks and balances. The correct
conceptualization of the constitutional source of government speech is
that it is a power, not a right.106 Because the constitutional basis for

103

See e. g. Santa Barbara Cnty. Coalition Against Auto. Subsidies v. Santa Barbara Cnty.
Assn. of Gov’ts, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), (citing Bradbury, 49 Cal. App.
4th at 1114 (holding “government agencies and their representatives have First Amendment
rights . . .”)); see also, Visher v. City of Malibu, 126 Cal.App.4th 364 fn.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005);
Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1247-1248 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). Rather
than addressing the basic paradox in extending rights-based protection to government actions and
considering the ramifications for general petition rights, the cases, like an echo-chamber, simply
bolstered their conclusions by mere citation to Bradbury and the cases relying upon it.
104
See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
1637, 1641 (2006) (“Courts and commentators alike have long dismissed the notion that the Speech
Clause could serve as a source of constitutional protection for government speech.”).
105
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . .”).
106
Confusion is perhaps exacerbated by ill-chosen judicial verbiage referencing government’s
power to speak as a “freedom” or “right” (E.g, “Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government
could function if it lacked this freedom. “( Summum. at
) ; “A government entity has the right to
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allowing government speech is not the First Amendment, the underlying
principles are not the same.107
This is not to say that government has no constitutional ability to
speak.108 The government speech doctrine recognizes that, consistent
with principles of popular sovereignty, government agents are able to
promote policies that are a product of the electorate’s choice—including
social, economic, political, and other agendas109. But this does not entail
a First Amendment right.110
D. ONE SOURCE OF CONFUSION IS REPLACED BY ANOTHER—ANTISLAPP PROTECTION FOR GOVERNMENT SPEECH THAT “SOUNDS
LIKE” PRIVATE SPEECH
In 2009, the California supreme court in Vargas I undid much of the
damage wrought by Bradbury and its misconceived progeny. It pulled
away the premise that government’s conduct at issue involved the
exercise of First Amendment rights. It did so by holding that the
language of the anti-SLAPP statute applies to government agents
engaging in activities listed in subsection (e) of the statute irrespective of
whether government entities have First Amendment rights.111 In
addition, the court declined to lend protection to all governmental
activity within the penumbra of subsection (e).112

“speak for itself.” (Summum at
, citing Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,
529 U. S. 217, 229 (2000) ).
107
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (holding
that, compared to the speech of private speakers, a government agency’s own speech is “controlled
by [very] different principles.”).
108
In this regard, speech is no different than any other governmental ability to promote
policies. For the states, the ability derives from the police power. For the federal government—at
least since 1937—this comes from the Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3.) as amplified
by the Necessary and Proper Clause (U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.18; see also McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819).).
109
Just as government “as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or
other exactions binding on protesting parties,” it follows that, “Within this broader principle it seems
inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to
advocate and defend its policies.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
110
Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n, 863 F.2d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Muir v.
Alabama Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) (“While the first
amendment does not protect government speech, it ‘does not prohibit the government, itself, from
speaking, nor require the government to speak. Similarly, the first amendment does not preclude the
government from exercising editorial control over its own medium of expression.’ “ (citation
omitted))).
111
Vargas I, 46 Cal. 4th at 17.
112
Id. (recognizing section 425.16’s protection for statements and writings of governmental
agents “on matters of public interest and concern” when protection would exist where “such
statements were made by a private individual or entity.” (emphasis added)).
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The Vargas I court recognized the anti-SLAPP statute’s ambiguity
with regard to the failure to differentiate “between (1) statements by
private individuals or entities that are made in the designated contexts or
with respect to the specified subjects, and (2) statements by
governmental entities or public officials acting in their official capacity
that are made in these same contexts or with respect to these same
subjects.”113 The court declined to examine the legislative history of
section 425.16 when it was enacted in 1997, to resolve the ambiguity as
to whether the Legislature sought to bestow anti-SLAPP protection on
government agents and the extent of that protection.114
The Vargas I court sought to resolve the difficulty by construing
subsection (e) to cover such statements “without regard to whether the
statements are made by private individuals or by governmental entities or
officials.”115 This was not exactly taking the bull by the horns. It is
questionable whether the answer is not more ambiguous than the
ambiguity it “resolved.” Here is why: If private individuals’ speech
potentially constitutes an exercise of rights protected by section 425.16
while government speech does not, their statements cannot be treated
alike in terms of the First Amendment balance.

113

Id. at 18.
Vargas I, 46 Cal. 4th at 18-19, n.9. Such examination would follow the statutory
interpretive technique identified by the state supreme Court: “'If the language permits more than one
reasonable interpretation . . . the court looks ‘to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible
objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy,
contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a
part.’[Citations omitted].” Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal.4th
309, 316. It is apparent that the Legislature never initially contemplated making Section 425.16
available to government. In reality, this was a leap made by the judiciary in Bradbury, supra. Such
an expansive application of use of the anti-SLAPP motion to strike – beyond that contemplated by
its progenitors (Supra, n.20) – would certainly have evidenced some indication the Legislature gave
this notion serious consideration. Yet there is nothing to suggest this occurred and every indication
instead that the Legislature did not imagine it might be allowing government agents to use the
procedure against citizens. The court in Vargas I noted that legislation occurring after courts had
ruled that government entities could avail themselves of the anti-SLAPP statute reflected the
Legislature’s acknowledgment that courts had already extended section 425.16’s protection to
government. The enactment of section 425.18 occurred in 2005. The 1997 amendment to section
425.16 was designed to specifically include pleadings besides a complaint; to specifically include
conduct as well as words; and to counteract the narrow construction of the act given by some courts.
(See, Zhou v. Wong (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1114; Briggs v. Eden Council, etc. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th
1237) However, the Legislature’s expression of intent behind the 1997 amendment indicates its
insertion of a broad construction to be given the anti-SLAPP provisions was for the purpose of
furthering constitutional rights, not all manner of other conduct without constitutional significance.
SB 1296 states that Chapter 271, enacted in August 1997, was an act to revise the statement of
legislative intent to “specify that the section is applicable to any conduct in furtherance of the
constitutional right of petition or of speech in connection with a public issue.” (emphasis added).
115
Id. at 18.
114
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Without engaging in any analysis, the court cautiously limited the
protection afforded government to that commensurate with the protection
enjoyed by citizens:
[W]e believe it is clear, in light of both the language and purpose of
California’s anti-SLAPP statute, that the statutory remedy afforded by
section 425.16 extends to statements and writings of governmental
entities and public officials on matters of public interest and concern
that would fall within the scope of the statute if such statements were
116
made by a private individual or entity.

How this approach should work is an enigma. The court provided no
explanation other than the facts in Vargas I itself.117 In effect, the court
seemed to limit the anti-SLAPP protection afforded governmental
activities to the same situations affording protection to statements by
private actors.118 Thus, perfunctory government activity that would not
be performed by a private individual—government doing what
government does—would not seem to be covered.119
Ostensibly, Vargas I pulled First Amendment protection out from
under government speech while simultaneously holding that government
conduct is covered by section 425.16. Understanding the inherent
contradiction in the problematic methodology for judicial application of
this fuzzy pronouncement is illuminated through the lens of the “arising
from” language of the statute. At the point Vargas I was decided, a well
developed and consistent body of decisions had elaborated the manner in
which courts were to analyze this prong one question requiring that the
116

Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
Id. at 40. The Vargas I facts are far from illuminating in terms of how to ascertain when a
governmental statement would be protected if made by a private citizen. The case involved a
lawsuit challenging allegedly improper government expenditures to favor one side on a ballot issue.
Id. at 36. Under the formula provided in Cotati and Navellier, that should have been the underlying
basis for liability. The Court instead focused upon the fact that the pre-election expenditures were
for government speech via a city newsletter, website and leaflets. Id. at 37. Had the city’s
expenditures been devoid of communication—involving directly providing public resources or
money to one faction in the election—presumably §425.16 would not apply. In terms of the
communications being “made by a private individual,” it is hard to say how the Court was applying
this approach to the website and other communications involved. It is one thing to say a private
citizen might maintain a website or distribute a leaflet opining upon an election issue. It is another
matter to go beyond the similarities in form and to say that a private citizen’s exercise of rights is
substantively the same as that involved in government speech. This is especially so when the
operative wrong is the use of public funds for government speech to counter private speech.
118
See Vargas I, 46 Cal. 4th at 17.
119
This would be comparable to the treatment accorded bureaucratic conduct by private
sector actors – reports, claims, investigations, administrative proceedings, hiring decisions and
communications and advertisements – which is not covered by §425.16. See notes 273 and 295,
supra (compiling private bureaucratic function cases not covered because no First Amendment
activity is implicated.)
117
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plaintiff’s claim arise from First Amendment activity. The question
which will be explored in part VII of this article, is whether application
of the “arising from” methodology provides any focal aid in figuring out
when, if ever, government actions, bereft of First Amendment stature,
have anti-SLAPP protection.
IV. THE BURDEN ON GENERAL PETITIONING IMPOSED BY
GOVERNMENT USE OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES AGAINST
PETITIONING CITIZENS
A.

PENALIZING UNSUCCESSFUL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

In terms of public interest litigation the chill upon general
petitioning from government use of anti-SLAPP statutes is especially
harsh and inimical to fundamental constitutional values. Critical public
interest legal success is generally only achieved after arduous appellate
litigation. Whether the potential burden of a fee award and/or other
sanctions is $30,000 or $1,000,000, the effect upon a private citizen with
average income or a struggling grassroots organization is identical – the
prospect dampens, if not drowns, civic spirit and deters socially
beneficial litigation.
Challenges to established legal doctrine often depend upon the body
of law into which litigants venture, resting on shifting sands. The
zealous advocacy required of120 public interest attorneys to challenge and
overturn stale doctrine is nullified by a standard that subjects counsel and
clients to a challenged government agency’s fees and penalties.121 Public

120

People v. McKenzie, 34 Cal.3d 616, 631 (1983). (“When statutory provisions have not yet
been interpreted in a definitive way, principled advocacy is to be prized, not punished.”); Jerman v.
Carlisle, McNellie, 559 U.S. 597 (2010) (Kennedy J., dissenting). Uncertainty means that those
desiring to test the bounds of government compliance with such a statute within the bounds of
zealous advocacy—a margin set at “frivolous” under ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.1 (2009), not “meritless” —are deterred from doing so.
121
In this light, the following handful of significant public interest lawsuits should be
considered: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (challenging laws adopted during
official legislative proceedings enacting a “separate but equal” policy for public schools); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (challenging an official statement (loyalty oath) required by California
for a veteran to be eligible for a tax exemption); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (challenging
state sanctioned recitation of a prayer in public schools); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (challenging a state law requiring the reading of biblical passages in public
schools); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (challenging a federal statute requiring
the post office to not deliver and to destroy mail containing statements deemed communist
propaganda); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393, U.S. 503 (1969) (challenging a
school district’s ban on armbands in a public school); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(challenging government statutes criminalizing desecration of the flag); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (challenging a statute banning display of any symbol “that arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”); Lee v. Weisman, 505
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interest litigants who may be able to assess whether a lawsuit passes
muster as non-frivolous under the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington
immunity cannot evaluate in advance the likelihood of
judicial
acceptance of the legal merits of a cutting-edge lawsuit. Important cases
would have certainly been severely discouraged and likely would never
have been brought had litigants willing to take the risk of challenging the
government action in question also faced the additional risk of an AntiSLAPP motion and the burden of a fee award in favor of the government
agency involved.122
Encouraging public interest litigation is the legislatively sanctioned
public policy objective. The California Legislature has enacted a
plethora of statutes designed specifically to promote and protect citizen
petitioning in the form of litigation challenging government conduct.123
Such statutes exemplify the acceptance of a policy embracing the
significance of public interest litigation. A two-faced scheme of
promoting such activity by rewarding citizens who succeed in advancing
U.S. 577 (1992) (challenging prayers led by religious figures at public school graduation
ceremonies); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (challenging a local ordinance
prohibiting yard signs); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 514 U.S. 573 (1995) (challenging a
government required statement (loyalty oath) required as a condition of employment in the public
schools); Legal Svcs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 535 (2001) (challenging a legislatively adopted
restriction upon the speech of legal services attorneys).
122
Qualifying cases, like those recited in the foregoing footnote, involve government
statements in the form of laws, religious endorsements or counter-speech policies made in the course
of legislative or other official proceedings or concerning public issues or matters of public interest.
In each of the recited cases, the government had an interest in promoting its policies by means of
making statements or by suppression of speech critical to those policies. Each government statement
would fall within the protected activities covered by California’s Anti-SLAPP statute. (Code
Civ.Proc. §425.16(e).)
123
One of California’s legislative efforts to rein in abusive use of its anti-SLAPP statute was a
provision exempting some public interest litigation. (Cal.Code Civ.Proc. §425.17) It may have zero
application to actions targeting government defendants. In Vargas I, the exemption was raised. The
trial court ruled that since anything government does is "political" the government expenditure
involved in Vargas I fell under an exception to the public interest exemption for "political works."
The court of appeal affirmed - basically holding for all intents and purposes that section 425.17 is
never going to apply to a lawsuit against government because government's work is "political." On
appeal, the state supreme court completely ignored section 425.17, although it was clearly raised as
an issue and briefed. In Vargas II, section 425.17 was again raised – this time as to the anti-SLAPP
fee award question. Although the Supreme Court’s grant of review in Vargas I had vacated the court
of appeal’s earlier decision and did not even address the section 425.17 question, the court of appeal
held the section 425.17 defense was "law of the case" and did not recant, reconsider or reiterate its
earlier ruling that the political exception to the public interest exemption prevented public interest
litigants from relying upon section 425.17 in a motion to strike brought by a government agency. Id.
at 1341. The point of all this is that Vargas I, Vargas II and Peninsula Guardians, Inc. v. Peninsula
Health Care Dist., 200 Cal.App.4th 1108 (2011 Cal.), now stand for the unsettling proposition that
§425.17 does not preclude government agencies from using section 425.16 against public interest
litigants or from obtaining fee awards against them. Compare, City of Carmel v. Bd. of Supervisors,
183 Cal. App. 3d 229 (1986 Cal.) (recognizing that Section 1021.5, providing for private attorney
general fee awards “applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public entities” Id. at 254256).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/4

26

Andre: Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & Government Speech

2014]

Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & Government Speech

141

an important public interest through litigation, but punishing efforts that
fail, ultimately discourages such litigation.124 Certainly, it departs from
the dual standard approach esteemed by the U.S. Supreme Court after
Christiansburg.
California has consistently treated expansively the remedy afforded
the public by taxpayer litigation such as suits challenging perceived
misuse of public funds.125 The California Supreme Court unanimously
recognized the importance of taxpayer challenges to government action
in Blair v. Pitchess, stating that the primary purpose of section 526(a) “is
‘to enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge governmental action
which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the
standing requirement.’”126 It is essential to encourage such litigation, not
discourage it. 127
The significance of public interest litigation is tied to basic
functional considerations of constitutional governance in as much as it is
a plain device for ensuring government accountability to the citizenry.
B.

ATTORNEYS FEES AND THE HISTORIC PROCESS OF UNBURDENING
THE PETITION RIGHT

The concern with imposition of penalties for petitioning activity is
one of the paramount features in the history of the emergence of the
petition right, and predates the Norman conquest. In his article on the

124
Whether imposition of fees upon the public interest litigant occurs via a separate lawsuit or
a motion in the initial litigation, the “chilling effect” (Bozek at 538) upon petitioning is the same.
The secondary effect of malpractice suits against the SLAPP plaintiff’s counsel is no differrent.
Moneer, James, Two SLAPPs Don’t Make A Right (2007) 20 Cal. Litigation No.1,16,20-21. The
same basic access to justice considerations recognized in Bozek apply to both fee-shifting and
malicious prosecution awards of fees: “Access to the courts would be illusory if plaintiffs were
denied counsel of their choice because attorneys feared being held liable as insurers of the quality of
their clients’ cases. Few attorneys would be willing to prosecute close and difficult matters and
virtually none would dare challenge the propriety of established legal doctrines.” 1 Mallen & Smith,
Legal Malpractice (1996 4th ed.) §6.9, pp.416-417.
125
See Ronald K. L. Collins and Robert M. Myers, The Public Interest Litigant in California:
Observations on Taxpayers’ Actions, 10 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 329, 336 (1977).
126
Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 267-268 (Cal. 1971) (citation omitted). See, also.,
Humane Society of the United States v. State Bd. of Equalization, 152 Cal. App. 4th 349, 355 (Cal
Ct. App. 2007) (citing Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 79 Cal.
App. 4th 1223, 1240. (Cal. Ct. App. 2000))
127
Collins & Myers, supra note 122, at 355. (“In a very real sense, the success or failure of
modern democratic government depends in part on the existence of such public-minded citizens. As
public guardians they help ensure that the rule of law will be preserved . . . The time, effort, and
potential expense of public interest litigation all render it particularly unappealing to the fanciful
dabbler in social causes. On the other hand, legal barriers in areas such as standing, remedial relief,
and attorney’s fees may create a wall too high for even the public-minded to scale . . . our state laws
should continue to encourage social input from the public interest litigant so that once litigated the
best interests of the public may prevail.”).
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Petition Clause, Norman Smith relates that the earliest petition in
recorded Anglo-American history was the nobles’ petition to Aethelred
the Unready in 1013.128 The King responded by promising not to
retaliate against the petitioners and to remedy their grievances.129 The
article goes on to chronicle in detail the emergence of the petition right
and the efforts to protect it from being burdened.130
Early in Anglo-American judicial history, the losing party to a
lawsuit paid the penalty of losing their tongue upon the view that false
swearing—an aggravated form of defamation—was a wrong meriting
that sanction.131 Gradually, English law replaced that burden with a
fine.132 Later still, the loser paid compensation to the winner, not to the
King.133 In 1278, only the victorious plaintiff could recover fees.134
After another two centuries, a defendant could recover fees in certain
instances.135 Only by 1607 could the defendant recover fees on the same
basis as the plaintiff—the present English rule.136
Fee-shifting statutes represent a legislative determination to
encourage or discourage certain litigation. At times such statutes permit
a certain level of equitable discretion by the trial court in making such
awards. Other times the award is mandatory, as is the case with section
425.16. The development of fee-shifting practices in the American
colonies was strongly colored by colonial distaste for lawyers.137 This
was reflected in a resultant legislative bent towards restricting fees, both
the fees an attorney could charge a client and the fees that could be
recovered from another party.138 In short, the colonial attitude perceived
fees as a burden on citizens’ access to justice and regarded it as
appropriate to prevent or limit them in order to enhance that freedom.
The American Rule disfavoring fee-shifting was framed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in terms of a national policy choice to avoid burdening

128

Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . ..”: An Analysis of the Neglected,
But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1986).
129
Id. at 1154-1155 (“[W]hether petitioners will be punished for their statements, and whether
petitioners have the prerogative of instructing or commanding action of the government – have been
the central features of the history of petitioning. Over the course of time, the former has been
resolved in petitioners’ favor, and the latter against them.”).
130
Id. at 1158-1167, 1170-1177.
131
Carol Rice Andrews, After BE&K: The “Difficult Constitutional Question” of Defining the
First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUST. L. REV. 1299, 1350 (2003).
132
133

Id.
Id. at 1350-1351
Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 853 (1929)
135
Id.
136
Andrews, supra note 128, at 1350-1351.
137
Id. at 1351 n.292
138
Id.
134
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access to justice through the courts. In Fleischmann Distilling Corp.v.
Maier Brewing Co., the Court spoke in terms of the uncertainty of
litigation, and stated that “the poor might be unjustly discouraged from
instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing
included the fees of opposing counsel.”139
The flipside to the American Rule, generally eschewing the burden
imposed upon access to justice created by awarding fees, is that some
litigation is favored by the Legislature. Chief among such favored
lawsuits is public interest litigation. Eight years after Fleischman, in
Alyeska Pipeline Svc. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y.,140 the Court reaffirmed
the American Rule and held that the power to depart from the rule and
determine fee-shifting was that of the Legislature.141 The Court
addressed an environmental group that brought suit to prevent issuance
of permits to build an Alaskan pipeline.142 As a result of the
organization’s litigation efforts, Congress stepped in and changed the
law.143 Lo and behold, the legislative change embodied the very relief
sought by the environmental public interest activists, but also mooted the
issues of the lawsuit.144
In applying the American Rule and deferring to the Legislative
branch, the Court in Alyeska held that it could not award fees absent
statutory authority.145 It refused to fashion an equitable remedy by
allowing the environmentalists to obtain an award of fees for the
achievements obtained as a direct product of their lawsuit.146

139

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
Alyeska Pipeline Svc. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y., 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
141
Id. at 270-271.
142
Id. at 242-243.
143
Id. at 244.
144
Id. at 245.
145
Id. at 269-270
146
Id. Congress then responded to Alyeska by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Award Acts. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. While the purpose of the Act was to allow a party to recover fees
without formally obtaining an award of relief (see, S. REP. 94-1011, 5, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5912; HR Rep. 94-1558 (1976) at 7) this was all for naught (see, Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. West (2001) 532 U.S. 598). Buckhannon presented a situation analogous to Alyeska. A
pending lawsuit prompted a state legislature to repeal a disputed law. The plaintiff sought fees now
armed with the new law. But the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the “impact” or “catalyst” approach
and held there could be no fee award unless there is a judicial sanction. In doing so, the Court relied
upon a legalistic understanding of “prevailing” rather than the common comprehension that
prevailing means one who achieves their objective. In California, however, the state Supreme Court
in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2005) 34 Cal.4th 553, rejected the legalistic/formalistic
approach of Buckhannon and accepted an impact / catalyst approach. The Court stated that the rule
as to prevailing under that state’s statute is not one of who obtained relief or a favorable judgment,
but one involving assessment of the broader social implications of a party’s accomplishment from
the litigation.
140
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Statutory fee-shifting between private litigants raises no
constitutional problem because the parties can expect to pay the winner’s
fees as an ordinary incident of certain litigation. A dual standard for
awarding fees designed to promote certain worthy litigation also presents
no problem after Christiansburg. On the other side of the scale from the
statutory right to fees in Alyeska was the judicial petition, not the
paramount general petition right.
Government use of anti-SLAPP statutes against challenges to its
actions, however, presents a different balance and involves a different
level of deference to legislative judgment. As revealed by Snyder147
courts have no duty to cow tow to legislative assessments of the relative
worth of individual rights in relation to governmental interests. They do
have a constitutional duty, recognized in Marbury v. Madison to act to
prevent legislative actions that impinge upon constitutional rights.
C.

THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF PROTECTION TO BE ACCORDED THE
EARNEST BUT ERRANT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGANT

With litigation between private parties, we are just talking about
shifting costs. In constitutional terms, petitioning government is
fundamentally different from suing someone for a contractual breach or a
tort.148 It is not typical, nor appropriate, to saddle an aggrieved citizen
with government’s fees just because the citizen is doing exactly what we
want to encourage them to do—earnestly challenging a questionable
governmental action—even though the citizen litigant happens to be a bit
off-base, gauged by judicial considerations. 149
The California Supreme Court in Bozek indicated it would defer to
the legislative branch in the case of legal disputes between private
litigants.150 But when it came to a prevailing government party, it would
only defer up to the point tolerated by the constitutional “sham”
exception to general petition immunity.151 Where an anti-SLAPP
statute’s objective is protection of individual constitutional rights, not the
protection of government activity from citizen scrutiny, this protection of
147

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (U.S. 2011).
This is not to say that government cannot act in the same manner as a private citizen in
terms of contracting, for example as an employer. It is just that causes of action arising out of such
private relations do not involve the participatory conduct sought to be protected by anti-SLAPP
statutes.
149
White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing, citizens should not be
penalized for “doing what citizens should be encouraged to do, taking an active role in the decisions of
government." (citation omitted)).
150
City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 538 (Cal. 1982), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983), opinion reiterated, City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 33 Cal. 3d 727,
728, (Cal. 1983).
148

151

Id.
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constitutional rights enshrined by the First Amendment may also weigh
in favor of the fee-shifting. However, government agents have no rights,
instead they have powers and can only claim statutory protection under
anti-SLAPP statutes. Where the litigant challenging government action
has guaranteed Constitutional rights the balancing is simple: the
individual’s rights must prevail over the governmental interests. Absent
a “sham” or a compelling interest, plaintiffs should be immune from any
burden upon their right to seek redress from their government.
Courts have not unequivocally regarded the burden imposed by feeshifting in favor of a government defendant as warranting NoerrPennington immunity. Christiansburg’s analysis of the burden imposed
by fee-shifting to government turned upon congressional intent in
seeking to encourage public interest litigation.152 The Court’s approach
did not entail both subjective and objective components of the “sham”
exception to Noerr-Pennington to allow a fee award to stand.
Subsequent lower court cases applying the dual standard, however,
invoked an access to justice analysis tethered to petition rights
considerations of the “chilling effect” upon such activity.153 The dual
standard is accepted in California as well to achieve “the avoidance of
undue chilling effect on the assertion of litigants’ rights.”154 But a
petition rights analysis applying the Noerr-Pennington standard to fee
awards after BE & K is not found.
Legislative and social policy objectives encourage and reward
public interest litigation, and protect petition rights from being chilled.
A position that anti-SLAPP statutes should discourage public interest
litigation by imposing a fee-shifting scheme awarding fees against
unsuccessful public interest litigants is inconsistent with such objectives,
departing from the well–accepted approach that has prevailed since
Christiansburg. A scheme of promoting such activity by rewarding
citizens who succeed in advancing an important public interest through
litigation, but punishing such efforts that fail, ultimately discourages
socially beneficial litigation.

152

Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 420.
See, e.g., Stenseth v. Greater Fort Worth, 673 F.2d 842,848-849 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding
courts are reluctant to award attorney’s fees against plaintiffs undertaking to enforce their
constitutional rights); see also U.S. Steel v. U.S., 519 F.2d 359, 364-365 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that
a routine allowance of attorney fees to successful defendants in discrimination suits might
effectively discourage suits in all but the clearest cases, and inhibit earnest advocacy on undecided
issues); see also Gage v. Wexler, 82 F.R.D. 717, 720 (N. D. Cal. 1979) (“This Court is mindful of
the possibly chilling effect an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant may have upon
other potential plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their civil rights.”).
154
Benson v. Greitzer, 220 Cal. App. 3d 11, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); see also Bach v. Cnty.
of Butte, 215 Cal. App. 3d 294, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
153
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Notwithstanding the decision in Schroeder, no appellate court had
addressed the burden upon petition rights imposed by interpreting an
anti-SLAPP statute as protecting the activity of government actors until
Vargas v. City of Salinas [hereinafter Vargas II].155 Vargas II ensued
from a city’s fee motion after the California Supreme Court upheld the
city’s use of section 425.16 against concerned citizens who sued to
challenge the city’s expenditures to promote defeat of a tax revenue
reduction ballot measure.156 Although the plaintiffs successfully
defeated the city’s “express advocacy” policy for expending funds on
electioneering, and clarified the legal standard applicable to the propriety
of the expenditures, the court held that plaintiffs had failed to establish a
probability of prevailing on the merits even under the clarified
standard.157
On remand, the city was awarded over $225,000 in fees against the
two private citizens.158 The public interest litigants had likely saved city
and state taxpayers millions of dollars and advanced the integrity of the
electoral process by preventing government expenditures to distort the
fair and unimpaired decision of voters at the polls. The plaintiffs
appealed, asserting use of the anti-SLAPP statute to impose the burden of
the government agency’s fees chills the constitutional right to petition.159
The court rejected the petition rights immunity challenge.160
The court’s holding that a Noerr-Pennington analysis was
inapplicable deserves scrutiny. The court acknowledged that the feeshifting at issue potentially discourages petitioning activity.161 However,
the court reasoned that imposing “costs of a suit” is not the same as
imposing “civil liability” for bringing suit.162 The decision analogizes
the burden involved in charging private citizens who lose their public
interest lawsuits against government agents to the foreseeable expenses

155

Vargas v. City of Salinas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1331 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied, 133
S.Ct. 424 (2012) [hereinafter Vargas II].
156
Vargas I, 46 Cal. 4th at 8 (reaffirming the standard identified in Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.3d
206 (1976), holding that based upon their style, timing and tenor, government expenditures relating
to election contests may be unlawful)..
157
Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1337
158
Id. at 1338.
159
Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1338.
160
Id. at 1350.
161
Id. at 1345.
162
Id. at 1344.
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involved in litigation amongst private parties.163 The appropriateness of
this analogy should depend upon the nature of the right impacted and
upon the significance of the government interest being advanced.
1.

A Fee by Any Other Name Still Smells Like a Burden

The cornerstone of the Vargas II court’s reasoning in rejecting
application of Noerr-Pennington immunity for the petitioning activity
was its treatment of the fee award as “costs” rather than “damages.” The
decision sought to reconcile Bozek with Equilon on the basis that feeshifting statutes—unlike malicious prosecution judgments—do not
impose civil liability.164 Bozek was an action seeking “damages” for
malicious prosecution.165 Fee-shifting statutes, meanwhile,
impose
“costs” incurred by a prevailing party in a lawsuit.166
The petition rights problem with allowing government to seek its
fees via malicious prosecution lawsuits against its citizens was identified
by the California Supreme Court in Bozek:
[T]he institution of legitimate as well as baseless legal claims will be
discouraged . . . . Allowing cities to sue for malicious prosecution
against unsuccessful former plaintiffs would provide the
municipalities with a sharp tool for retaliation against those who
pursue legal actions against them. Indeed, it is not unlikely that even
good faith claimants would forego suit in order to avoid the possibility
of having to defend against a subsequent malicious prosecution action
167
should their action against the city prove unsuccessful.

The identical concerns with chilling well-founded litigation are entirely
applicable to government fees awarded by means of a motion.
Malicious prosecution suits have long been recognized as having a
chilling effect upon a citizen’s willingness to bring a dispute to court.168
For this reason the tort is a disfavored cause of action.169 The primary
objective of abuse of process and malicious prosecution lawsuits is also a
major objective of one utilizing an anti-SLAPP statute—to recover

163

Id.
Id. at 1345.
165
Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 530.
166
Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1344.
167
Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 535-36.
168
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 872 (Cal. 1989)
169
Id.; Kendall-Jackson Winery v. E.J. Gallo, 76 Cal. App. 4th 970, 986 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999);
Sebastian v. Crowley, 38 Cal. App. 2d 194, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940).
164
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attorney fees and costs racked up as a result of the SLAPP bringer’s
efforts to sap the financial resources of the SLAPP target.170
The distinction drawn between damages and costs is relevant in
other contexts: Malicious prosecution judgments, for example, impose
civil liability.171 Fee-shifting statutes, meanwhile, impose “costs.” The
distinction is germane to whether a prevailing defendant may recover
fees as costs or must bring an independent action seeking them as
damages. The purpose of damages is compensatory. Statutory shifting
of fees as costs can represent a legislative assessment concerning fairness
and the need to encourage or discourage certain types of litigation.172
In terms of petition rights, drawing a distinction between costs and
damages elevates form over substance and misdirects inquiry away from
the pertinent First Amendment question—whether petitioning is
burdened. In the First Amendment context, courts must “look through
forms to the substance” of government conduct.173
Fee awards are distinguishable from routine cost awards for
purposes of constitutional analysis. The neutral flat charge for filing a
lawsuit, like the sales tax in Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of
Equalization, is “a nominal fee imposed” “to defray the expenses”
involved in processing judicial petitioning activity.174 It can readily be
differentiated from the burden on First Amendment freedoms imposed
by a charge for unsuccessful general petitioning which operates “to
inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.”175 The latter
charge is a discriminatory tax upon actual exercise of some persons’—
but not others’—right to petition government itself. 176
For Noerr-Pennington analysis, it does not suffice to say that the
identical burden is constitutionally valid when imposed by the method of
cost-shifting but not when imposed as a liability. The distinction
between “damages” and “costs” is one without a difference in terms of
result. Neither the appellation nor the means by which the fees are
imposed makes the burden on rights any less. Whether imposition of
fees upon the public interest litigant occurs via a separate lawsuit or a
motion in the initial litigation, the chilling effect upon petitioning is

170

See John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs 26
LOY. L. REV. 395, 440–445 (1993) (considering the unusual situations where recovery of other
economic losses, emotional distress damages and punitive damages occurs in anti-SLAPP lawsuits).
171
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee-shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 Duke L. Journal 651, 659 (1982).
172
Id. at 652
173
See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
174
Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 387 (1990).
175
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963).
176
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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identical such that there is no constitutionally cognizable difference
between the two modes of imposing fees upon the citizen litigant. If
anything, the contrary is true because the protection afforded the litigant
is reduced when fees are sought via a motion to strike. 177
Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was developed in the
context of prosecutions seeking to impose liability for petitioning, the
First Amendment’s language is plainly not so narrowly drawn. It applies
to all laws abridging that right.178 Thus, it includes governmental action
other than efforts to impose liability. Accordingly, “any impairment of
the right to petition, including any penalty exacted after the fact, must be
narrowly drawn.”179Thus, imposition of a fee to address a municipal
council or to submit a letter to an elected official or government agency
expressing concerns over a proposed project would be subject to scrutiny
under Noerr-Pennington, just as the burden of a poll tax would fall under
similar scrutiny.180
2.

Distinguishing Imposition of Costs from Burdens

There is a difference between the cost of exercising a right – the
expense of printing a leaflet or the gas needed to drive to the voting
booth – and a burden on a right – the imposition of a franchise tax or a
prerequisite fee to allow circulation of a leaflet or a charge for crowd
control to address hostility engendered by one’s message. For example,
the Supreme Court has recognized that an indigent person has a
fundamental right to counsel at trial, but that the cost of a discretionary
appeal must be borne by the appellant regardless of financial
wherewithal.181 Likewise, the fact that the Constitution may protect a
woman’s right to have an abortion does not mean she does not have to

177
There is greater protection afforded a petitioning citizen facing a government lawsuit to
recoup fees than he or she receives from a motion under an anti-SLAPP statute. There is no
requirement of malice or improper purpose for an award of fees after an anti-SLAPP motion to strike
and the protections of a trial, such as the right to a jury, are absent.
178
The First Amendment is not framed in terms of liability at all. It speaks in terms of
governmental action that inhibits the exercise of the right. It provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances.” U.S.C.A. CONST. amend. I.
179
Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 53 Cal. App. 4th 43, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
180
The discriminatory imposition of a fee upon just those who are unsuccessful in their
endeavors to persuade government officials would effectively discriminate and chill impecunious
and economically disadvantaged would-be petitioners. The Supreme Court held, “wealth or fee
paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.” Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
670 (1966).
181
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 600 (1974).
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pay for the medical expense involved in exercising that right.182 The
exercise of the Constitutional right to confront one’s accusers or to a jury
trial in a criminal proceeding involves no expense for the defendant,
while a civil trial may require the party exercising the right to deposit
jury fees.183 The exercise of rights of constitutional stature, including the
assertion of First Amendment rights, may not be conditioned by a state
upon “the exaction of a price” or “punishment” or “threat of criminal or
civil sanctions”184 The former payments for appellate counsel and
medical bills are not imposed by and paid to the State, whereas the latter
exactions, like anti-SLAPP fees to government defendants, are levied by
the government as a price for the exercise of fundamental rights.
The California Supreme Court has distinguished between the costs
of exercising rights and the burdens imposed on rights on the basis of
whether a party should reasonably anticipate the expense associated with
the exercise of a right. In In re Marriage of Flaherty, the court reversed
a sanction award and—citing access to justice considerations—
recognized that a party faced with the usual risks and uncertainties
entailed in any litigation should not also have to deal with the “‘fear of
suffering a penalty more severe than that typically imposed on defeated
parties.’”185 While the right to sue someone else may not be fundamental
and the cost of the other party’s litigation expenses may - unlike the
sanction in Flaherty - be reasonably contemplated as an incident of
losing a lawsuit, the right to petition government is fundamental and
should involve no such unanticipated downside. The litigant should not
be apprehensive of such awards.186
Imposition of fees against the citizen petitioning his or her
government is not properly characterized as merely a shifting of costs.
Unlike routine filing fees and ordinary litigation expenses, this is not the
182

Harris v. Macrae, 448 U.S. 297, 297 (1980).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 631.
184
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (“There are rights of constitutional
stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.”); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern
without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication
“chills” speech, prior restraint “freezes” it at least for the time.”).
185
In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d at 648 (citation omitted).
186
This is because the immunity attaching to an exercise of general petition rights is not
subject to the same considerations relative to allocating litigation costs involved in invoking judicial
processes. Attaching to the exercise of general petitioning the possibility of paying an indeterminate
sum of money to the government agency addressed by the petition is a sanction. It is not an
expected part of mustering a challenge to government. Such a burden is in its effect no different than
forbidding the exercise of the right altogether. This allows government “to ‘produce a result which
[it] could not command directly.’ [citation] Such interference with constitutional rights is
impermissible.” Perry v. Sinderman (1972) 408 U.S. 593, 597.
183
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sort of expense Jane Q. Public would reasonably expect is involved in
the exercise of her constitutional right.
3.

The Petition Clause Protects Even Baseless Petitioning

The Vargas II court also reasoned that Noerr-Pennington immunity
should not apply since the plaintiffs’ lawsuit did not amount to legitimate
First Amendment activity because it was baseless.187 However, it is
significant that in BE & K, the U.S. Supreme Court distanced itself from
dicta contained in an earlier case relied upon by the Vargas II Court, Bill
Johnson’s Rests. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.188 The Court in Bill
Johnson’s Rests. indicated that “baseless litigation is not immunized by
the First Amendment right to petition”.189 In BE & K, the Court qualified
that statement by stating that even baseless litigation may not be
“completely unprotected.”190
BE & K, therefore, recognized that baseless suits should be
protected just as false statements are. While false statements may be
unprotected for their own sake, “[t]he First Amendment requires that we
protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”191 The
Court observed the need to provide First Amendment rights with
“breathing space” and continued, “[a]n example of such ‘breathing
space’ protection is the requirement that a public official seeking
compensatory damages for defamation prove by clear and convincing
evidence that false statements were made with knowledge or reckless
disregard of their falsity.”192
The Vargas II decision effectively created a new, disfavored class
of general petitioners inserted somewhere between those who bring
“sham” lawsuits and those who pursue meritorious legal action. This
raises a vital Petition right question not reached by BE & K – whether
imposing early termination and an award of fees to a government agency
requires a higher threshold than that a plaintiff be unable to demonstrate
a probability of prevailing at a pre-discovery phase of litigation.193
187

Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1348.
Bill Johnson’s Rests., 461 U.S. at 731.
189
Id. at 743; Schroeder, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 195.
190
BE & K, 536 U.S. at 531.
191
Id. (citation omitted).
192
Id.; see New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-280, 285.
193
BE & K at least litigated its case beyond an early termination motion. The Court
analogized: “For even if a suit could be seen as a kind of provable statement, the fact that it loses
does not mean it is false. At most it means the plaintiff did not meet its burden of proving its truth.”
BE & K, 536 U.S. at 532-533. Anti-SLAPP statutes, like California’s require the plaintiff to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing 60 days after service and without benefit of discovery. CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(f),(g).
188
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THE NATIONAL SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of an improper balancing is of national concern.
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is not alone in its susceptibility to an
interpretation that government activity is covered by its terms.194 It is
also not alone in potentially awarding government onerous fees and other
sanctions against private citizens or groups, and their attorneys, who
petition it.195
California’s interpretation of its anti-SLAPP statute as protecting
government actors has not always been accepted elsewhere.196
Washington’s Supreme Court, addressing similar statutory language in
its state’s statute, held:

194

This stems from anti-SLAPP statutory language being descriptive of activities protected,
and therefore inclusive of all manner of speech and other interactions involving government, instead
of who is doing that interacting. With respect to the representatively expansive wording of
Missouri’s statute, it is observed that “[t]he Missouri anti-SLAPP statute’s coverage is very broad.”
Stephen L. Kling, Missouri’s New anti-SLAPP Law, 61 J. MO. BAR 124, 125 (2005) (footnote
omitted). “ ‘The “in connection with” text of the statute protects citizen activity outside of public
hearings [and] meetings. . . .’” Id.
More specifically, there is the potential for statutory interpretation lending government agents
protection against citizen lawsuits:
The Missouri anti-SLAPP statute provides coverage to a person. While this clearly covers an
individual citizen, a question arises as to how broad is the coverage. Does it apply to public
officials, such as planning commissioners, city council members, etc.? . . . There is no
definition of “person” . . . and its plain meaning would argue for expansive coverage.
Id. at 129. For this reason, 24 states, districts, and territories have anti-SLAPP statutory language
potentially encompassing and protecting government activity from legal challenges by private
persons and organizations. The specific code sections are:
ARK. CODE § 16-63-501 et seq.; DEL. CODE. ANN. § 8136 et seq.; D. C. LAW § 16-5501 et
seq.; GA. CODE § 9-11-11.1; 7 GUAM CODE §17101 et seq.; HAW. REV. STAT. § 634 (F-1) et
seq.); ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 et seq.; IND. CODE § 34-7-7-1 et seq.; LA. Code. Civ. Proc. §
971; ME. REV. STAT. § 556; MD. CODE. ANN. CTS & JUD. PROC. §5-807; MASS. GEN. LAWS.
§ 59(H); MINN. STAT. § 54.01 et seq.; MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,
241 et seq.; NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.635 et seq.; NEW MEXICO N. M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1;
NEW YORK N.Y. CIV. RTS. § 70-a, § 76-a; OR. REV. STAT. § 31.150 et seq.; R. I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-33-2; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-21-1001 et seq.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001 et
seq.; VERMONT VT. STAT. ANN. § 1041; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.500 et seq.
195

All the anti-SLAPP laws cited above, save Maryland’s, provide for fee awards to a
prevailing defendant without omitting government defendants. E.g. HAW. REV. STAT. § 634 F-2(8)
(requiring minimum mandatory sanction of $5,000 and allowing additional sanctions against the
plaintiff’ and plaintiff’s attorney); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(6)(a) (requiring additional
mandatory $10,000 award plus sanctions on plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel); and TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE §27.009 (providing for mandatory award of sanctions against the plaintiff).
196
See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (observing “the oftenexpressed understanding that ‘in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign,
[and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.’” (citations omitted)).
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The purpose of the statute is to protect the exercise of individuals’
First Amendment rights . . . A government agency does not have free
speech rights. It makes little sense to interpret “person” here so that an
immunity, which the legislature enacted to protect one’s free speech
rights, extends to a government agency that has no such rights to
197
protect.

Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected a city clerk’s
reliance on an anti-SLAPP statute to protect statements made in an
official capacity as petitioning activity, and held “the statute is designed
to protect overtures to the government by parties petitioning in their
status as citizens.”198
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Louisiana Supreme Court
engaged in no discussion of the constitutional propriety of government
using anti-SLAPP statutes against petitioning individuals.199 The
individuals brought suit to enjoin public officials from discussing a
contract between a private landowner and
FEMA.200 Although
Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute is modeled on California’s, the court did
not draw from California law or scrutinize how the statutory language
applied to government officials. The court simply concluded that the
motion to strike “was proper.”201 In another case, the Louisiana court
addressed the question of whether a town is a “person” for purposes of
enjoying anti-SLAPP protection and concluded that a town is a “juridical
person”, and could use the anti-SLAPP statute.202
A Nevada case similarly involved an employment dispute and
treated a government employer as a “person” entitled to anti-SLAPP
protection. In John v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., the Nevada supreme
court considered a school district’s anti-SLAPP motion directed at a fired
employee who sued it on various civil rights and other grounds. 203 The
court found “communications by school employees and the DCSD
regarding the plaintiff’s inappropriate behavior at work and the resulting
investigations were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute”.204 In
construing the statute, the court relied upon California precedent,
observing, “Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute was enacted in 1993, shortly

197

Segaline v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 238 P.3d 1107, 1110 (Wa. 2010).
Moriarty v. Mayor of Holyoke, 883 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Mass. 2008). (citing Kobrin v.
Gastrfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Mass. 2005).
199
Ruffino v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 965 So.2d 414, 418 (La. 2007)
200
Id. at 415
201
Id. at 418.
202
Hunt v. Town of New Llano, 930 So. 2d 251, 254 (La. 2006).
203
John v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 219 P.3d 1276 (Nev. 2009).
204
Id. at 1279.
198
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after California adopted its statute, and both statutes are similar in
purpose and language.”205 The court looked to the statute which
provides: “If an action is brought against a person based upon a good
faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition . . . [t]he
person against whom the action is brought may file a special motion to
dismiss.”206
Finally, New York took the opposite tact from the Nevada court,
finding that their anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect persons who
petition government, not the government agency being petitioned. In
City of Saratoga Springs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, the court reasoned:
“Clearly, as a municipality, petitioner is not a ‘public applicant or
permittee’ and, thus, is not authorized to bring any claim for damages
under this statute . . . .”207
VI. THE PROPER CRITERIA FOR BALANCING THE
GOVERNMENT INTEREST AT STAKE AGAINST THE
PARAMOUNT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO
PETITION GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
Those state courts allowing government to use anti-SLAPP statutes
are not applying the delicate balancing that pits a private right against
another coequal private right. They are not protecting any right. What
they are weighing involves the exercise of a preferred right against the
government on one scale against a government interest on the other. The
question is whether government may extract payment of its expenses
incurred in preventing the successful exercise of that right. Resolution of
that question has implications beyond government’s ability to use antiSLAPP statutes.
A.

THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD

Outside of the Noerr-Pennington analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court
has balanced governmental interests against individual rights following

205

Id. at 1281.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.660(a); John, 219 P.3d at 1284. The decision does not dwell
upon whether the statute’s protection of a “person” for communications made “to” a government
agency should only protect a defendant citizen who petitions government, not the government
agency recipient. Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes define the operative language relied upon by the
court: “good faith communication,” as any “Communication of information or a complaint to a
Legislator, officer or employee of the Federal Government, this state or a political subdivision of this
state, regarding a matter reasonably of concern to the respective governmental entity” NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41.637(2).
207
City of Saratoga Springs v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 178, 181 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001).
206
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certain fairly identifiable criteria. The undue burden standard has been
used particularly in cases involving state restrictions on a woman’s
access to abortion.208 A compelling state interest is required where a
right is directly impinged such as by a statute targeting a particular
exercise of a right by creating an obstacle to or criminalizing the exercise
of that right.209 Incidental burdening of a right which does not unduly
burden that right is subject to a less exacting scrutiny.210
Where a law does not directly infringe (such as a neutral regulatory
measure), but incidentally burdens the exercise of a constitutionally
protected right, no compelling state interest is required.211 However, a
neutral regulation affecting the exercise of a right may still require a
compelling state interest where it unduly burdens the right.212 Thus, the
208

The standard was applied by Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her dissent in City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 US 416, 463 (1983) (O’ Connor, Sandra Day
dissenting). O’Connor utilized the test as an alternative to the strict scrutiny test applied in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The test was later used by a plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), to uphold state regulations on abortion. In City of
Akron, O’Connor stated: “If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly burden’ the fundamental
right, then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination that the regulation
rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.” City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 453. Justice John Paul
Stevens in his partial concurrence, partial dissent to Planned Parenthood further defined undue
burden by saying, “[a] burden may be ‘undue’ either because [it] is too severe or because it lacks a
legitimate, rational justification.” Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
209
Church of Lukumi Babula Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that an
ordinance banning ritual sacrifice—a key practice of the Santeria religion—required a compelling
interest because the law was not neutral or of general applicability); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
472 (1977) (noting that the criminalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade constitutes such an
impermissible obstacle to the exercise of a right);.
210
Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1973) (holding that a state system of financing
public schools was “affirmative and reformatory” not an undue burden upon the fundamental right to
an education); Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (holding that because a statute denying funding to indigent
women for abortions placed “no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant woman’s path to an
abortion” and that no compelling state interest was required to justify the law); Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (recognizing the regulatory needs involved in assuring the integrity of the
electoral process allowed for incidental burdening of the right to vote: “[T]o subject every voting
regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are
operated equitably and efficiently.”) Laws imposing “reasonable, nondiscriminatory” burdens only
require the state to show an “important regulatory interest.” Id. at 434.
211
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879 (1990) (upholding the denial of
unemployment benefits to employees terminated for sacramental use of peyote: “We have never held
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”).
212
Wisconsin v. Yoder, (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 220 (holding that a law which is “neutral on its
face” is unconstitutional where it “unduly burdens the practice of religion” absent a compelling
interest.); Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 877 (1992) (“A finding of an undue burden is a
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose
is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be
calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the
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U.S. Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhail invalidated a law prohibiting
an individual who was behind in support payments from obtaining a
marriage license, because it “directly and substantially” interfered with
the right to marry.213 The government agency was unable to “make clear
the connection between the State’s interest and the statute’s
requirements.”214 The Court recognized:
When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests. Appellant asserts that two
interests are served by the challenged statute: the permission-to-marry
proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the
necessity of fulfilling his prior support obligations; and the welfare of
the out-of-custody children is protected . . . [S]ince the means selected
by the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the
215
right to marry, the statute cannot be sustained.

The Court distinguished the undue burden upon Redhail’s right to marry
from the loss of a $20 monthly benefit as a result of marriage216 in
Califano v. Jobst.217
The burden involved in government use of anti-SLAPP statutes
against petitioning citizens can be fit into the Court’s analysis. A strong
argument can be made that anti-SLAPP statutes constitute a means of
regulating the use of the judicial process to prevent abuse and inhibition
of the exercise of participatory rights. The State’s interest in protecting
such participatory rights is an important one, but hardly compelling.218
An incidental effect of achieving that important governmental objective
is that governmental use of the procedures results in the burdening of
general petition rights. So the question is whether the burden imposed is

interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its
legitimate ends.”)
213
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-387 (1978) (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that
every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of our prerequisites for marriage
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. . . reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.”)
214
Id. at 389.
215
Id. at 388 (citations omitted).
216
Zablocki at n.12.
217
(1977) 434 U.S. 47.
218
As much as SLAPPs are to be condemned, American society has functioned without antiSLAPP laws for most of its history. In addition, the judicial process provides many means to
address meritless lawsuits, including malicious prosecution actions, motions for sanctions, summary
judgment motions, demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings, and for nonsuit.
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severe or undue, requiring a compelling state interest. If not, only a
rational basis and narrow tailoring are required.
Certainly, it would seem passing strange to the petitioning citizen
who is charged over $225,000 for challenging what he or she genuinely
believes to be government wrongdoing, that this would fee would not be
considered a severe or undue burden.219 The question of government use
of anti-SLAPP statutes stands apart from that presented by the mere
regulatory imposition of a neutral fee for the governmental expense
involved in registering a firearm or processing a marriage license.
Instead, it involves a state imposition of a license, tax, or fee upon a
constitutionally protected right.
Myriad examples can be imagined of how governmental expense
may be imposed upon one genuinely, but unsuccessfully, asserting a
constitutional right. The effect of such an approach, however, is to chill
the exercise of rights. In particular, the burden is felt by those of
minimal means. Because it singles out particular exercises of a particular
right for a burden and not others, it moves beyond the neutral treatment
of rights compelled by constitutional design. As the Court observed with
regard to the disparate impact of such selective burdening of a First
Amendment right in Follett vs. Town of McCormick:
Freedom of religion is not merely reserved for those with a long purse.
Preachers of the more orthodox faiths are not engaged in commercial
undertakings because they are dependent on their calling for a living.
Whether needy or affluent, they avail themselves of the constitutional
privilege of a “free exercise” of their religion when they enter the
pulpit to proclaim their faith. The priest or preacher is as fully
protected in his function as the parishioners are in their worship. A flat
license tax on that constitutional privilege would be as odious as the
early “taxes on knowledge” which the framers of the First Amendment
220
sought to outlaw.

Potentially, fees incurred by state prosecutors responding to failed
suppression motions, the state’s expense of a criminal jury trial, fees
expended defending constitutional challenges to laws - all would be
proper subjects for government to shift expenses to individuals who rely
upon constitutional rights. Unquestionably, government agencies incur

219

See Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 250. (awarding $229,423.84 in costs and fees against
plaintiff). Much the same could be said for an award in the more common anti-SLAPP fee award
range of $20-40,000, where the questionable, challenged government conduct is held to be proper.
220
Follett vs. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-577 (1944); see also, Murdock v.
Pennsylvania 319 US 105, 113 (1942) (“A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a
right granted by the federal constitution. “).
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litigation expense in defending lawsuits. This expense is ultimately borne
by the citizenry.221 Much the same observation can be made with respect
to government expense incurred dealing with the exercise of other rights
by individuals.
Consider elections—like petitioning, a key means for the People to
control and hold government accountable. The cost to a city for handling
a single, simple municipal election is indisputably significant.222 Yet it
would be inconceivable that voters who cast losing ballots should absorb
this expense. Those who vote in good faith for obviously lost causes are
not fined for civic irresponsibility in casting meritless votes. Even the
idea of soaking supporters of “frivolous” ballot positions (e.g., write in
votes for “Donald Duck”) with such costs is unthinkable and would
involve limiting First Amendment expression.223 Once again, the impact
of such a scheme would fall most heavily upon the economically
disadvantaged
segments
of
American
society,
effectively
disenfranchising them.
Similarly, the extension of anti-SLAPP protections to government
might be argued to serve the valid regulatory purpose of discouraging
frivolous litigation against government, saving taxpayers the expense of
defending such disingenuous litigation. The rationale bears examination
in light of treatment of the identical rationale pressed in regard to
candidate filing fees in Lubin v. Panish.224 Lubin concerned an indigent
candidate’s challenge to a $701.60 ballot filing fee in California.225 The
state’s rational basis was the need to limit candidates on the ballot by
discouraging “frivolous or otherwise non-serious candidates.”226 The
Court held that the California law imposed a fee with the effect of
excluding good faith as well as frivolous actors:
Filing fees, however large, do not, in and of themselves, test the
genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the voter support of an
aspirant for public office. A large filing fee . . . is not a certain test of
whether the candidacy is serious or spurious. A wealthy candidate

221
See Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Imposed upon an individual of average means,
$225,000 is significant. Spread among over 150,000 Salinas residents or covered by insurance
(protection not afforded the public interest plaintiff), this dwindles to insignificance.
222
Patricia Zengerle, 2012 Elections Putting Increased Financial Strain on Cash-Strapped
Cities, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 25, 2012, 5:12 AM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/04/25/2012-elections-voter-id-cost_n_1452433.html.
223
Jeanne Kaiser, No Constitutional Right to Vote for Donald Duck: The Supreme Court
Upholds The Constitutionality of Write-In Voting Bans in Burdick v. Takushi, W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
129, 148 (1993).
224
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
225
Id. at 710
226
Id. at 714.
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with not the remotest chance of election may secure a place on the
227
ballot by writing a check.

Likewise, the shrewd, wealthy SLAPP plaintiff may calculate paying
fees as one more cost of the process of punishing the defendant with an
abusive lawsuit.228 Suits brought in earnest by less ruthless, but poor or
impecunious litigants facing the risk of paying government’s potentially
ruinous fees are chilled. In Lubin the exclusionary effect of the fee was
fatal:
Thus, California has chosen to achieve the important and legitimate
interest of maintaining the integrity of elections by means which can
operate to exclude some potentially serious candidates from the
ballot . . . Selection of candidates solely on the basis of ability to pay a
fixed fee without providing any alternative means is not reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of the State’s legitimate election
229
interests.

The size of a fee burdening exercise of a right may appropriately be
considered as well. The U.S. Supreme Court in Bullock v. Carter
compared less burdensome filing fees most candidates could be expected
to pay with the size of the fees in the Texas system. 230 It observed, “the
very size of the fees imposed . . . [gave] it a patently exclusionary
character.”231 The Court also observed that the restrictive filing fee
would disproportionally impact the less affluent.232
Like fees imposed upon electoral candidates, voters and religious
proselytizers, the impact of awarding potentially tens to hundreds of
thousands of dollars in anti-SLAPP fees to government entities relates to
the resources of litigants. The effect is unequal. The chill falls more
heavily upon less affluent litigants who would challenge perceived
government malfeasance—those unable or less able
to
afford
government’s fees if they are earnest, but unsuccessful. The chill is even
more foreboding than that recognized in Bullock, where the candidate fee
was defined and imposed beforehand. The anti-SLAPP fee is nonquantified and imposed afterward, yet it still chills.

227

Id. at 718.
Thomas Waldmen, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Laws and in the Courts’
Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1043 (1992).
229
Lubin, 415 U.S. at 718.
230
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
231
Id.
232
Id. at 144
228
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The foregoing cases counsel that the effect of statutory regulation
must be assessed in terms of its effect upon the exercise of fundamental
rights. Where the burden it imposes is direct or severe, a compelling
state purpose is required.
B.

INTERMEDIATE STANDARD

Assuming the burden upon the general petition right implicated by
government use of an anti-SLAPP statute to suppress citizen petitioning
is not undue, the appropriate level of inquiry is whether the government
regulatory objective furthers a substantial government interest and the
means are narrowly tailored to achieving that objective.233
The governmental interest at stake behind anti-SLAPP statutes is
hardly in doubt. It is stated plainly in the first paragraph of California’s
anti-SLAPP statute:
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing
increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress
of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public
interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public
significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through
abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be
234
construed broadly.

Thus, the statute is intended to encourage petitioning activity—
participation by members of the public in the process of self-governance.
For this reason, the Motion to Strike procedure applies to a lawsuit
“against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or
California Constitution . . . .”235
Unquestionably, this objective of protecting citizen activity that is
essential to the function of our democratic processes furthers a
substantial government interest. The real question is whether deterring
that same participatory citizen activity in order to protect government
from the challenge it presents is a means closely tailored to achieving
that objective.

233
234
235

Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 256
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(a).
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
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The intermediate analysis was carefully articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien with regard to freedom of
expression. 236 That approach is formulated as follows:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) it is within
the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the
incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
237
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

No argument is made here that anti-SLAPP statutes are not within the
power of government to enact.238 We will start with the second and third
intermediate standard requirements.
1.

The Governmental Objective in Advancing its Objectives Through
Speech

Government has an important interest in protecting the public
participation of citizens in the processes of government just as it has a
substantial interest in ensuring that the electoral process is sound.
However, advancing the First Amendment rights of some involves
diminishing the First Amendment rights of others. Anti-SLAPP statutes
directly suppress First Amendment activity—the right of litigants to
access to the courts. This involves terminating litigation. It also involves
imposing fees and other penalties upon plaintiffs. While these burdens
upon rights may be appropriate in private litigation, whether permitting
government to use anti-SLAPP protections to impose such burdens
actually furthers the statute’s stated interest and is narrowly tailored to
serving that purpose involves different considerations.
The statute’s purpose in protecting speech and petitioning has
nothing to do with protecting any government objectives other than
protecting those exercises of individual rights. This is congruent with
basic constitutional theory. The Framers were concerned with confining
government power and protecting citizen rights, rather than with
insulating government from the insignificant insults of those citizens

236

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(relying upon the restatement in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991), of the
standard laid out by the United States Supreme Court in O’Brien.
238
For discussion of this question see Pring & Canan, supra note 17.
237
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with the temerity to stand up to its power.239 This is apparent historically
and from the Constitution’s structure manifested inter alia in the Bill of
Rights and the separation of powers and system of checks and balances.
Government policies are not forged solely by election returns.240
Petitioning in all its forms is protected as a significant mechanism for
citizens to direct their government and hold it accountable. As
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burrough of Duryea,
petitioning in the form of litigation is itself actually a source of
government policy.241 The Court described how, historically, petitioning
government allowed even those excluded from the franchise to interact
with and influence government.242 The function of petitioning by means
of litigation serves as a device for citizens to hold government
accountable and to effect political change:
Petitions to the courts and similar bodies can likewise address matters
of great public import. In the context of the civil rights movement,
litigation provided a means for “the distinctive contribution of a
minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.” Individuals
may also “engag[e] in litigation as a vehicle for effective political
expression and association, as well as a means of communicating
useful information to the public.” Litigation on matters of public
concern may facilitate the informed public participation that is a
cornerstone of democratic society. It also allows individuals to pursue
desired ends by direct appeal to government officials charged with
243
applying the law.

If petitioning activity has this functional component244of allowing
citizens to interact with their government, then that activity is to be

239

Madison, J. (1792) in Hunt, G. (ed.), The Writings of James Madison v.6: 1790-1802 (New
York, Knickerbocker Press) (“It is sufficiently obvious that persons and property are the two great
subjects on which Governments are to act; and that the rights of persons and the rights of property
are the objects for the protection of which Government was instituted”)
240
Pre-election speech is but one means of touching social consciousness and effecting
political change. There would seem to be no valid reason why citizens are protected in their first
amendment right to be “wrong” when it comes to speech, but not when it comes to petitioning.
Justice Holmes’ comment, “[N]obody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet
by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would
hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.” Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919). This would seem to have every bit as much application to
ill-advised petitioning activity as to the speech erroneously penalized there.
241
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2489 (2011).
242
Id. at 2499
243
Id. at 2500 (citations omitted).
244
In terms of the social utility of a litigant’s right to be wrong on the merits, see, Reinert,
Alexander A., Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, (2014) 89 Ind.L.J. 1191
(explaining the social value provided by baseless lawsuits and the unfortunate tendency of courts and
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promoted, not discouraged.245 In this light, it would be hypocritical to
“protect” the advancement of government policies (via speech or
otherwise) “against” such activity. Any supposed government interest in
protecting its speech is both insignificant and invalid. More to the point,
protecting that interest is not related to the purpose of anti-SLAPP
statutes.
The protection of such government activity as an incident of antiSLAPP protection of rights-based activity in no way furthers achieving
anti-SLAPP objectives.
2.

Narrow Tailoring of the Burden to Achieving Anti-SLAPP
Objectives

Given the plain purpose of anti-SLAPP statutes to protect the
exercise of participatory rights from retaliatory lawsuits, there is no
reason to extend such protections to government. Given the burden such
an extension would impose upon the exercise of petition rights—
ironically, the very First Amendment freedom anti-SLAPP statutes seek
to encourage and protect—it must be avoided under intermediate
standard requirements where this is reasonably feasible. Because
government may easily be excluded from enjoying anti-SLAPP
protections, extension of anti-SLAPP provisions to government agencies,
as will be shown, unquestionably fails narrow-tailoring analysis.
California courts accept the O’Brien requirements and apply them
to petition rights. Mejia v. City of Los Angeles held that “[r]estrictions
on the right to petition generally are subject to the same analysis as

legislators to conflate “meritless” with “frivolous”). Such arguments for succor for the social utility
of meritless lawsuits gain more force as litigation moves outside of the situation of private disputes.
245
That encouraging such litigation, rather than discouraging it, is the legislative objective is
amply supported by enactment of a plethora of statutes designed specifically to promote and protect
citizen petitioning in the form of litigation challenging government conduct, such as California’s
Code Civ. Proc. §425.17, §526a and §1021.5. A scheme of promoting such activity by rewarding
citizens who succeed in advancing an important public interest through litigation, but punishing
efforts that fail ultimately discourages such litigation. This, if anything, is the lesson taught by
Christiansburg Garment Company v. E.E.O.C. (1978) 434 U.S. 412, and copious other cases which
recognize that fee awards against unsuccessful public interest litigants chill such beneficial activity
and that a showing that the litigation was frivolous is necessary before such an award may be
allowed. Geier v. Richardson (6th Cir.1989) 871 F.2d 1310,1314 (Dual standard not applicable to
award of fees in favor of prevailing state defendant against the United States intervening as a
plaintiff because, “The Christiansburg standards and statutes, congressional history, all indicate that
it's designed to protect and to prevent the chilling of the assertion of rights by private attorney
generals, by citizens trying to assert their constitutional rights and the reluctance of this court and all
courts to award defendants fees against plaintiffs is to prevent the chilling of such rights. There's
absolutely no element in this case where the awarding of fees against the United States could chill
anybody's activity in the assertion of civil rights.”).
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restrictions on the right of free speech.”246 The Court recognized that
“[l]aws that cause some incidental restriction on conduct protected by the
First Amendment but do not regulate the content of the expression
generally are evaluated under the less stringent standard announced in
United States v. O’Brien . . . .”247 Thus, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the “incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”248
With this in mind, it should involve a relatively simple analysis to
recognize that a means of advancing the governmental interest in
protecting participatory rights is readily available that does not involve
suppressing fundamental petition rights: Government does not need to be
included as a beneficiary of anti-SLAPP protection. Government
agencies can easily be excluded from use of anti-SLAPP protections
against petitioning citizens without degrading or undermining antiSLAPP protections of public participation rights. Thus, the use of antiSLAPP statutes against petitioning citizens flunks the intermediate
standard analysis.
3.

The Vargas II Approach—Revisionism of Anti-SLAPP Statutes’
Objectives

The court of appeals in Vargas II, approached the petition rights
problem presented by government use of section 425.16(c) to levy fees
against petitioning citizens with a novel twist on intermediate analysis. It
managed to find that government use of the state’s anti-SLAPP statute
passes muster under the O’Brien test by substituting out the statute’s
purpose.
Before moving to whether a government interest is advanced in a
permissible (narrowly-tailored) way, Vargas II identified two different
governmental interests underlying anti-SLAPP statutes that are not
apparent from the statutory language or context: interests in protecting
government’s promotion of its policies via speech and recouping
government’s fees.249 Both of these posited governmental interests are
suspect in terms of 1) whether they actually are the legislative interests
advanced; 2) whether they are substantial enough to outweigh the
intrusion upon petition rights incidentally infringed, and; 3) whether they
are valid or important governmental interests at all.

246

Mejia v. City of Los Angeles, 156 Cal. App. 4th 151, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citation

omitted).
247
248
249

Id.
Id. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S.at 377).
Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1346.
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The Government Interest in Advancing its Objectives Through
Speech

The promotion of policies enacted by voters or legislatures through
speech or otherwise is an entirely mundane function of government.
Framed in general terms, it can be regarded as essential. In specific
terms—such as announcing bus schedules and driver sobriety checks—it
hardly stands out as being of any greater importance than the minor
function of watering the grass at city hall.
The proposition that government has an interest of substantial
importance in protecting its speech elevates the significance of its speech
above private speech and over the importance of the particular policies
the speech may actually serve to promote. The Bill of Rights was
designed to protect individuals against government’s prerogatives.250 As
already observed, deference to legislative evaluations that rights
colliding with governmental objectives should be burdened is tempered
by the judicial branches’ role in observing constitutional limitations:
“When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding
due deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional
remedy.”251
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that to permit a
statutory burden upon a right, more is required than that government is
inconvenienced in carrying out its general objectives. This is the premise
underlying the O’Brien test:
[A] governmental regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its
incidental impact upon First Amendment interests, ‘if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on . . . First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
252
essential to the furtherance of that interest.’

The proper inquiry then is whether government’s objective in avoiding
criticism is significant enough to permit it to burden persons who
exercise First Amendment rights with the fees government incurs
successfully resisting them. Without evaluating the specific interest
advanced by particular government speech, the Vargas II court stated,
“the government’s right to speak is a substantial interest to be

250
251
252

W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628 (1943).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976).
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protected.”253 The difficulty with this generalization is that it lumps a
routine report on sidewalk maintenance together with a tsunami warning.
No doubt government must speak to govern, and likewise, must make
laws and administer them.254 This does not mean, however, that
legislation and the executive functioning of government should be
insulated from criticism and legal challenge. Those functions are not so
significant as to allow the imposition of government’s expense upon
those who unsuccessfully assail government actions or inactions as
improper.
Government policies should not be exposed only to criticism that
is “right.”255 Suffering challenges to policies and the promotion of its
policies and enduring the slings and arrows of having members of the
citizenry exercise rights is what government is supposed to do as a matter
of design in a system of popular governance. Facilitating the exercise of
rights is its function in the constitutional scheme. There is no valid or
substantial interest in preventing such dissent. On the contrary, it is
implicit that government is improved as a result of such exercises of
rights. It is hypocritical to “protect” advancement of governmental
policies (via speech
or otherwise) “against” such activity. This
generalized government interest is invalid and insubstantial and, if
accepted as a basis to compromise citizen dissension and other
participatory conduct, would portend more than the erosion of the
Petition right poised against vague and potentially insignificant or even
improper governmental interests.256
Carrying out policies is a governmental objective of
greater
importance than talking about them. Following from this premise, a
statute permitting a government agency to obtain fees any time a person
unsuccessfully sues concerning actual government action should have

253

Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1347.
Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467-68 (“Indeed it is not easy to imagine how
government could function if it lacked this freedom.”).
255
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-2 (1964) (providing that "error" must
be protected if the freedom of speech is to have the "breathing space" required).
256
Allowing government’s interest in speaking to exist at the expense of constitutional rights is
the tip of the iceberg. Consider how the logic extends beyond governmental communications. If
government’s interest in making statements to promote policies – regardless of the underlying
policy’s importance - trumps the right of persons to sue over such statements, then myriad other
indefinite and insubstantial governmental interests should similarly provide a basis for incursion
upon citizen rights. The First Amendment right to publicly criticize one’s government, the Second
Amendment right to bear arms, the Third Amendment freedom from the burden of quartering
soldiers, the Fourth Amendment’s protections from search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment’s right
against self-incrimination and right to due process, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy trial
and right to a jury trial - all involve individual objectives conflicting with state policies of some sort
and also involve a cost to the government, directly or indirectly.
254
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greater stature than one merely protecting government speech.257 If
protecting mere government speech merits sanctioning the exercise of
citizen rights, extending this logic compels the aberrant conclusion that
the general governmental interest in advancing any policy should always
outweigh incidental infringement of individual rights and permit its
suppression. This unprotective approach to weighing First Amendment
rights against governmental interests fell by the wayside almost 100
years ago, with the opinions of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis
which engendered a rights-protective “clear and present danger” standard
and later, with Brandenburg,258 into a standard lending even greater
protection to rights balanced against the assertion of government
interests.
b.

Recouping the Expense of Entertaining Unsuccessful Citizen
Petitions

The second legislative objective attributed by the court in Vargas II
to California’s anti-SLAPP statute was the advancement of the
governmental interest “in being free of the costs of defending meritless
lawsuits aimed at infringing the government’s free-speech activities.”259
In general, anti-SLAPP statutes are set up to protect persons from
retaliation for rights-based public participation. They operate by
preventing well-heeled, powerful plaintiffs from using the legal process
to squelch those exercising their political rights to oppose a plaintiff’s
objectives: “The paradigm SLAPP is a suit filed by a large land
developer against environmental activists or a neighborhood association
intended to chill the defendants’ continued political or legal opposition to
the developers’ plans.”260
The economics of SLAPPs are explained, as follows:
SLAPP suits are brought to obtain an economic advantage over the
defendant, not to vindicate a legally cognizable right of the plaintiff.
Indeed, one of the common characteristics of a SLAPP suit is its lack
of merit. But lack of merit is not of concern to the plaintiff because
the plaintiff does not expect to succeed in the lawsuit, only to tie up
257
Likewise, a state scheme that discriminates against unsuccessful defendants who assert
the right to trial by jury or right to refuse to testify by imposing government fees incurred
resulting from the exercise of such rights would be proper. This allows the government to
recoup its expense of dealing with troublesome assertions of constitutional rights. Nor, in light
of this purpose, does there seems to be any reason not to impose the governmental expense upon
all defendants who assert those rights (but not upon those who waive them) irrespective of
whether or not they are successful in their defense.
258
See supra note 74, and related text.
259
Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1350.
260
Wilcox v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 815 (1994).
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the defendant’s resources for a sufficient length of time to accomplish
plaintiff’s underlying objective. As long as the defendant is forced to
devote its time, energy and financial resources to combating the
lawsuit its ability to combat the plaintiff in the political arena is
261
substantially diminished.

Consequently, one of the remedies for the SLAPP problem is to prevent
the economic exploitation involved. This is accomplished by relieving
the person who is SLAPPed from the legal expense involved in
defending against the SLAPP so as to enable continued public
participation.262
The foregoing reasoning has no correlation to a government
defendant sued by an earnest, but misguided citizen. The government
agency is not exercising free speech or any other right. Its “public
participation” is merely a corollary of the fact that it is the government
simply doing its job. The genuinely concerned plaintiff is not trying to
punish or retaliate against the government, but is seeking redress—trying
to change or prevent something the government is doing wrong.
Shifting fees upon those who are exercising their rights by publicly
participating—speaking out and criticizing their government’s actions or
policies and seeking legal recourse to change the status quo—does not
serve any anti-SLAPP purpose. The justification for doing so must be
found outside of anti-SLAPP considerations—in the savings to taxpayers
from having to defend against gadflys, cranks, misguided public interest
groups and just plain aggrieved, but mistaken citizens.
The rationale cited by the state in Bullock, as justifying disparate
treatment of candidates who were not able or willing to afford to be on
the ballot, is the same as that relied upon by the court in Vargas II: “if
the State must assume the cost . . . taxpayers will ultimately be burdened
with the expense”.263
The U.S. Supreme Court’s rebuke of that rationale is informative
here. The Court recognized that once the right to participate in the
democratic process (via a primary) is established, it is too late to contend
it is of such lesser stature that its cost may be shifted away from
taxpayers generally to those exercising the right: “Without making light
of the State’s interest in husbanding its revenues, we fail to see such an

261

Id. at 816 (citations omitted). Not only does early termination end the expense of
litigation, but a fee award restores some of the funds diverted by the SLAPP target to combat the
SLAPP.
262
Id. at 817.
263
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 148.
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element of necessity in the State’s present means of financing primaries
as to justify the resulting incursion on the prerogatives of voters.”264
Where citizens seek redress from their government, particularly in
public interest lawsuits, the public benefits directly when that process
vindicates individual rights, exposes government wrongdoing or
improves government practices. Lawsuits amongst parties litigating
private rights do not have the same implications. Such activity
redounding to the public benefit is to be encouraged. If the right to
petition one’s government for redress of grievances means anything, it
means that one who seeks redress in good faith should not be
individually burdened with the governmental expense involved in
making that appeal.
The purported fiscal interest is inevitably tied to suppression of
persons critical of government policies. While characterized as
benefitting taxpayers generally—by saving them the expense of dealing
with the exercise of individual rights which interfere with government
achieving its objectives—this purpose is ultimately misguided. As
Justice Brandeis aptly observed: “Experience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are
beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without
understanding.”265
In view of the overtly political objectives of lawsuits noted in
Borough of Duryea, even unmeritorious litigation must be regarded as
valued and protected in the American political process.266 Yesterday’s
gadfly may be tomorrow’s elected member of Congress or public interest
litigant successfully obtaining a cutting-edge legal result.
The expense to taxpayers of non-frivolous general petitioning
activity is the price of freedom and of a participatory form of
government.267 If the statute’s purpose is truly to allow government to
recoup expenses dealing with some citizen petitions, the benefit of doing

264

Id. at 148-149; see also Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“[W]e
conclude that this interest is not ‘of compelling importance,’ nor is the means of achieving it
‘narrowly drawn.’” (citation omitted)).
265
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
266
BE & K, 536 U.S. at 532 (“Nor does the text of the First Amendment speak in terms of
successful petitioning–it speaks simply of ‘the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.’”).
267
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U. S. 147, 162 (1939) (holding the financial burden to
city when listeners throw speaker’s leaflets on the street does not justify restriction on distribution of
leaflets); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (holding imposition of
parade permit fee designed to offset county’s administration expense invalid where basis for
assessment depended upon the content of the speech and potentially hostile response).
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so is not worth the corrosive effects upon citizen participation.268 If the
statute’s objective is instead to promote First Amendment activity, this
purpose is counteracted by burdening general petitioning.
An extrapolation of the purpose of anti-SLAPP statutes as allowing
government to recoup expenses in dealing with unsuccessful citizen
petitions is not only at odds with anti-SLAPP statutes’ expressly stated
purposes, it is contrary to the well established line of cases indicating
that fee awards in favor of public interest litigants are favored, while
awards against them are disfavored. It is not that fee awards are never
properly granted in favor of government entities against private
persons,269 but that such awards do not comport with anti-SLAPP
objectives, constitutional protection of First Amendment petitioning, or
public policy against burdening those exercising
rights
with
government’s fees incurred responding to that public participation.
C.

APPLYING THE TRUE PURPOSE OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES UNDER
THE NARROW-TAILORING REQUIREMENT OF THE TEST

The conclusion of the Vargas II court, that government use of an
anti-SLAPP statute to obtain fees incidentally burdening citizen petition
rights is narrowly-tailored to serving the government’s purpose, derives
268

Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minn Comm’r. of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586

(1983).
269

The dissent in Bozek pointed out that there are cases allowing such awards, but overlooked
the significant difference between private suits and suits seeking redress from government. In
addition, the dissent did not analyze why the cases it cited all imposed a higher threshold for the
imposition of fee awards in favor of government agents:
Numerous federal cases have indicated that . . . government defendants may recover attorney
fees against private parties who have maliciously pursued civil actions against them. (See,
e.g., Gage v. Wexler (N.D.Cal. 1979) 82 F.R.D. 717, 719-720; Abney v. Ward (S.D.N.Y.
1977) 440 F.Supp. 1129, 1131-1132; Blackburn v. City of Columbus, Ohio (S.D. Ohio 1973)
60 F.R.D. 197, 198-199; cf. Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2d Cir.
1976) 538 F.2d 918, 920-921.) The majority’s constitutional conclusion flies in the face of
these authorities.4
Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 542 (Kaus, J., dissenting). Footnote four elaborated, but none of the cases cited
actually considered the constitutionality of making a private citizen pay government’s fees as the
price of unsuccessfully petitioning:
In fact, the relevant decisions demonstrate that even in the absence of bad faith, there is
nothing unconstitutional in requiring a losing plaintiff to pay attorney fees to a prevailing
government defendant under a generally applicable attorney fee statute. (See, e.g., Gage v.
Wexler, supra, 82 F.R.D. 717, 718-719 (applying standard enunciated in Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421-422); Anthony v. Marion County General
Hospital (5th Cir. 1980) 617 F.2d 1164, 1169-1170; Lujan v. State of N.M. Health & Soc.
Serv. (10th Cir. 1980) 624 F.2d 968, 970; Lopez v. Aransas Cty. Independent Sch. Dist. (5th
Cir. 1978) 570 F.2d 541, 545.) . . .
Id. at 432 n.4.
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from and depends entirely upon whether its identification of
governmental purposes is correct, and whether those government
purposes are valid. Where the purposes identified are inaccurate or
invalid, any narrow tailoring to achieve those purposes is beside the
point.
As has been demonstrated, government has no valid purpose in
suppressing citizen participation either to advance its generalized interest
in speech of no identifiable significance or to recoup the expense of
handling citizens’ assertions of their rights. The problem with the
Vargas II analysis is its flawed and errant concoction of these supposed
purposes supporting government use of an anti-SLAPP statute. While
the means of burdening and suppressing citizen petitioning activity are
closely attuned to achieving the ends identified by the Vargas II court,
those purported objectives really have nothing to do with the genuine
evil addressed by anti-SLAPP statutes.
Treating the narrow-tailoring analysis in terms of the actual
objective of anti-SLAPP statutes—promoting and encouraging public
participation, rather than the revisionist purpose assigned by the Vargas
II court, yields a very different and inescapable conclusion. The actual
anti-SLAPP purpose in protecting such First Amendment rights is not
served by allowing government agents to punish and chill First
Amendment activity of good faith litigants. That would be hypocrisy.
There is no substantial relationship between the end and a means that is
counter to that end. Nor is the burdening of petition rights the least
restrictive means to achieving that objective.
VII. ANALYTIC DIFFICULTIES WITH BESTOWING ANTI-SLAPP
PROTECTION UPON GOVERNMENT SPEECH IN LIGHT OF
THE “ARISING FROM” REQUIREMENT
Justice Souter, concurring in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
observed: “Because the government speech doctrine . . . is ‘recently
minted,’ it would do well for us to go slow in setting its bounds, which
will affect existing doctrine in ways not yet explored.”270 Difficulties
with the undefined parameters of the government speech doctrine have
been created by: 1) the resemblance of government acts to private First
Amendment activity; and 2) the similarity of the protections bestowed
upon the private exercise of rights to acts of government power. There is
a marked tendency to confabulate government speech with private
petitioning and speech and to treat it in the same manner as a protected
right.
270

Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 485 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring).
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This confusion is evident in California common law construing
section 425.16 as privileging government speech over citizen petitioning
and as treating statements made by private actors as unprotected while
statements made in identical contexts by government agents are held
protected. To understand how this paradoxical construction developed,
we will start with the statute, then look at how the courts have interpreted
section 425.16 in the private context, and then compare this treatment to
that bestowed upon government speech. This analysis will reveal how
confusion over the position government speech occupies in the
constitutional firmament has resulted in an awkward and unorthodox
judicial approach to both government speech and to government use of
anti-SLAPP statutes.
A.

THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL OVERBREADTH

The inappropriateness of treating all government conduct recited in
subsection (e) of California’s section 425.16 as protected becomes
glaring upon examining the vast expanse of such activity described as an
“act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.”271 Because this language was framed to protect all kinds of
citizen activity involving participation in public issues, it describes all
manner of interaction with government bodies, procedures, agencies and
officials. 272
When applied to government actors, section 425.16(e)’s literal
application in that context ipso facto encompasses almost any of the
myriad functions of government agencies and anything a government
agent says or does. Courts have tended to treat government actors
performing such functions as protected by California’s anti-SLAPP
statute. Comparable bureaucratic conduct by private sector actors—
reports, claims, investigations, administrative proceedings, hiring

271
272

See Siam v. Kizilbash, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1563, 1569-1570 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.16(e) states:

As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1)
any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.
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decisions and communications and advertisements—has been held to not
constitute an act in furtherance of speech or petitioning.273 Under the
former approach, it is the activity’s relationship to government that is
regarded as imbuing it with anti-SLAPP status, not the activity’s
relationship to the exercise of rights.274 Under the latter approach, antiSLAPP protection is dependent upon a nexus to rights-based conduct.275
Application of the anti-SLAPP statute to private situations that are
comparable to government processes has been limited to those special
circumstances where a proceeding is required by public law and subject
to review by mandamus276 or involves a matter in the public interest.277
Judicial treatment addressing what government activity encompassed by
the broad language of section 425.16 is subject to anti-SLAPP protection
also betrays deep-seated confusion over the nature and relationship of
rights and government power.

273

See, e.g., Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1400 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (holding allegations of claims handling misconduct relating to report not subject to
motion to strike); Scott v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 404, 418 (holding
commercial speech about product safety for purposes of sales does not constitute an issue of public
interest); Century 21 Chamberlain v. Haberman (2009) 173 Cal. App. 4th 1, 5 (holding statute does
not protect the initiation of private arbitration); People ex re. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 809 (alleged fraudulent insurance reports); Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th
1508 (allegedly improper non-judicial foreclosure); Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 199
(alleged improper preparation of document); People ex rel. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Building Permit
Consultants, Inc. (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 280 (alleged fraudulent estimates, reports); Lafayette
Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 855, 863, n.5 (newspaper
publication of allegedly libelous material). Compare, Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 798, and Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 226 (both
involving public issues and decided after the 1997 amendment adding subsection (e)(4) which
protects “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”);
State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Majorino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 974, 977 (insurer's action for
declaratory relief did not arise from defendants’ lawsuit against the insured, but rather arose from the
insured's tender of defense to insurer and the terms of an insurance policy, so anti-SLAPP statute did
not apply); Min v. Tanaka (2nd Dist.Div4,2008) B202175 (unpublished decision) (in lawsuit over
driveway construction the fact the claim related to the permit process did not place it within scope of
anti-SLAPP law).
274
See Siam, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1569-1570.
275
Infra, Section VII B 1 a.
276
Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist., 39 Cal. 4th 192, 203 (Cal. 2006); but
see Olaes v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th 1501 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding a
private company’s sexual harassment grievance protocol did not constitute an official proceeding
authorized by law).
277
Cabrera v. Alam, 197 Cal.App.4th 1077 (Cal.2011), 1087-1088 (statements made during a
board meeting prior to the election for directors of a homeowners association covered); Damon v.
Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal.App.4th 468 (Cal.2000) (holding conduct involving
homeowners association was protected, observing: "The definition of 'public interest' within the
meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly construed to include not only governmental
matters, but also private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a
community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity." Id. at 479).
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JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-SLAPP “ARISING FROM”
PREREQUISITE FOR PROTECTED CONDUCT APPLIED TO
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

California’s anti-SLAPP statute does not differentiate between
communication and other acts.278 It allows a motion to strike for a cause
of action “arising from any act” of the defendant in “furtherance” of free
speech or petitioning. 279 It covers activities which include both speech
and other conduct implicating the First Amendment.280 Other states use
the same terminology281 or “based on”282 or something similar283 to
insulate activity involving exercise of a First Amendment right from

278

See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1116 (Cal. 1999)
(resolving a conflict in the appellate courts over whether anti-SLAPP protection was limited to
expressive activity by rejecting the limited view that Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 425.16 only protects
“expressive” conduct); see also Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 10461047 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 425.16 “requires simply any writing or
statement made in, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by, the specified
proceeding or body. Thus these clauses safeguard free speech and petition conduct aimed at
advancing self government, as well as conduct aimed at more mundane pursuits.”); but see Zhao v.
Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 1125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), disapproved by Briggs v. Eden Council for
Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106 (Cal. 1999) (advancing the view that the anti-SLAPP statute
was intended by the Legislature to protect activity “with a particularly clear focus on expressive
conduct.”)
279
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE. § 425.16(b)(1)
280
Cal. Civ. Pro. Code. § 425.16(e)
281
Guam (7 Guam Code §17105); Hawaii(Haw.Rev.Stat. §634(F-2); Illinois (Ill.Comp.Stat.
110/15); Indiana (Ind. Code §34-7-7-9(d)); Maine (Me.Rev.Stat.§556); Massachusetts (Mass.Gen.
Laws.§59H); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003 (“If a legal action is based on, relates to, or is
in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association,
that party may file a motion to dismiss the legal action.”); Washington (Wash.Rev.Code
§4.24.525(4)(b)).
282
District of Columbia (D.C.Law §16-5502(a)); Georgia (Ga.Code §9-11-11.2); Louisiana
(LA.Code.Civ.Proc.§971(A)(1)); Oregon (Or.Rev.Stat.§31.150(2)); Vermont (Vt.Stat.Ann.
§1041(a)).
283
Similarly, Arkansas’ statute protects, conduct “in furtherance of the right of free speech or
the right to petition”.(Ark.Code §16-63-504); Delaware covers conduct “materially related to any
efforts of the defendant to report on, rule on, challenge or oppose” permit and other applicants for
government entitlements. (Del.Code.Ann. §8136(a)(1)-(2)); Minnesota provides protection where a
claim “materially relates to an act of the moving party that involves public participation.”
(Minn.Stat.§54.02); Missouri and New Mexico protect “conduct or speech undertaken or made in
connection with” official proceedings. (Mo.Rev.Stat.§537.528(1)), (N.M.Stat.Ann.§38-2-9.1(A));
Rhode Island protects the exercise of one’s right of petition or of free speech . . . in connection with
a matter of public concern”. (R.I.Gen.Laws §9-33-2); Nebraska protects against an action “involving
public petition and participation”. (Neb.Rev.Stat.§25-21,244-246); Nevada provides protection for a
“good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition”. (Nev.Rev.Stat.§41.637);
Tennessee immunizes communications to a government agency “in furtherance of” a “person's right
of free speech or petition. . . in connection with a public or governmental issue”. (Tenn.
Code.Ann.§4-21-1003); Maryland covers public communications and communications to
government “to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge, oppose, or in any other way exercise
rights under the First Amendment . . .” Maryland (Md.Code.Ann. Cts&Jud. Proc.§5-807(b)-(c));
New York protects “efforts. . . to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose” permit and
other applicants; (N.Y.Civ.Rts,§76-a(1)(a)).
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suppressive, retaliatory, meritless lawsuits. Such statutory language
expansively describing contexts in which protected statements may occur
is interpreted by courts to involve inquiry into the nature of the liability
asserted. In other words, courts look beyond whether a statement was
merely made in a described setting.
Massachusetts, for example, has addressed whether anti-SLAPP
protection covers activity that is not rights-based. Unlike California’s,
Massachusetts’ statute seeks to protect petitioning activity, but not free
speech activity.284 Like California’s law, however, it does so by broadly
covering statements made in official proceedings without qualifying that
the statements must actually involve or further exercise of First
Amendment rights.285 In Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., the
Massachusetts high court recognized that inquiry into whether First
Amendment activity is the primary basis for liability is compelled by the
balancing of respective petition rights at stake: “By protecting one
party’s exercise of its right of petition, unless it can be shown to be sham
petitioning, the statute impinges on the adverse party’s exercise of its
right to petition, even when it is not engaged in sham petitioning.”286
To avoid constitutional infirmity and to remain consistent with the
statute’s objective of disposing “expeditiously of meritless lawsuits that
may chill petitioning activity,” the court construed “based on” to exclude
“meritorious claims with a substantial basis other than or in addition to
the petitioning activities implicated.”287
The same analysis was recently approved in Maine and Illinois.
Nader v. Maine Democratic Party rejected an overbroad treatment of
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. 288 Recognizing the negative impact upon
the petition rights of litigants, and particularly the plaintiff there, Ralph
Nader, a candidate for elected office, the court acknowledged the
paramount protection bestowed upon petitioning entailing more than the
resolution of private disputes: “Petitions to the government assume an
added dimension when they seek to advance political, social, or other
ideas of interest to the community as a whole.”289
The Illinois Supreme Court likewise followed Duracraft.290 It held
Illinois’ anti-SLAPP statute should be construed in keeping with its
284

Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, Note, The Special Motion Requirements of the Massachusetts
Anti-SLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the Face for Traditional Civil Practice and Procedure, 16 B.U.
Pub. Int.L.J. 97, 101-102 (Fall 2006).
285
286

Id.
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp, 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998)..
Id.
288
Nader v. Maine Democratic Party, 41 A.3d 551, 554 (Me. 2012).
289
Id. at 559 n.8.
290
Sandholm v. Kueker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 431 (Ill. 2012).
287
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intent and did not “immunize defamation or other intentional torts.”291
The court rejected an approach inquiring as to the defendant’s motives:
“If a plaintiff’s complaint genuinely seeks redress for damages from
defamation or other intentional torts . . . it is irrelevant whether the
defendants’ actions were ‘genuinely aimed at procuring favorable
government action, result, or outcome.’”292 The court concluded:
Not only is a suit subject to cursory dismissal . . . but the plaintiff is
prohibited from conducting discovery, except through leave of court,
and is required to pay defendant’s attorney fees incurred in connection
with the motion. In light of the severe penalties imposed on a plaintiff
under the Act, we will not read into the statute an intent to establish a
293
new, qualified privilege absent an explicit statement of such intent.

California courts likewise have recognized the accommodation of
countervailing rights involved and evaluate whether a plaintiff’s action is
brought substantially because of protected activity or whether First
Amendment activity is merely incidental to the liability:
The applicable test is whether the allegations referring to arguably
unprotected activity are only incidental or collateral to a cause of
action based essentially on protected activity, and therefore we
examine the principal thrust or predominant nature of the complaint to
294
determine applicability of the anti-SLAPP statutory scheme.

Based upon this constitutionally compelled inquiry, California courts in
suits involving private litigants hold that merely because a statement was
made in an official proceeding described by the state’s anti-SLAPP
statute, it does not necessarily follow that the liability pertaining to that
statement relates to an exercise of the speaker’s First Amendment rights.
Where the defendant’s statement is not imbued with First Amendment
stature, the interest in protecting the defendant does not outweigh the
plaintiff’s First Amendment right to seek redress from the courts.
Consequently, statements literally described by the statute are not

291

Id. at 429.
Id. at 433.
293
Id. at 432. The balance achieved by the Illinois decision has been criticized for going
beyond Duracraft and making availability of anti-SLAPP protection depend upon the genuineness of
the plaintiff’s intent in bringing suit. Charles E. Harris and Victoria D. McCoy, Applying Illinois’s
Anti-SLAPP Statute Following the Illinois Supreme Court’s Decision in Sandholm v. Kuecker,
MARTINDALE.COM (Feb. 1, 2012), www.martindale.com/Government/article_Mayer-BrownLLP_1431038.htm.
294
Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 585 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
292

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/4

62

Andre: Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & Government Speech

2014]

Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & Government Speech

177

afforded anti-SLAPP protection where they do not actually involve the
speaker’s rights-based activity. 295
When it comes to government defendants, since government agents
have no First Amendment speech or petitioning rights, the inquiry into
whether an act was protected First Amendment conduct or not, makes no
sense. 296 The judicial focus has instead often devolved upon the statute’s
reference to “statements” occurring in various governmental settings.297
However, treating any governmental statement made in the specified
contexts as warranting protection regardless of First Amendment
significance also makes no sense. This approach would not correspond
with the anti-SLAPP statute’s objective in protecting and encouraging
First Amendment participatory activity. For example, anti-SLAPP
statutes protect private actors in regard to subsection (e)(1) and (e)(2)
“official proceedings” and in regard to a subsection (e)(3) and (e)(4)
“issue of public interest” because of the significance individual activity
has to self-governance in a popular sovereignty.298 In the case of
extending this protection to government actors, the anti-SLAPP statute
would really just be protecting governmental actions, not protecting any
activity endowed with constitutional significance. To the extent it would
privilege government action over the petition rights of citizen litigants,
bestowing such protection would be counter to the anti-SLAPP statute’s
overarching objective.
Since the wording of the statute frames the anti-SLAPP movant as
the person whose First Amendment rights must be furthered by the
conduct, a government agent would seemingly be unable to claim

295

Garretson v. Post, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding acts and
statements made in pursuing a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding are not protected); Blackburn v.
Brady, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding bids made at sheriff’s auction were
not protected activity); Kajima Engineering & Constr. v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 187,
189 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding filing of a lawsuit, submission of bids to a city to obtain a
construction contract, and written requests for payment not protected)., A.F. Brown Electrical
Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc., 41 Cal.Rptr.3d (2006)(Submission of stop notices
relating to a construction project.); Wang, supra. (Applications for development permits.) Panakosta
Partners, LP v. Hammer Lane Mgt., LLC, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 835 (2011)(Lawsuit for dissolution of
partnership.)
296
While the court in Vargas I declined to rule on the question, the lower courts recognized
the court’s cue as a departure from the line of cases that had previously premised government’s
ability to utilize the anti-SLAPP statute upon a government “right” and have specifically
acknowledged that government agents have no free speech rights when acting in their official
capacities. See USA Waste of Cal., Inc. v, City of Irwindale, 184 Cal. App. 4th 53, 62 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010 (“The First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to government
speech.”); see also Vargas II, 200 Cal App. 4th at 1347 (“Plaintiffs are correct that the First
Amendment does not explicitly grant the government the right to speak.”).
297
CAL. CIV PRO. CODE § 425.16(e).
298
CAL. CIV PRO. CODE § 425.16(a).
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vicarious protection for furthering participatory acts of actual persons.299
The Vargas I court’s use of the term “statements” rather than “acts” may
reflect the statute’s pinpoint of “other conduct”300 involving the exercise
of rights and as literally not including government.
In any event, the correct focus for anti-SLAPP purposes is not
merely whether a statement was made,301 but whether the lawsuit at issue
arises from actual First Amendment activity. This is where application
of anti-SLAPP statutes to government activity has gone seriously awry.
It is critical to understand how courts have treated the requirement that a
statement or act must be “based on” or “arise from” First Amendment
activity in the context of private activity before considering the treatment
given comparable governmental statements or acts.
1.

California’s Judicial Application of the “Arising From”
Requirement to Lawsuits Based Upon Private Speech and
Petitioning

a.

Cotati & Navellier

The California supreme court directly rejected the view that the antiSLAPP statute applies to all statements made in the governmental
299

But see Vergos v McNeal, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1387, 1399 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding
that “[s]ection 425.16 ‘does not require that a defendant. . . demonstrate that its protected statements
or writings were made on its own behalf (rather than, for example, on behalf of its clients or the
general public.”). However, the court in Vergos did not consider the statute’s limiting language in
finding that a public agency hearing officer could avail herself of §425.16’s protection because she
was advancing the First Amendment actions of others. Courts have not considered the implications
of providing vicarious constitutional protection to government asserting First Amendment rights of
individuals in abstentia. See, e.g.,, Kearney v. Foley, 590 F.3d 638, 644-645 (9th Cir. 2009). The
difficulty in pushing the logic that government is acting on behalf of citizens and therefore deserves
the same protection they would enjoy is that theoretically government is always acting on behalf of
citizens. Fundamental to the concept of rights is that they exist to protect minority interests against
majoritarian power represented by the State. Making the call as to whether a government is
representing individual or governmental interests is a chicken-egg question—neither answerable nor
a proper exercise of judicial power. Another analytic obstacle, even without the limiting language of
subsection (b)(1), is that rights are generally considered personal and non-assignable. See Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-134 (1978) (holding one person may not invoke another’s Fourth
Amendment right).
300
Vargas I’s language was limited to protection of government “statements” falling under
§425.16 (e)’s description of covered conduct. Subsection (e) goes beyond “statements” in only one
particular. Subsection (e)(4) describes an “act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free
speech” as including “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.”
301
Obviously some free "speech" is not really speech (shouting “fire” in a crowded theater, a
statement reneging on a contract, obscenity) for First Amendment purposes and does not enjoy
protection. Meanwhile, some non-speech is protected (expressive acts, filing a lawsuit, acts of
association).
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contexts described by subsection (e) in City of Cotati v. Cashman.302
There, mobile home park owners sued the City of Cotati in federal court
for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, with respect to the
City’s efforts to enforce a rent-control ordinance applicable to mobile
home parks.303 The City responded by suing in state court for
declaratory relief relating to the same facts.304 The park owners filed an
anti-SLAPP motion as to the City’s state lawsuit.305 The court
considered the issue of whether the City’s lawsuit should be regarded as
“arising from” the lawsuit filed by the owners (qualifying as protected
petitioning activity), and thus subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.306
The court recognized that the mere fact the one lawsuit was filed in
response to the other “does not mean it arose from that activity.”307 The
court pointed out that it was a different matter where a countersuit was
brought based upon the first suit (i.e., a malicious prosecution or abuse
of process suit), and stated:
To construe “arising from” in section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) as
meaning “in response to,” as Owners have urged, would in effect
render all cross-actions potential SLAPPs. We presume the
Legislature did not intend such an absurd result. Absurdity aside, to
suggest that all cross-actions arise from the causes of action in
response to which they are pled would contravene the statutory
scheme governing cross-complaints . . . . Indeed, Owners’ counsel,
when arguing before the trial court, acknowledged City’s action could
not be a SLAPP if City had filed it as a counterclaim in Owners’
308
federal action.

The California supreme court did not stop with recognizing that a crosscomplaint premised on the same factual circumstances as the complaint
or raising unrelated counterclaims against a plaintiff is not automatically
subject to a motion to strike. It went on to state that even purely tactical
considerations driving the filing do not amount to a SLAPP.309
Applying this approach to the situation in Cotati yielded no
surprises. Instead of looking at the form of the legal theory, the
gravamen of the cause of action stated by the cross-complaint, the
302

City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 76-77 (Cal. 2002).
Id. at 72
304
Id.
305
Id. at 72-73
306
Id. at 76
307
Id. at 76-77
308
Id. at 77 (citation omitted); see also Navellier v. Sletton, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 90-91 (Cal.
303

2002).
309

City of Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 78-79.
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strategic considerations behind that filing or the fact that it was filed in
response to a lawsuit, the court focused upon whether, factually, the
reason the cross-complaint was brought was protected First Amendment
activity. The court observed that the activity producing the suit was an
underlying controversy, not the federal lawsuit it incited.
That the constitutionality of an ordinance can be a proper subject for
declaratory relief is without doubt. . . . In this case, as the Court of Appeal
stated, a dispute exists between the parties over the constitutionality of
Cotati Ordinance No. 680. And just as Owners’ lawsuit itself was not the
actual controversy underlying Owners’ request for declaratory relief in
federal court, neither was that lawsuit the actual controversy underlying
City’s state court request for declaratory relief. Rather, the actual
controversy giving rise to both actions—the fundamental basis of each
request for declaratory relief—was the same underlying controversy
respecting City’s ordinance. City’s cause of action therefore was not one
arising from Owners’ federal suit. Accordingly, City’s action was not
310
subject to a special motion to strike.

In a companion case, the California supreme court elaborated
further on this point. In Navellier v. Sletton, the court explained a court’s
duty to look at whether First Amendment activity is the basis for claimed
liability:
As is discussed at length in Cotati . . . the mere fact that an action was
filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose
from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.
Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been “triggered”
by protected activity does not entail it is one arising from such. In the
anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of
action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning
311
activity.

The claimed liability in Navellier involved a complex backdrop of
federal suits, countersuits, and settlement.312 Following execution of a
release by the parties, the plaintiff continued prosecuting the federal
lawsuit.313 The defendant counterclaimed, challenging the validity of the
release.314 Plaintiff then sued in state court claiming a breach of the
310

Id. at 79-81.
Navallier, 29 Cal. 4th at 89 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
312
See id. at 86-87.
313
Id. at 86.
314
Id.
311
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release terms, and fraud concerning the defendant’s representations as to
compliance with the release.315 The defendant responded to this reaction
to his challenge to the validity of the release by filing a motion to
strike.316 In holding that each of the defendant’s alleged acts and
omissions fell squarely within the statute’s purview as protected
petitioning or speech, the court found that his negotiation and execution
of the release, his arguments contesting its validity, and his counterclaim
were “statement[s] or writing[s] made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a . . . judicial body,” or “made before a . .
judicial proceeding” within the meaning of sections 425.16(e)(1) and
(e)(2).317
The court explained the first showing that must be made by a party
bringing a motion to strike is to establish that the basis for the cause of
action is protected activity. Not surprisingly, more than the mere fact
that a defendant’s petitioning (a lawsuit) was involved or that official
actions were implicated was required.318
The court also recognized that it was necessary that the cause of
action319 arise from defendant’s First Amendment petitioning or speech,
observing that the constitutional right of petition encompasses filing
litigation and concluding, “Sletten is being sued because of the
affirmative counterclaims he filed in federal court.”320 The court zeroed
in on the flaw in the plaintiff’s attempt to mischaracterize the lawsuit as
simply based upon fraud or breach of contract:

315

Id. at 87.
Id.
317
Id. at 90.
318
Id. at 89-90.
319
An obvious source of confusion for attorneys and judges seeking to wrap the legal mind
around the “arising from” analysis emanates from use of two terms of art: “cause of action” and
“gravamen.” The phrase “cause of action” is used colloquially as synonymous with a count
expressing a legal theory of recovery in a complaint. Additionally, in one important legal context
the terms are understood in relation to the concept of a plaintiff’s primary right: the basic legal
wrong for which the plaintiff seeks recovery. See, 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d), Pleading § 22.
For example, a complaint may include various counts: fraud, negligence, breach of contract and so
on. But the gravamen of the complaint may be one basic wrong sounding in tort: the defendant
intentionally falsely promised some material thing, took plaintiff’s money and did not deliver. In the
anti-SLAPP context, judicial use of these terms does not have the same meaning and is misleading.
The inquiry is not into the “cause of action” in the sense of determining the legal theory or the
primary right involved. Instead, it probes whether the reason for the lawsuit was constitutionally
protected activity. So, when decisions engaged in this evaluation refer to the “gravamen,” “gestalt”
or “principal thrust” for the claim, they are not trying to place the lawsuit as sounding in equity as
opposed to law or fraud as opposed to contract, they are seeking to gauge whether the main reason
for the plaintiff’s suit was First Amendment activity or something else. One court in addressing this
misleading terminology and rejecting an approach seeking to divine the metaphysical essence of the
action observed, “We are admonished to examine the act underlying the cause of action, not the gist
of the cause of action.” Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1190; see also, the
Wallace court’s discussion at n.5.
320
Id. at 90.
316
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The logical flaw in plaintiffs’ argument is its false dichotomy between
actions that target “the formation or performance of contractual
obligations” and those that target “the exercise of the right of free
speech.” A given action, or cause of action, may indeed target both.
As the facts in this lawsuit illustrate, conduct alleged to constitute
breach of contract may also come within constitutionally protected
speech or petitioning. The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is
not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the
defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.
Evidently, “[t]he Legislature recognized that ‘all kinds of claims could
achieve the objective of a SLAPP suit—to interfere with and burden
the defendant’s exercise of his or her rights.’” Considering the purpose
of the [anti-SLAPP] provision, expressly stated, the nature or form of
the action is not what is critical but rather that it is against a person
321
who has exercised certain rights.

Thus, the California Supreme Court clearly tethered
anti-SLAPP
protection to the exercise of First Amendment rights, not context, and
rejected the idea that conduct not associated with the exercise of such
rights merits anti-SLAPP protection.
b.

Lower California court treatment of the requirement that the cause
of action must arise from First Amendment activity

From Cotati and Navellier, it can be understood that merely because
a written or oral statement was made in relation to activity falling under
subsection (e) does not mean the liability in question is per se premised
upon protected activity and subject to a motion to strike. Certainly, this
has been the understanding of the lower courts applying the logic of
those decisions. For example, Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles involved a lawsuit to collect for construction work
on a city contract.322 The court held that First Amendment activity was
not the basis for liability.323 The basis for the cross-complaint was
instead the movant’s bidding and contracting practices.324
The court in Kajima rejected an anti-SLAPP motion premised upon
the mere filing of a cross-complaint in response to Kajima’s lawsuit
without any showing “that the amended cross-complaint ‘alleges acts in
furtherance of [Kajima’s] right of petition or free speech in connection
321

Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 95 Cal. App. 4th 921,
924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
323
Id. at 935
324
Id. at 933
322
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with a public issue.’”325 The court recognized that, in spite of the
subsection (e) context, the anti-SLAPP statute had no application where
the City’s cause of action did not arise from protected acts.326 The court
stressed the critical difference between acts or conduct relating to
litigation and acts and conduct in furtherance of speech and petitioning:
We publish this opinion, however, to emphasize that a cross-complaint
or independent lawsuit filed in response to, or in retaliation for,
threatened or actual litigation is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute
simply because it may be viewed as an oppressive litigation tactic. No
lawsuit is properly subject to a special motion to strike under section
425.16 unless its allegations arise from acts in furtherance of the right
327
of petition or free speech.

Lending protection where any liability claim involves statements poses a
basic problem that should be avoided after Cotati and Navellier. This is
easily illustrated by an example. Let’s say an employer accused of a
highly publicized Ponzi scheme publicly announces an employee that is
the subject of the investigation is being let go “because she is a woman.”
When the employee sues, the employer should not be able to rely upon
free speech considerations in invoking
anti-SLAPP
protection.
Certainly, a statement was made and the employer’s right to speak is
protected. But the liability arises not from protected speech on a matter
of public interest, but from the act of discrimination. By contrast, the
employer’s statement, “She’s fired because she cooked the books,”
would entitle the employer to raise anti-SLAPP protection against the
employee’s suit for slander.
Failing to look at anything more than the fact that a claimed liability
involves a statement would disregard the distinction between whether
First Amendment activity is the basis for bringing the claim, or whether
the statement is merely peripheral to or evidence of a different,

325

Id. at 929 (citation omitted).
Id. (“This error is fatal to Kajima’s motion: The amended cross-complaint alleges causes
of action arising from Kajima’s bidding and contracting practices, not from acts in furtherance of its
right of petition or free speech.”)
327
Id. at 924; see Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1388,
1399 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding protected communicative acts were merely evidence supporting
the liability, not the alleged wrongful act itself); see also Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l., Inc., 113 Cal.
App. 4th 181, 184-185 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a product liability suit involving
commercial statements made concerning the merits of a dietary supplement were not the basis for
the plaintiff’s cause of action and thus were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute “merely
because the complaint also alleges the manufacturer or seller engaged in commercial speech”); see
also, Scott v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 404, 416-417 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that statements made in products advertising were not the basis for liability in products liability
action).
326
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unprotected, underlying basis.328 With Cotati and Navellier, California
recognized that failing to look beyond the context and the mere fact that
a claim of liability involves a statement disregards that distinction. Cotati
emphasized that whether a lawsuit ensues from or involves contexts
described by the statute is not the proper inquiry: “In short, the statutory
phrase ‘cause of action . . . arising from’ means simply that the
defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have
been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.”329 The
form of the asserted liability is also not controlling, merely because a
lawsuit is framed as one for discrimination does not mean the activity
giving rise to the liability is not protected.330
To recap, a clear distinction has been drawn by California and other
appellate courts between liability arising from First Amendment conduct
and liability that arises for other reasons. This involves an inquiry into
whether the activity forming the basis for liability is actually First
Amendment activity, or something else. Judicial acceptance of this
distinction is particularly illustrated by courts’ treatment of attorneys
who are sued for acts related to the litigation process.

328
Martinez, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 188 (“[W]hen the allegations referring to arguably protected
activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral
allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.”);
Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820 (stating in the hypothetical of a lawsuit against a defendant whose
act was burning down a developer’s office in political protest, the incidental First Amendment aspect
meant “the defendant’s motion to strike could be summarily denied without putting the developer to
the burden of establishing the probability of success on the merits in a tort suit against defendant.”);
but see Thomas v. Quintero, 126 Cal. App. 4th 635, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the
primary reason the suit had been brought was not the torts of trespassing, infliction of emotional
distress, blocking the passage of churchgoers, etc., but First Amendment activity). See, Tri-City
Healthcare Dist. v. Sterling (4th Dist. 2011) D060431 (unpublished) (Censured board member who
sought to enter meeting from which she was barred was sued for trespass, assault, battery, injury to
business reputation and dilution, and negligence. The court of appeal rejected the plaintiff’s position
that the basis for the action was Sterling’s violence involved in “violating the Board's resolutions and
disobeying disciplinary measures imposed because of her disruptive behavior.” (Slip Opn. at 17-18)
and held the protected conduct giving rise to the claims “was Sterling’s desire for access to a public
meeting room to express her views to the board members, or her constituents in the audience” (Slip
Opn. at 19)); Yan v. Sing (1st Dist. 2008) No. A120311 (unpublished) (Where reporter sought to
photograph and interview trial witness and witness sued for assault, the activity was held to be in
furtherance of right of free speech). So, the anti-SLAPP prong one inquiry searches beyond
allegations and involves evaluating the facts to prevent frustration of “the purposes of the SLAPP
statute through a pleading tactic of combining allegations of protected and nonprotected activity
under the label of one ‘cause of action.’” Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.
App. 4th 294, 308.
329
Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 71.
330
See Tuszynska v. Cunningham, 199 Cal. App. 4th 257, 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding
that a lawsuit for alleged gender discriminatory assignment of attorneys to litigation was based upon
the “attorney selection and litigation funding decisions themselves,” and thus an activity
substantially tied to protected petitioning activity).
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The analogy to cases involving attorneys

Outside of government use of the anti-SLAPP statute, in cases
where the basis for liability underlying the veneer of an official
proceeding is something other than First Amendment conduct, courts in
a robust body of case law consistently have found anti-SLAPP protection
does not apply in spite of literal application of subsection (e). This
departure from the judicial treatment afforded governmental activity is
especially apparent in lawsuits charging attorneys with a breach of duties
related to, but separate from the litigation process—misfeasance or
malpractice. For example, an attorney who allegedly
commits
malpractice or reneges upon a promise to represent a client for a certain
fee is not covered, even though statements might occur during the course
of litigation. Attorney malfeasance is not invariably protected by antiSLAPP statutes because the operative conduct from which liability often
arises is not the actual conduct of litigation, but instead other related
activity.331 This tracks the essential distinction illuminated in Navellier.
This inquiry involves looking beyond whether statements were
merely made in a legal proceeding to whether the statement is connected
to actual petitioning activity. In Paul v. Friedman, a lawyer brought an
anti-SLAPP motion as to a securities broker’s allegations that the
attorney had in a prior arbitration proceeding concerning alleged
securities fraud disclosed to the broker’s clients and others personal
details about the broker’s financial affairs, spending habits, tax liabilities,
and intimate relationship with another individual.332 The attorney
asserted his conduct was protected because it was undertaken “in
connection with” the arbitration.333
In finding the attorney’s conduct did not “arise from” protected
activity, the court of appeal recognized that section 425.16 “does not
accord anti-SLAPP protection to suits arising from any act having any
connection, however remote, with an official proceeding. The statements
or writings in question must occur in connection with ‘an issue under
consideration or review’ in the proceeding.”334 Statements that “bear [ ]
no relationship to” or “ha[ve] nothing to do with the claims under
consideration” in the litigation do not satisfy prong one’s requirement

331

The courts have not blinked at providing anti-SLAPP protection for an attorney in spite of
the fact that the lawyer is doing the petitioning of someone else—a client—in the litigation process.
This vicarious treatment would seem to be directly at odds with the requirement that anti-SLAPP
protection is personal – it only extends to acts by a person in furtherance of their personal speech or
petition rights. CAL CIV. PRO. CODE §425.16(b)(1).
332
Paul v. Friedman, 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 857-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
333
Id. at 865.
334
Id. at 866.
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that First Amendment activity be the basis for the liability.335 The
investigation and disclosure of the plaintiff’s private information,
although “in connection with” the proceeding, were not tied to issues
under review in the arbitration proceeding.336
There are numerous instances of attorney malfeasance in which an
overlay of litigation was involved, statements were made and yet
attorneys were unable to avail themselves of section 425.16 because the
liability in question was not for protected litigation activity, but was
based on related, but separate wrongful conduct.337

335

Id.
Id. at 867-68.
337
In spite of the existence of statements made in contexts where protection would otherwise
be available, but the cause of action is not actually based upon First Amendment conduct, the courts,
following Cotati and Navellier have consistently declined to apply anti-SLAPP protections. See
Kolar v. Donaine. McIntosh & Hammerton, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1535 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(“Legal malpractice is not an activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. That the malpractice
allegedly occurred in the course of petitioning activity does not mean the claim arose from the
activity itself.”); California Back Specialists Medical Group v. Rand, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1032, 1037
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Not all attorney conduct in connection with litigation, or in the course of
representing clients, is protected by section 425.16”); Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp, 114 Cal.
App. 4th 624, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a cause of action for legal malpractice was not
subject to an anti-SLAPP motion because the cause of action did not arise from furtherance of
speech or petitioning, but from negligent failure to serve timely discovery responses); Freeman v.
Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a contract and tort action
against attorney for representing adverse interests in litigation not subject to anti-SLAPP statute);
Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182 (action against estate planning attorney for participation
in breach of trust not subject to anti-SLAPP motion); Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299
(plaintiff’s cause of action based upon the defendant attorney’s letter was not based upon protected
activity where the letter "constituted criminal extortion”. Id. at p. 311.); McConnell v. Innovative
Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 176-177 (basis for liability
underlying plaintiff's claims of retaliation and wrongful termination was imposition of restrictive
work conditions, not a letter written by the employer's attorney imposing the conditions); United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1617 (
§425.16 did not apply in action to enjoin law firm from representing another party based upon “a
disqualifying conflict of interest” arising out of the firm’s former representation of U.S. Fire in
another matter because the complaint did not arise out of protected activity since “the principal
thrust of the misconduct averred in the underlying complaint [was] the acceptance by Sheppard
Mullin of representation adverse to U.S. Fire” Id. at 1628.); Prediwave Corporation v. Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204 (anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to suit
against law firm for “(1) breach of fiduciary duty by defendants, (2) constructive fraud by
defendants, (3) legal malpractice by defendants, and (4) violation of Business and Professions Code
section 17200 et seq.” (Id. at 1209), where the principal thrust of the action was that the defendant
law firm represented two clients in matters in which they had an irreconcilable conflict of interest.
Id. at 1226-1227); Hylton v. Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264 (§425.16 did
not apply to action against attorney based on an unconscionable contingency fee where the gravamen
of the cause of action rested “on the alleged violation of Rogozienski’s fiduciary obligations to
Hylton by giving Hylton false advice to induce him to pay an excessive fee to Rogozienski.” Id. at
1274); Robles v. Chalilpoyil (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 566 (action against law firm for negligence and
conspiracy to commit fraud was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute where: “The gravamen of this
cause of action is not litigation-related speech or petitioning activity on respondents’ behalf; it was
conduct outside the litigation—specifically, suppression of information about defendants’ business
relationship—which deprived respondents of the representation for which they had retained
defendants.” Id. at 579).
336
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The anti-SLAPP statute comprehends acts constituting steps taken
to advance the constitutional right of petition. Nevertheless acts that do
not advance any actual petitioning enjoy no protection, including conduct
involving litigation. For example, in Benasra v. Mitchell, Silberberg &
Knupp338, plaintiffs argued the defendant law firm breached a duty of
loyalty owed to them as current and former clients because it represented
an opponent in an arbitration proceeding against them.339 The trial court
concluded the suit was based on the firm's statements and writings made
in or in connection with arbitration and judicial proceedings and was
subject to §425.16.340 The court of appeal reversed.341 It recognized that
the plaintiffs' malpractice claim did not arise out of the firm's protected
activity in representing an adverse party in arbitration, but rather from
the earlier breach of loyalty that occurred when the law firm allied itself
with the adverse party.342
Where cases have allowed attorneys to avail themselves of antiSLAPP protection, the courts have viewed the basis for liability asserted
against the attorney to be premised upon petitioning activity.343 Here
again, the courts scrutinize whether the statements are the basis for
liability and whether they are actually tied to an exercise of First
Amendment rights. In Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation
Corp., a homeowners association was denied maintenance access by a
homeowner. 344 The association sued and had its lawyer send a letter to
association members averring that the denial of access had resulted in
increased costs.345 The homeowner sued for defamation and the
homeowners association brought a motion to strike.346 The court of

338

(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1179.
Id. at pp. 1182-1183.
Id. at 1183-1184.
341
Id. at 1190.
342
Id. at pp. 1186-1189.
343
See Neville v. Chudacoff, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1267-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
anti-SLAPP statute covers pre-litigation communications such as demand letters or other statements
to adverse parties, potential adverse parties, and sometimes nonparties); Gallanis-Politis v. Medina,
152 Cal. App. 4th 600, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A]cts in furtherance of free speech or petition
rights include ‘communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil
action.’” (citation omitted)); Salma v. Capon, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1285 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that filing a notice of lis pendens and a notice of rescission falls within the purview of
§425.16); Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728 (malicious prosecution);
Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048 (abuse of process based on a lawsuit); Drum v. Bleau, Fox
& Associates (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 109 (abuse of process action based upon a levy); Ludwig v.
Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8,17 (an entity’s act of directing litigation, even though it was
not a party to the underlying lawsuit, fell within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute).
344
Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp., 137 Cal. App. 4th 1, 3 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006).
345
Id. at 4.
346
Id.
339
340
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appeal found the statements in the letter to be related to the purpose of
petitioning involved in the judicial proceeding and allowed
the
association to rely upon the anti-SLAPP statute: “Because one purpose of
the letter . . . was to inform members of the association of pending
litigation involving the association, the letter is unquestionably ‘in
connection with’ judicial proceedings.’”347
Similarly, Taheri Law Group v. Evans allowed use of the antiSLAPP statute by a lawyer. 348 The Taheri Law Group sued another
attorney alleging that he improperly solicited Taheri’s client during
pending litigation.349 The complaint premised liability upon Evans’s
communications with the client and his conduct in enforcing a settlement
agreement on the client’s behalf.350 The case should not be read as
holding that an attorney’s solicitation of a client during pending litigation
constitutes an act in furtherance of speech or petition rights. On the
contrary, the court stated:
Taheri contends its lawsuit . . . arose from Evans’s conduct soliciting a
client, ‘not what [Evans] did when he got into the case.’ Taheri’s
analysis is erroneous. Its complaint plainly shows it arose from
Evans’s communications with Sorokurs about pending litigation, and
from Evans’s conduct in enforcing the settlement agreement on
351
Sorokurs’s behalf.

The act of solicitation arises out of the attorney’s interest in obtaining
business and advances no speech or petitioning interests. But because
the cause of action was based upon “conduct in enforcing the settlement
agreement”, it arose from an act in furtherance of the client’s right of
petition. 352
In Chodos v. Cole,353 an attorney, Chodos, was sued for
malpractice. He cross-complained, seeking indemnification against other
attorneys who had rendered advice concerning a marital settlement
agreement. They responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. The court
observed the uniform authority354 establishing that §425.16 “does not

347

Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
Taheri Law Group v. Evans, 160 Cal. App. 4th 482, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
349
Id. at 485.
350
Id. at 489.
351
Id.
348

352

Id.
210 Cal.App.4th 692 (2012).
The court expressed some unease with the holdings in Taheri, supra, (Id. at
) and Thayer
v. Kabateck, Brown, Kellner, LLP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 141 (Wife’s lawsuit against husband’s
attorneys for wrongful disposition of class action settlement proceeds subject to anti-SLAPP motion)
and observed the statement in Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar (9th Cir.2010) 611 F.3d 590, 598, that
353

354
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apply to claims of attorney malpractice.”355 It reviewed a number of the
cases cited infra, noting the statement in Kolar that “In a malpractice suit,
the client is not suing because the attorney petitioned on his or her behalf,
but because the attorney did not competently represent the client’s interests
while doing so.”356 The court concluded the indemnification claim was
still grounded in attorney malpractice and, therefore, did not arise from
First Amendment activity: “Malpractice involves a breach of duty by
neglecting to do an act or doing an act, not the right of petition.”357
The treatment of the distinction drawn between lawsuits challenging
attorney misconduct and conduct involving access to the courts is in
stark contrast to the treatment given by courts to lawsuits challenging
wrongful conduct by government agents. Where the courts have readily
distinguished attorney acts that further the purposes of an official
proceeding from acts that do not, the government agent’s activities are
the official proceeding and cannot be dichotomized between petitioning
and non-petitioning conduct.
C.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE “ARISING FROM” REQUIREMENT TO
GOVERNMENT SPEECH

In view of the anti-SLAPP statute’s requirement that the liability in
question “arise from” a First Amendment exercise of rights, it is
necessary to consider how courts apply this to government speech. Prior
to Vargas I, the courts took two approaches. Some evaluated the
underlying basis for liability in terms of whether the challenge to
government involved an actual challenge to an exercise of First
Amendment rights. 358 Reflecting confusion over the nature and extent of

attorney malpractice claims were not categorically excluded from anti-SLAPP coverage,
acknowledging the “arising from” inquiry probes beyond the form of the action. Id. at
.
355
Id. at
.
356
Id at
.
357
Id. at . The court held that “a claim by an attorney against other attorneys for equitable
indemnity in connection with a claim of attorney malpractice is not distinguishable from a client’s
claim against an attorney for malpractice.” Id. at
.
358
E.g., San Ramon Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Empls. Ret. Ass’n, 125 Cal.
App. 4th 343, 354 (2004) (distinguishing “[a]cts of governance mandated by law” from speech);
Visher v. Malibu, 126 Cal. App. 4th 364, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the lawsuit was
based upon Malibu’s refusal to issue a permit and did not arise from the city’s appeal of unrelated
Coastal Commission decision). Why a public entity’s mandatory act should be treated any
differently from a governing body’s discretionary decision with regard to whether or not it is an act
“in connection with an . . . official proceeding” is not explained by the court. Nor does there appear
to be any cogent reason to treat government activity involving statements in a police report or
investigatory communications differently from activity involving statements in other contexts. All
these situations just involve government doing what government does (albeit allegedly without
proper authority, improperly or with an improper purpose), rather than government engaging in
quasi-free speech or petitioning activity in the manner of a private citizen.
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the government speech doctrine, some of these courts treated any
statement by a government agent as an exercise of First Amendment
rights.359 Others did not even mention the First Amendment and found
protection for government agencies in the language of the statute. 360
Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica is a representative case of preVargas I judicial application of the “arising from” analysis to find antiSLAPP protection extended to conduct of government actors.361 In
Holbrook, the plaintiff brought suit for declaratory relief and mandamus
alleging the city failed to comply with open meeting requirements and
other laws by holding meetings that ran late into the night.362 The
decision, including a smattering of references to the “City Council’s
exercise of its right of free speech,” found that “the causes of action arise
from protected activity: governmental speech and legislative action at
City Council meetings.”363 The court found the protection was bestowed
by the broad language of all four parts of subsection (e):
Council members make oral statements before the other members of
their legislative body and in connection with issues under review by
the City Council. They make statements in a place open to the public
or a public forum in connection with issues of public interest. The
public meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public

359

E.g., Santa Barbara Cnty. Coalition Against Auto. Subsidies v. Santa Barbara Cnty. Ass’n
of Gov’ts, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1237-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding government use of
§425.16 against a citizen challenge to government expenditures to develop a ballot initiative);
Gallanis-Politis v. Medina, 152 Cal.App.4th 600, 611-612 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (retaliation claim
against county employer based on content of report and memorandum); Levy v. City of Santa
Monica, 114 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1255-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (lawsuit for injunctive and declaratory
relief in response to building code red-tag to large backyard playhouse subject to the anti-SLAPP
law because it arose directly out of the neighbor's and the building inspector's communications with
city employees.)
360
See Schaffer v. City of San Francisco, 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 1003-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that the asserted liability was characterized as arising from protected Civ. Pro. Code
§425.16(e) activity—official police investigation proceedings and a memorandum and arrest
warrant); see also, Hansen, supra (likewise characterizing liability as arising from an official
investigation, not just statements related to or involving that official proceeding); Maranatha
Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1085-1086 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that an alleged defamation by government agents arising from a letter regarding an
issue under consideration in an official proceeding was covered by Civ. Pro. Code §425.16(e));
Miller v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1383 (holding a city’s investigation into a
public employee’s conduct was covered relying solely upon subsection (e) and without regard to
whether the liability actually arose from petitioning or free speech.) While these decisions give lipservice to the Navellier and Cotati analysis requiring that the liability involved must “arise from”
protected activity, they reached their conclusion by the circular logic of citing subsection (e)’s list of
activity defined as First Amendment speech and petitioning.
361
Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1242 (2006).
362
Id. at 1245.
363
Id. 1247.
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interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council
members’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with public
364
issues and issues of public interest.

Without the premise that the governmental statements are the exercise of
First Amendment rights, the analysis crumbles. If the underlying basis
for liability—holding meetings too late—did not “arise from” the
exercise of free speech or petitioning, there could be no anti-SLAPP
protection. But if the government statements made at the overlong
meetings are endowed with First Amendment stature, the basis for
liability is transformed from an assault upon government misconduct to
an attack upon protected activity.
Vargas I effectively removed the First Amendment prop to this
analysis. But the house of cards has not fallen yet.
1. Post Vargas I “arising from” analysis of government speech —
confusion compounded
After Vargas I, the threshold inquiry for applicability of §425.16 –
whether to a governmental statement or private statement –remains the
“arising from” inquiry of whether liability is based upon activity in
furtherance of the speaker’s First Amendment speech or petition rights.365
The conundrum is how this question can ever be answered in the
affirmative for a government speaker.
The Vargas I approach that looks at whether a private speaker would
be protected if he or she made the governmental statement cannot be
reconciled with Cotati’s “arising from” approach that disregards the form
of the cause of action and looks to whether the defendant’s activity that
gives rise to the asserted liability constitutes constitutionally protected
366
The mere fact a statement was made or an official proceeding
speech.
367
occurred is not the determinant.
The court in Cotati recognized that

364

Id. at 1247-48.
§425.16(b)(1).
Navellier at 92; Cotati at 78-79.
367
Considering whether the government conduct in question involves the public interest is not
helpful because the innumerable functions of government are always and necessarily of interest to
the public. Looking to section 425.16(e)’s list of protected conduct only hampers analysis by
redirecting inquiry away from substance (i.e., whether First Amendment activity is threatened by a
SLAPP) to form (i.e., whether activity that is the subject of the lawsuit is simply listed in that
subsection). The superior source for guidance lies in the admirable purpose of section 425.16 in
protecting First Amendment activity by creating an expedited mechanism for addressing lawsuits
brought to suppress such activity. An approach to section 425.16 that disregards its primary object –
the protection of “any act . . . in furtherance of the . . . right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue. . .” (§425.16(b)(1) ) - in
favor of sub-definitional considerations set forth at subsection (e), overlooks the forest for the trees.
365

366

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014

77

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

192

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

whether a lawsuit follows or involves activity listed in subsection (e) is
not the proper inquiry.
Applying the “arising from” inquiry to private statements has never
368
proven easy for California courts – even the state supreme court , - and
the methodology remains fraught with discord. Cases addressing private
disputes where the ostensible basis for liability might be either retaliation
for First Amendment activity or unprotected conduct or a combination of
both, appear to make it something of a crap-shoot how the court will
dispose of the first prong inquiry of whether the lawsuit is substantially
369
rather than incidentally premised on rights-based activity.
In application, this has yielded much judicial uncertainty expressed
in split decisions, dissents and dueling authorities. For one thing, “any
written or oral statement or writing” as set forth in subsection (e) does
not confine anti-SLAPP protection to activity involving communicative
activity. The supreme court in Rusheen v. Cohen370 made it plain that
necessarily related non-communicative acts subsequent to protected
communicative acts are protected as well. Additionally, the court in
Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.371 held that the anti-SLAPP first
prong is satisfied where a defendant shows that a “substantial part” of a
cause of action is protected activity.” Applying this approach, the court
in Wallace v. McCubbin372 held that causes of action arising from both
subsection (e) protected activity and nonprotected conduct are covered
by the anti-SLAPP statute unless the protected activity is merely
incidental to the unprotected activity.373 Courts addressing
private
lawsuits have not agreed with this standard and have disagreed over how
to apply it.374 In terms of government actions this is significant because

368
Navellier, addressed whether a lawsuit for breach of contract alleging violation of a
settlement release was subject to anti-SLAPP protection. The dissenting opinion, relying upon
Duracraft objected that the majority holding that the suit was covered lent an overly broad treatment
of the “arising from” language, chiding: “Distinguishing SLAPP's from legitimate petitioning is
challenging but essential. Our proper solicitude for one party's right to petition cannot come at the
expense of the other party's parallel right.” Navellier at 718-719.
369
Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 658, 672 (holding a " 'cause of action will be subject to section 425.16 unless the
protected conduct is "merely incidental" to the unprotected conduct.' "); Salma v. Capon (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 1275, 1287. ("A mixed cause of action is subject to section 425.16 if at least one of the
underlying acts is protected conduct, unless the allegations of protected conduct are merely
incidental to the unprotected activity.") .
370
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1062.
371
120 Cal.App.4th 90 (2004).
372
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169
373
Id. at 1187.
374
See, Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d
129,144 (2010) (concurring and dissenting opn.: “The majority opinion adopts the rule set forth in
Mann . . . that a plaintiff may freely make utterly meritless attacks on a defendant's exercise of free
speech and petition, if the plaintiff has also alleged some nonprotected activity that supports the
cause of action. This is plainly inconsistent with the anti-SLAPP statute's purpose of curbing
lawsuits that chill the valid exercise of free speech.”); Wallace v. McCubbin, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d
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government functions generally involve mixed activity – communicative
in nature (e.g., a report, citation, finding) as well as non-communicative
conduct (enforcement action, determination, arrest).
The second prong analysis for mixed protected and non-protected
activity is in flux as well. The court in Mann reasoned that so long as a
plaintiff can establish minimal merit for the cause of action it should not
matter whether the merit relates to protected or nonprotected activity, the
cause of action survives.375 Some courts have held that only the
allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint that arose from protected activity
and for which minimal merit cannot be established get stricken.376
Courts applying Mann have held that a cause of action which does not
meet the probable cause standard gets stricken regardless of whether or
not it is based in part upon underlying activity that is unprotected.377
The perils this confusion presents for prospective private litigants laypersons not in the habit of parsing legalistic hairs - who approach the
possibility of a lawsuit involving official proceedings cannot be gainsaid.
One cannot divine when a lawsuit will be subject to an anti-SLAPP
motion where appellate courts are in disarray on where to draw the line.
The difficulty – and likewise the chill - for a citizen contemplating suit
against the government, however, is considerably greater. This is
because in addition to all the other vagaries plaguing evaluation of
private actions, the litigant must also guess when challenged

205,242 (2011) (Concurring opn.; “I respectfully disagree with my colleagues' criticism of the rule
articulated in Mann . . . and so I cannot join the majority's view that a plaintiff ‘basing liability on
both protected activity and unprotected activity should have to establish a probability of prevailing
as to his or her attack on the activity the statute was designed to protect--protected activity--nothing
more than that, and nothing less.’”); City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th
751,(Concurring & dissenting opn.: “In my view, the gravamen of the fourth cause of action as well
as the sixth cause of action of the cross-complaint was wholly unrelated to any protected activity.”)
375
Mann at 106 (if a plaintiff pursuing mixed cause of action demonstrates probability of
prevailing on any part of his or her claim, the cause of action survives the motion to strike and the
court does not parse allegations of protected activity from nonprotected activity)
376
City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 772, (holding that court should
parse a mixed cause of action, granting motion to strike meritless protected activity while allowing
complaint to proceed as to unprotected activity;   and see dissenting opinion by Richli, J., at 206
Cal.App.4th at pp. 787, 789, disagreeing with this view); Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1169, 1199, 1210 (holding §425.16 requires a plaintiff to establish probability of
prevailing on protected activity “and nothing else” to allow the court to strike just the “claims” based
on protected activity);   Cho v. Chang (2nd District, Div. 4) B239719 September 06, 2013
(unpublished) (holding court is to strike “allegations” arising from protected conduct but not those
arising from activity that is not protected by §425.16).
377
  Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
1539, 1554, (entire cause of action properly stricken where any part arises from protected conduct
not merely “incidental” to unprotected activity, and plaintiff fails to show requisite probability of
success on any part of the cause of action). But see dissenting opinion by Needham, J., Id. at 1555
(arguing this approach is inconsistent with the statute, rejecting Mann’s reasoning, and asserting that
the court should distinguish between “claim” and “cause of action”); Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 357, 378, (disagreeing with majority opinion in Singletary that a court should parse and
strike allegations in a complaint and agreeing with the dissent).
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governmental action is going to be characterized by a court as in the
nature of a “right.”
The Vargas I proposition that courts should regard government
speech as protected if it would be protected when uttered by a private
actor provides an entirely unworkable guideline. For fundamental
reasons of constitutional design government activity cannot be treated
like rights. Treating communicative governmental activity like an ersatz
exercise of individual rights fails to comprehend the vast difference
between the constitutional roles of private and government conduct,
including speech.378 Both individuals and government play roles and
speak in the process of governance. They just do this differently. For a
private actor it means the exercise of rights - seeking to influence the
government in order to change the status quo or to maintain it. For a
government actor it does not.
For the same reasons it cannot be discerned when an individual
would have made a particular governmental statement because a private
379
individual or entity would not make a governmental statement.
A
county policy, school board decision or police report cannot be treated
“as if” made by a person for section 425.16 purposes because private
actors do not make governmental policies, decisions and reports. They
participate in the process – they complain to government officials, they
attend and have input into proceedings, they report crimes and concerns.
But they do not bureaucratically process the policies, decisions and
reports themselves. Even the expression of a point of view on an issue
by a government actor represents government’s view, not a First
Amendment expression of private opinion.

378
Conceptually, government’s role is to provide for sovereign citizen participation in the
political process and to implement decisions of the electorate and its elected representatives. This
role is entirely responsive, incidental or collateral to private activity in furtherance of speech or
petitioning rights. Government agents accept and process and decide and regulate based upon
individual participatory activity. They facilitate such exercises of rights. But they do not engage in
such petitioning or expressing themselves. Their participation is limited to simply performing the
function of government – holding meetings, making reports, accepting public input and advancing
policies. Government furthers the rights of private actors, not its own.
379
Certainly both government agents and private actors make statements. Those statements
may involve liability on tort, breach of contract or other theories. For example, governmental
statements were made in McGarry v. Univ. of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 57, concerning the
circumstances of a college head football coach’s termination that were alleged to be defamatory.
The court held anti-SLAPP protections applied because the liability arose from “speech in
connection with a public issue or a matter of public interest within the meaning of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4).” Id. at 111. While the remarks about the coach’s conduct could be uttered by
private actors, they did not amount to an exercise of free speech rights. It is the context of such
statements that generally has no correlation to private speech. In McGarry these were the comments
of a government agent on why a particular official action occurred. In Schaffer, supra, these
allegedly false statements were remarks in a police report. Private actors do not speak in those
official capacities. Compare, People ex rel. Fire Exchange v. Anapol (2012) Cal.App.4th
(holding that private action asserting preparation of false and fraudulent insurance reports was not
subject to a motion to strike).
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For a court or a litigant pondering the question, it makes no sense to
treat governmental speech and private speech involving an exercise of
rights identically in terms of their similarities in form when they are
entirely different in substance. The propriety of government handling of
government affairs is a question of misconduct, not the exercise of a
right. Seeking to isolate governmental statements emulating free speech
to some greater degree than countless government communications
amounting to nothing more than government performing routine
functions is a venture into a Dickensian “fog everywhere.”
The analytic approach after Cotati calls upon a court to evaluate
when an asserted basis for liability originates in actual rights-based
activity. A court cannot do this if the government activity in question
merely seems like First Amendment conduct. The entire point of the
“arising from” analysis is to sort out liability that looks like it attacks
First Amendment rights (but does not) from liability that actually does
retaliate against First Amendment activity. Extending protection to
speech that mimics exercises of rights completely defeats the point of
this exercise. And it defeats the objective of protecting First Amendment
rights.
The California supreme court recognized “Vague definitions of what
constitutes a frivolous appeal raise the danger that attorneys will be
deterred from asserting valid claims out of a fear that they will incur
court sanctions.”380 Vagueness over when government may use §425.16
raises the identical danger: “Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason
vague laws chill speech: People of ‘common intelligence must
necessarily guess at [the law’s] meaning and differ as to its
application.’”381
2. Judicial Application of Anti-SLAPP Statutes to Government
Speech in a Post-Vargas World Where Government Speech is Not
Constitutionally Protected
The difficulty in applying the vague analogy, drawn by the court in
Vargas I, between government speech and the exercise of First
Amendment rights by private agents, has been reflected in the decisions
of California’s lower courts. Instead of expressing well-deserved,
profound befuddlement as to how to proceed in analyzing when
government’s speech could have been made by a private agent, the courts
seeking to apply this elusive proposition have engaged in disingenuous
treatment of the “arising from” analysis. While paying pious respect to

380
381

In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal.3d 637, 651 (1982).
Citizens United v. FEC (2009) 558 U.S. 310, 324.
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that requirement, many courts dealing with government anti-SLAPP
movants have simultaneously ignored its essence and have disregarded
considering whether the government activity in question actually
involves exercise of a First Amendment right.
a.

The literal approach—all governmental statements are protected

Lower California courts have split after Vargas I in addressing the
requirement that there be an underlying First Amendment aspect to a
claim for liability against a government agent. The approach by some
courts has been to skirt the inquiry and instead focus on the language of
subsection (e) as describing potentially protected situations. PostVargas I decisions finding that the basis for liability asserted against
government agents does allow anti-SLAPP protection have mostly been
unpublished. Although they contain no mention of government
exercising First Amendment rights, they either rely upon pre-Vargas I
case law that analyzes the question from that perspective or treat the
“arising from” requirement as satisfied by circular reliance upon the antiSLAPP statute’s examples of First Amendment activity.
Characteristic of such decisions is a logical mobius strip reliance
upon the language of the statute as satisfying the “arising from”
requirement rather than a review of whether the liability in question
actually implicates real First Amendment speech or petitioning activity.
The “arising from” inquiry is confined to whether the lawsuit implicates
statements made in subsection (e) contexts, relying upon the statute’s
definition of such statements as per se constitutionally protected speech
or petitioning. In other words, if the activity that incited the litigation fits
under the statute’s language, it is First Amendment activity. Therefore
the lawsuit “arises from” First Amendment activity and is subject to a
motion to strike. This approach is exactly what was rejected as incorrect
in Cotati and Navellier.382
For example, in White v. City of Santa Ana, plaintiffs sued to
challenge a city’s compliance with the law in its use of automated traffic
enforcement systems (ATES), complaining that notice requirements had
not been met and that citations had been and were being issued and
prosecuted unlawfully.383 What the plaintiffs were really challenging in
White was whether the City was conducting its affairs relating to the

382

Cf. Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 78 (“[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . . arising from’
means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been
an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” (citation omitted)).
383
White v. City of Santa Ana, No. G045757, 2012 WL 5412018 at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 5,
2012).
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ATES system in a lawful manner. The court of appeal treated the
governmental activities as protected by the anti-SLAPP statute,
reasoning:
Appellants’ complaint is based on the City’s allegedly improper
issuance of citations, rather than only warning notices, and the
subsequent prosecution and conviction of plaintiffs and imposition of
penalties based upon those citations, all of which constitutes protected
speech. The citations themselves constitute writings “made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . .
judicial body” within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision
384
(e)(2).

Because the activity that gave rise to the White lawsuit fell within
the vast range of governmental affairs described in the statute as
protected, the court found the anti-SLAPP statute applied.385 What
eluded the court’s grasp, however, was that the official issuance of
citations, failure to give notice and so on, while literally falling under the
statutory language, is not actually First Amendment-based conduct at all.
It is just government doing what government does concerning matters in
which citizens might have reason to participate.386 A citizen challenge to
the lawfulness of what government does, meanwhile, is First
Amendment activity.
Also representative of this tautological approach is Petersen Law
Firm v. City of Los Angeles,387 holding that a lawsuit challenging a
government employer’s policy relating to overtime pay involves
statements made in official proceedings and, therefore, falls within the
ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute:

384

Id. at *7 (footnote and citation omitted).
Id. at *8 (“The complaint is entirely directed at the allegedly inappropriate issuance and
enforcement (or prosecution) of citations. As such it falls within the statutorily enumerated first
prong grounds in section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) [written statement made in connection with
official proceeding], and (e)(2) [written statement made in connection with an issue under
consideration before official proceeding].”).
386
Kapler v. City of Alameda (First Dist., Div. 1, Sept. 6, 2012) No. A133001 (unpublished)
addressed a public employee’s lawsuit. A city’s fire chief resigned after being photographed putting
gas into his personal car from a city pump. He sued for breach of contract and wrongful termination.
Finding that the defendant’s activity giving rise to the liability was “the city’s divulging to the media
accusations of misconduct and allegedly incriminating photograph” and also “the
city’s
investigation,” the court held the causes of action “fall squarely within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP
statute.” This overlooks whether actual First Amendment activity was involved, and instead finds
anti-SLAPP application because one activity was covered by subsection (e)(2) as implicating
“statements ‘made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative body”
and the other by subsection (e)(3) as implicating “statements made in a . . . public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest.’”(Slip Opn, at 8).
387
(Second Dist., Div.4, April 13, 2011) No.B220030 (unpublished).
385
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Here, the actions at issue in the petition for writ of mandate are
defendants’ actions of implementing an overtime policy, including
authorizing investigations of any police officer who brings a lawsuit to
recover overtime pay. Under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), “any
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law” is “an act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.” An internal investigation is an official proceeding authorized
by law. Interviews and written statements made in connection with an
internal investigation are thus protected activities under the anti388
SLAPP statute.

The “arising from” inquiry is shifted away from whether the underlying
basis for liability is First Amendment activity. Obviously a challenge to
governmental policies is not an assault upon free speech or petitioning.
The inquiry becomes one of asking whether liability is based upon
statements falling under subsection (e). Under this approach, anything
involving a governmental statement in a proceeding or upon a matter of
public concern has anti-SLAPP protection. The result is no different
from the pre-Vargas I approach that regarded all governmental
statements as an exercise of First Amendment rights.
This shift in focus away from whether First Amendment activity is
the source of the liability sought to be imposed to whether the activity
that gave rise to the lawsuit is covered by subsection (e) is evident in
Nesson v. Northern Inyo Cty. Local Hospital Dist. In that case, the court
of appeal addressed a fired radiologist’s lawsuit against his employer for
breach of contract, retaliation, and discrimination.389 The court
recognized that “[t]he gravamen of each cause of action asserted by
Nesson is that the Hospital somehow acted wrongfully” including that he
could not be terminated based upon a summary suspension or for a
disability.390 Nevertheless, the court regarded the improper acts of
summary suspension and termination as protected.391 This was because
388

Petersen Law Firm v. City of Los Angeles, No. B220030, 2011 WL 1380059, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. April 13, 2011) (citations omitted).
389
Nesson v. N. Inyo Cnty. Local Hospital Dist., 204 Cal. App.4th 65, 72 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012).
390
Id. at 83.
391
Id. at 84.; but see Martin v. Inland Empire Utils. Agency, 198 Cal. App. 4th 611, 625
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that although an employee’s discrimination claim against a
government employer derived from a board meeting, evaluation review proceedings, and other
official conduct that would have to be considered “official proceedings,” the liability arose from
“racial and retaliatory discrimination” and denied anti-SLAPP protection). In both cases, however,
liability was premised upon retaliatory discrimination. The difference is that in Martin the court did
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these actions which bear no resemblance to private First Amendment
activity and, instead, look entirely like employer-employee relations,
involved “official proceedings” covered by subsection (e)(1) and
(e)(2).392
Likewise, a particularly illustrative case is Gallant v. City of
Alameda,393 where the court distinguished a city’s employment decision
from cases denying anti-SLAPP protection for private
decisions
involving termination of an employee because those cases did not
concern “a municipality’s protected activity as defined in section 425.16,
subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).”394 The fact the firing was done by a
government agency endowed it with anti-SLAPP protection only because
it involved activity that was “official.”
A more involved version of this approach to whether a claim arose
from protected activity was sketched by the court in City of Costa Mesa
v. D’Alessio Investments, LLC. In finding that anti-SLAPP protection
applied to city employees’ remarks concerning a commercial property,
the court set forth a three-part process for concluding they were protected
by subsection (e)(2): “(a) was there an ‘issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body’; (b) were the
employees’ statements made ‘in connection with’ this issue; and (c) did
the causes of action pleaded by D’Alessio ‘aris[e] from’ the employees’
statements?”395
This involves unnecessary, protracted analysis to arrive at the
foregone conclusion that subsection (e) covers governmental statements
concerning governmental matters. Public employees’ communications in
the course of performing their duties are necessarily going to relate to
issues of concern to the agency they serve. The issues will be “under
consideration” and the statements will be made “in connection” to them.
As far as whether a claim for liability involving such statements is one
“arising from” those statements, the court engaged in the same circular
logic we have seen before. It did not ask whether the statements that
formed the basis for liability actually constituted or furthered First
Amendment activity, but instead probed whether those statements were
the basis for the asserted liability, as distinguished from liability
premised upon other governmental activity involving statements.

not become sidetracked by the fact that the discrimination was manifested in or evidenced by its
occurrence in official proceedings.
392
Nesson, 204 Cal. App. 4th at 77-78.
393
No. A133777 (2013)
394
Id., at 6
395
City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Invs., 214 Cal. App. 4th 358, 372-373 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013).
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Ultimately, in spite of the extra hoops the court jumped through in
City of Costa Mesa, it was really just asking whether the governmental
statements fall within the contexts described in subsection (e), not
whether they actually involved First Amendment activity.
On the continuum between a picketer treading on someone’s foot or
blocking entrance and a violent physical assault or false imprisonment,
evaluating whether the predominant factor behind a legal action places it
closer to the exercise of First Amendment rights or an intentional tort is
not an easy one for courts to make. Removing from the evaluation
altogether the requirement that there be a First Amendment aspect to the
activity makes such placement impossible.
For example, consider a law enforcement officer who encounters a
criminal suspect. In performing her official duty the officer tells the
suspect, “Stop, police.” The suspect starts running, so the officer shouts,
“Stop, or I will shoot.” The suspect keeps running, so the officer shoots.
When the deaf, innocent, injured individual who was hurrying to catch a
bus sues alleging excessive force, should the officer’s conduct be
protected by the anti-SLAPP law in addition to all the other immunities
and legal protections bestowed upon law enforcement officers? The
liability arises from statements made in a subsection (e) context and
would be covered under the approach adopted in City of Costa Mesa,
Nesson and the other cases. However, the evaluation ignores the fact that
the activity, like any government activity, has no free speech or
petitioning aspect to it.
b.

The other approach to application of “arising from” by post-Vargas
I courts

Other post-Vargas I courts have viewed government conduct as
devoid of First Amendment protection. These courts have critiqued the
use of anti-SLAPP statutes by government as counter to the petition
rights the statutes were meant to protect and have located the alleged
liability in question as based upon some manner of governmental
misfeasance rather than as arising from government speech.
In Graffiti Protective Coatings v. City of Pico Rivera, the trial court
ruled that because maintenance of bus stops was a matter of public
interest, a city could bring a motion to strike in response to a lawsuit
challenging related procedures.396 In reversing, the court of appeal held
that even if a public issue was implicated by claims that the city violated
competitive bidding requirements, “they are not based on any statement,
396

Graffiti Protective Coatings v. City of Pico Rivera, 181 Cal. App. 4th 1207, 1214 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010)
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writing, or conduct by the city in furtherance of its right of free speech or
its right to petition the government for the redress of grievances.”397 The
fact that official proceedings and related communications covered by
section 425.16(e) occurred relating to the issue was not dispositive.398
The pertinent inquiry was one of whether the city’s rights were
attacked by the lawsuit: “Nor are the claims based on any conduct in
furtherance of the City’s right of petition or free speech. Rather, GPC’s
claims are based on state and municipal laws requiring competitive
bidding.”399 The court reasoned that more was required to afford antiSLAPP protection to government activity than that it concern a matter of
public interest or communication related to an official proceeding:
Many of the public entity decisions reviewable by mandamus or
administrative mandamus are arrived at after discussion and a vote at a
public meeting . . . . If mandamus petitions challenging decisions
reached in this manner were routinely subject to a special motion to
strike . . . it would chill the resort to legitimate judicial oversight over
potential abuses of legislative and administrative power, which is at
............ 400
the heart of those remedial statutes

Similarly, in USA Waste of Cal., Inc. v. City of Irwindale, a
developer sued a municipality to obtain a determination of whether the
city had complied with enacted land use guidelines.401 Recognizing the
claims were not based upon any statement or conduct in furtherance of
the city’s right of speech or petition, the court flatly concluded: “Actions
to enforce, interpret or invalidate governmental laws generally are not
subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.”402
The reasoning of the courts in Graffiti Protective Coatings and
USA Waste, that extending “the anti-SLAPP statute to litigation merely
challenging the application, interpretation, or validity of a statute or
ordinance would expand the reach of the statute way beyond any
reasonable parameters”, warrants examination. 403 These cases represent
a flat judicial rejection of the idea that the anti-SLAPP statute should
cover all governmental activity described by section 425.16(e). Their
reasoning begs the question whether the traffic citations in White, the
overtime policies in Petersen Law Firm, the election materials in Vargas

397

Id. 1211.
Id. at 1224.
399
Id. at 1218 (citation omitted).
400
Id. at 1224-25.
401
USA Waste, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 56.
402
Id. at 65.
403
Id. at 66.
398
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I and Peninsula Guardians, or any other governmental activity, is
covered.
The courts in Graffiti Protective Coatings and USA Waste were
simply refusing to apply the provisions of section 425.16(e) to
government conduct literally within its scope. In Graffiti Protective
Coatings the activity in question fell smack-dab within the “official
proceeding” clauses of section 425.16(e), which the court candidly
acknowledged apply “without a separate showing that a public issue or
an issue of public interest is present.”404 Likewise, in USA Waste, the
activity was encompassed by the “official proceeding” clauses of
subsection (e). Yet in both cases, the courts balked at applying the antiSLAPP statute to the government activity at issue based upon a
substantive concern that has nothing to do with whether the liability at
issue arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute: “Were we
to conclude otherwise, the anti-SLAPP statute would discourage attempts
to compel public entities to comply with the law.”405
What provided the basis for the decisions in Graffiti Protective
Coatings and USA Waste was the concern of protecting the ability of
citizens to challenge government policies, such as the “interpretation, or
validity of a statute or ordinance.”406 This is a petition rights concern
that recognizes a fundamental hypocrisy involved in government use of
anti-SLAPP protections against citizens who seek government
accountability and take issue with government policies and practices.
Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. addressed a lawsuit challenging
an agency’s administrative determination. 407 In holding that anti-SLAPP
protections did not apply to the government conduct there, even though it
involved statements made in official proceedings, the court of appeal
stressed Cotati’s requirement that acts underlying a plaintiff’s cause of
action must “in and of themselves” further free speech or petitioning
rights.408 Rather than recognizing that government acts are not an
exercise of speech or petition rights, the court merely observed that
government acts “do not necessarily amount to” the exercise of rights.409
The court sought to distinguish other cases finding that section 425.16
does apply to such claims. It did so by finding that the government
action there did not qualify for anti-SLAPP protection because the
plaintiff’s mandamus challenge to the propriety of the agency’s decision

404

Graffiti Protective Coatings, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 1217.
Id. at 1210; see also USA Waste, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 65.
406
USA Waste, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 66.
407
Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist., 210 Cal. App.4th 35 (2012).
408
Id. at 55.
409
Id. at 57.
405
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“arose out of his statutory rights under section 1094.5, and is separate
and different from an action for damages that arose out of the content of
the allegedly wrongful peer review statements.”410
The court did not explain why a legal proceeding seeking damages
should be treated differently than one seeking a remedy in the form of
judicial review of the administrative proceeding. No doubt both lawsuits
arise from the same conduct in the same official proceeding and both
propose the agency did something wrong in that proceeding. In other
words, the activity giving rise to the cause of action is unchanged. Only
the remedy sought is changed. The distinction is not valid. The real
reason the court arrived at this conclusion seems plain enough: The court
simply could not accept that anti-SLAPP protection should apply to
governmental activity involving no free speech or petitioning.
In Mandurrago v. City of Carmel,411 the court of appeal,
realizing the paradox of endowing government with “rights” that counter
individual constitutional rights - indicated that
subsection
(e)’s
application should be limited to situations involving government speech.
It rejected a city’s attempt to secure anti-SLAPP protection from a legal
challenge to a refusal to certify an EIR for a construction project. Such
an approach - allowing anti-SLAPP protection for government speech remains fraught with problems. Why single out government activity
involving speech for special protective treatment? What is evident here
is the misguided tendency to equate government speech with First
Amendment activity. However, government speech is no sacred cow
beatifying it above all other dreary government activity. It is just another
government activity.
The court in City of Montebello v. Vasquez,412 held that elected
city officials were not able to invoke the anti-SLAPP statute against a
city’s suit alleging violations of statutory prohibitions against city
officers having a financial interest in any contract made in their official
capacity. The court essentially reasoned that the defendants’ speech and
voting was government speech, not their individual exercise of rights,
and for that reason it warranted no protection. Conversely, another court,
Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Protection & Comm. Services Dist.
Bd.,413 addressed a lawsuit naming board members of a public agency as
well as the board, alleging misconduct. Relying upon San Ramon, the
court held that the agency’s legislative activity was not subject to antiSLAPP protection, but that the voting and other legislative activity of
individual board members was protected. Why government actors

410

Id. at 58.
(6th Dist. 2010) No. H034439 (unpublished).
412
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1084 (Review granted).
413
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1345, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 899.

411
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engaging in government speech or government activity individually
should receive protection for their pseudo-First Amendment activity
while the government agency in toto gets no protection is not
satisfactorily explained by the court’s pat observation that voting is First
Amendment activity.
The court in Vasquez seems to have the better argument when it
reasoned that legislative activity, in contrast to the exercise of the
electoral franchise, is not really an exercise of individual rights.
However, Vasquez failed to follow its reasoning to its logical conclusion:
that governmental activity of any kind involves no exercise of a right
and, therefore, deserves no anti-SLAPP protection.
What is apparent from the foregoing decisions is that courts are
having difficulty ascertaining when, if ever, governmental acts are
protected by anti-SLAPP provisions after Vargas I. The “arising from”
analysis that makes sense with regard to ascertaining whether private
action is rights-based for purposes of anti-SLAPP protection makes zero
sense when applied to governmental activity—speech or otherwise. This
is because such activity cannot be identified as an exercise of First
Amendment petitioning or speech rights.
D.

WHY APPLICATION OF THE “ARISING FROM” REQUIREMENT DOES
NOT PERMIT ANTI-SLAPP PROTECTION TO GOVERNMENT AGENTS

To search beyond the statements involved in a governmental act to
find an underlying basis of liability sounding in the First Amendment is
like trying to find a mirage or locating the pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow—it is never there. Examining the cases where courts purport to
engage in precisely such smoke and mirrors and legerdemain shows that
they do two things: 1) they either give lip service to the “arising from”
approach and then seize upon a statement falling under subsection (e)
and treat it as protected purely by virtue of its statutory definition as
such, or; 2) they characterize the underlying activity that is the basis for
liability as something other than the statement—e.g., government failing
to perform a required duty or a dispute over the validity of a policy or
law.
The reality is that trying to differentiate between a government
official’s statements in denying a permit and the denial of a permit or the
communication of a policy and a challenge to its validity for purposes of
quantifying it as free speech is an exercise like separating water from
rain. Applying the approach identified in Cotati and Navellier to a
lawsuit brought against a police officer concerning the result or the
content of an official police investigation should yield one conclusion
whether the report contains remarks resembling private speech or not.
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Because the basis for liability involving a statement made in a
governmental proceeding is not the exercise of free speech or petitioning,
section 425.16 cannot apply. Just because an official investigation
occurred, this fact is not the operative inquiry. Just because a statement
was made during the investigation, this is not the operative inquiry.414
Because of this confusion, the courts have been unable to coherently
and consistently apply the arising from requirement identified as
constitutionally compelled in Cotati and Navellier to government speech
and see beyond its resemblance to the private exercise of rights. For
example, in Tuchscher Dev. Enters., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist.,
the court held that a developer’s action against a city for inducing breach
of contract and related claims was subject to a motion to strike. 415 This
was because it was based on communications among the parties.416
Meanwhile, in Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, the same
court held a property developer’s action against a city and others for
breach of contract, fraud, and related claims was not subject to an antiSLAPP motion to strike because the court could not say as a matter of
law that liability was based “solely or principally upon protected
communications” as opposed to other misconduct during the permit
process.417 In neither case did the governmental communications involve
the exercise of rights.418 The liability did not “arise from” free speech or
414
Let us consider an easy example - a plaintiff suing for injuries sustained while beaten during an
official police investigation. Obviously liability there has nothing to do with the investigation. It has to
do with something related to the investigation – the civil rights violation and battery that occurred
during that official process. Likewise, the fact statements were made in that official proceeding
(“confess or we’ll hit you again” or “ouch, stop that”) are not the factual basis for the liability asserted
against the defendant. The focus is not what “triggered” the lawsuit, strategic considerations
motivating the suit, the evidence supporting the theory of liability, the mere fact that circumstances
involving protected activity are implicated or even the fact that statements were made, reports prepared
or official conduct occurred. It is instead whether the liability is based upon First Amendment
petitioning or speech. The defendant’s act violating the plaintiff’s civil rights is not First Amendment
activity entitling the defendant to bring a motion to strike. More importantly, the investigation itself is
not petitioning or free speech – it’s just government performing a governmental function.
The governmental activity that forms the basis for liability is always just that – a governmental
activity, rather than an exercise of free speech. To illustrate, let’s make the governmental
communication involved resemble private First Amendment speech: an offensive remark in an
investigative report that incites a lawsuit for defamation. If a private person were sued for making the
recorded communication, there would be no question – anti-SLAPP protections would apply. But the
governmental communication merely looks like private speech. It is not itself petitioning or otherwise
an exercise of a protected right. It is just government doing its job, albeit perhaps badly. Once we
penetrate the confusion created by the government speech doctrine, it becomes clear the basis for
liability is a government communicative act, not any act of First Amendment stature covered by the
anti-SLAPP statute.
415
Tuchscher Dev. Enters., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal. App. 4th 1219,
1226-27. (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
416
Id. at 1228-1229.
417
Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, 153 Cal. App. 4th 790, 809 (Cal. Ct. App.
809).
418
See id. at 808.
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petitioning. Hence, anti-SLAPP protection should have been denied in
both cases.
This confusion is especially evident when one considers what
happens when the shoe is on the other foot—when the same type of
activity that is the basis for government liability is engaged in by private
actors. Comparable conduct by private sector actors—reports, claims,
administrative proceedings, and communications and advertisements—
has been held to not constitute acts in furtherance of speech or
petitioning.419
Where a government entity sues for declaratory relief over the
validity of a law or policy—its action “arises from” its effort to seek a
determination of its legal duties.420 Where a private citizen sues
government for the same thing, suddenly the government law or policy
or activity in question is covered by anti-SLAPP provisions because it
entails communications relating to government activities.421 The reason
for this schism is that the “arising from” standard is misapplied to
government activity by looking at whether statements are made in
statutorily described contexts, rather than recognizing that government
activity is never the exercise of First Amendment rights.
The error in application of the “arising from” requirement to
government acts is illuminated in a non-government case by the court in
1100 Park Lane Assocs. v. Feldman.422 The conduct that formed the
basis for liability and provided anti-SLAPP protection were acts of
litigation and serving a legal notice.423 The court of appeal distinguished

419

See supra, n. 273, 295; People ex re. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012) Cal.App.4th
(alleged fraudulent insurance reports).
420
City of Riverside v. Stansbury, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1582, 1594 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007),
abrogated by, Mission Springs Water Dist. v. Verjil, 218 Cal. App. 4th 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013),
reh’g denied (Sept. 5, 2013), review denied (Oct. 16, 2013) (holding a declaratory relief action as to
validity of ballot initiative not subject to anti-SLAPP motion); Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 80 (holding
declaratory relief challenge to constitutionality of rent stabilization ordinance not subject to antiSLAPP motion). Mission Springs departed from Stansbury after reconciling Cotati with City of
Santa Monica v. Stewart, 126 Cal.App.4th 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) on the basis that the latter case
involved the public entity’s preelection duties with respect to an initiative. This distinction is of
questionable significance in view of Cotati’s holding that the activity from which that declaratory
relief action arose was from a dispute over legal duties with respect to an enactment which exists
apart from the manifestation of that dispute in a lawsuit. Thus, whether the controversy originates
with regard to an ordinance, referendum or initiative or when in the process would not seem to alter
the pertinent activity from which the lawsuit arises.
421
Santa Barbara County Coalition, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 1237-38; but see San Ramon
Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Ret. Assn., 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 357-58,
n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the practical consequence of applying anti-SLAPP protection to
suits challenging government actions is that “suits to compel public entities to comply with the law
would be chilled.”)
422
1100 Park Lane Associates v. Feldman, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1467 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
423
Id. at 1483.
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Dept of Fair Emp’t & Housing v. 1105 Alta Loma Rd. Apartments, LLC,
where another court held the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to a
landlord who filed and served notices because the basis for liability was
not those protected petitioning acts, but unlawful discrimination.424 That
action arose from the landlord’s failure to accommodate the tenant’s
disability and the communications, notices, investigation, and unlawful
detainer action were simply evidence of that discriminatory conduct. 425
The court in 1100 Park Lane Associates recognized the need to look past
the mere fact that acts covered by subsection (e) may be involved and to
focus upon the actual basis for liability.426
The court contrasted the DFEH situation to the situation before it
and to that confronted by the court in Birkner v. Lam. In 1100 Park Lane
and in Birkner, the basis for liability was acts by private actors—service
of a 3 day notice, statements relating to the eviction process and filing of
an unlawful detainer action—that are protected as in furtherance of
petitioning. 427
Government action by definition involves liability that is not based
upon protected activity. While statements and official proceedings may
relate to the liability or might be evidence of the liability or might even
be the basis for the liability, they cannot be the exercise of petition rights
or free speech.428
The problem with applying anti-SLAPP protection to government
acts should now be abundantly clear. The act underlying the asserted
liability is always for something other than free speech or petitioning.
The cause of action can never “arise from” First Amendment activity,
because ab initio government cannot ever engage in such activity. Even
a lawsuit brought purely as retaliation for something government said (an
unkind remark contained in a report) or did (the denial of an application),
does not involve First Amendment conduct. These situations are just
government doing something someone does not like. As much as
government action may resemble private First Amendment participatory

424

Id. at 1481-82.
Id.
426
Id. at 1483
427
Birkner v. Lam, 156 Cal. App. 4th 275, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
428
See Beach v. Harco National Insurance Co., 110 Cal. App. 4th 82, 94-95 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003), (rejecting an attempt to apply the anti-SLAPP statute where an insured sued his insurer,
alleging bad faith and seeking damages due to excessive delay). Although the claim had been
submitted to arbitration—an exercise of the insurer’s right of petition under the First Amendment
and therefore protected by the anti-SLAPP statute—the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. Id. at 94.
While the act that was the basis for liability involved petitioning it was not itself petitioning or even
tied to advancing petitioning. Id. at 94-95. This was because the cause of action based liability in
inaction and delays, not in any specific statement or writing by the company, and none of that
conduct involved the company’s right of petition. Id. at 93
425

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014

93

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

208

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

conduct or freedom of expression, it cannot actually be furthering
petitioning or free speech because it is not private agents, properly
endowed with rights, who are engaging in the activity.
CONCLUSION
The apostasy for broad anti-SLAPP statutes is that they defeat their
worthy and principled purpose of advancing Petition Clause activity
when utilized by government actors. Judicial interpretation of those
statutes to avoid this conflict with the very constitutional rights they were
designed to protect has occurred in some states. However, California, a
source of guidance nationally in the anti-SLAPP area, has not followed
that path. The wake of California’s efforts to reconcile in which
instances government agents should be able to utilize anti-SLAPP
protections is a muddle, leaving the lower courts to struggle with the
impossible conundrum of deciphering when government speech should
be treated like the exercise of a First Amendment right.
Even more disconcerting is the predicament left for concerned
prospective citizen litigants who might contemplate challenging
perceived government wrongdoing. Because courts already struggle to
decide when an anti-SLAPP statute applies to protect private actors, the
indefinite judicial treatment of government actors makes it impossible
for the public interest litigant to determine when government might avail
itself of anti-SLAPP protection and obtain early termination and a fee
award and other sanctions against the concerned citizen. The cautious
litigant will likely shrink from bringing suit, and careful attorneys will
counsel such caution.
To every constitutional law student, it is familiar ground in assessing
conflicts between the individual and the State that different balancing
considerations apply depending upon what is placed upon each side of
the constitutional scale. It is one thing to balance
individual
constitutional rights. It is another to balance a government interest
against a constitutional right429 even where the government interest is one
of bolstering a private right. These involve entirely different
constitutional analyses. Anti-SLAPP statutes were supposed to engage
in the former weighing, not the latter. Forgetting this and treating a
government interest on the same par as a paramount constitutional right
leads to results that do not comport with either the objectives of antiSLAPP statutes or of the First Amendment. California courts - confused
by the government speech doctrine – became sidetracked. They

429
And this depends in turn upon whether the importance of the government interest and
whether it directly or indirectly impinges upon an individual constitutional right.
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mistakenly treated government speech on a par with a constitutional
right. They have been employing the wrong analysis for years in spite of
the intent and language of §425.16 and in spite of very clear directives
from the United States Supreme Court as to how to weigh state interests
against First Amendment rights.
Where general petition rights are involved and no First
Amendment rights appear upon the other side of the scale, the antiSLAPP second prong standard (lack of probable cause) does not apply
any more than the first prong applies (that the basis for the lawsuit arises
from First Amendment activity). Noerr-Pennington immunity is the
proper standard, requiring a defendant demonstrate both that the suit is
objectively so utterly without merit that no reasonable litigant would
have brought it and that it was not brought for a genuine purpose in order
for the defendant to trump the petition right.
In view of public policy encouraging and rewarding public interest
litigation, and in protecting petition rights from being chilled, there is no
support for the proposition that anti-SLAPP statutes were enacted to
impose early termination, let alone, a fee-shifting scheme awarding fees
against unsuccessful public interest litigants differing from the approach
that has prevailed since Christiansburg. Imputing to state legislatures a
prerogative of promoting petitioning by rewarding citizens who succeed
in advancing an important public interest through litigation, but
punishing efforts that fail, runs counter to the objectives of anti-SLAPP
statutes, common sense and the judicial decisions considering and
construing statutes designed to promote civil rights and public interest
litigation.
Such a scheme would ultimately discourage such socially beneficial
litigation. It would undermine and defeat the value of the Petition right
as a device for holding government accountable and achieving needed
social change. Nevertheless, the courts in a few jurisdictions,
particularly in California, have accepted the view that protections for
government speech trump the petition rights of private citizens.
The trumpet has sounded for government agencies to charge ahead
with use of anti-SLAPP statutes to stamp out troublesome citizen legal
challenges to government action. Counsel for government agencies
herald the Vargas decisions as providing “a powerful tool” “in
California’s anti-SLAPP statute”.430

430

David Urban, Anti-Slapp Motions As A Litigation Resource For Public Employers,
PUBLIC
AGENCY
LABOR
EMPLOYMENT
BLOG
(Feb.
24,
2012),
CALIFORNIA
www.calpublicagencylaboremploymentblog.com/first-amendment/anti-slapp-motions-as-a-litigation
-resource-for-public-employers/.
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Unfortunately, with a suboptimal judicial rejection of the
constitutional problems presented in Vargas II, in the event the state’s
supreme court fails to alter this course when it considers the issue in City
of Montebello v. Vasquez,431 it may be left to California’s legislative
branch to re-tailor the state’s statute in order to avoid this irony and
preclude government from using anti-SLAPP procedures to burden
private litigants who challenge government conduct. It is time for the
California legislature and other legislatures to revisit that problem. It is
time to prevent anti-SLAPP statutes from being used to undermine their
very purpose in protecting participatory First Amendment activity.

431

Supra, p. 203.
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